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Abstract
The processing and exchange of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) has become an increas-
ingly important topic in recent years. This trend can be attributed to various factors.
On the one hand, the exchange of information offers great potential to strengthen the
knowledge base of companies and thus improve their protection against cyber threats.
On the other hand, legislators in various countries have recognized this potential and
translated it into legal reporting requirements. However, CTI is still a very young research
area with only a small body of literature. Hence, there are hardly any guidelines, uniform
standards, or specifications that define or support such an exchange. This dissertation
addresses the problem by reviewing the methodological foundations for the exchange
of threat intelligence in three focal areas. First, the underlying data formats and data
structures are analyzed, and the basic methods and models are developed. In the further
course of the work, possibilities for integrating humans into the analysis process of
security incidents and into the generation of CTI are investigated. The final part of the
work examines possible obstacles in the exchange of CTI. Both the legal environment
and mechanisms to create incentives for an exchange are studied. This work thus creates
a solid basis and a structured framework for the cooperative use of CTI.
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1. INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Information technology (IT) has advanced into nearly all areas of life in recent years and
has become an indispensable part of our daily lives. It has also become a driver of growth
and a key technology for companies and institutions, making a significant contribution
to secure their competitiveness. With the widespread use and increasing importance of
IT, it is also continuously becoming a target of cybercrime. The attacks are growing
in their complexity and intensity, and sometimes cause immense damage [17]. A wide
variety of scenarios can be observed, ranging from data theft to ransom and sabotage.
The threat situation described is particularly problematic if the attacks affect critical
infrastructures. These are systems and assets fundamental to the functioning of society
and whose disruption or failure could have dramatic consequences for public order and
human security [6].
In order to ensure protection against the dangers of cybercrime, a variety of methods
and approaches have been developed and published in recent years. This includes a
large number of possible measures to detect and prevent future attacks as well as defend
and mitigate the impacts of damaging events that have already occurred. The arsenal of
countermeasures ranges from access control procedures and firewalls to the detection of
attacks and emergency recovery plans. These traditional approaches, however, often work
with an insufficient and isolated knowledge base; they only provide reliable protection
against threats which are already known [26]. As a result, there is often little protection
against or situational awareness of current threats, and defensive mechanisms can often
only be initiated reactively.
The problems outlined above have also been recognized by companies and nation states
[23]. As a result, there is a recent trend toward collaboration in the defense against
cyber threats. For example, the first collaborative projects have already emerged between
companies to jointly increase their security level by exchanging information on security
incidents and threats1,2. Approaches involving the exchange of information on threats
are also encouraged and supported by different governments. More specifically, various
laws have been passed in this regard, such as the IT Security Act in Germany [7] and the
NIS Directive 2016/1148 in the European Union [10]. These regulations define a number
of reporting obligations in cases of suspected and actual damage, mostly in connection
with critical infrastructures. Apart from its practical relevance, the beneficial effects of
the exchange of information are widely recognized within scientific literature and have
been discussed in various publications [28, 21, 4].
At the center of information exchange for cooperative security are the data structures
which allow identified threats to be stored and transported. In the literature, this is
commonly referred to as Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). Although there is no uniform
and sharp definition of CTI to date, a work by the Bank of England from 2016 provides a
good starting point. Following this, CTI can be considered as "information about threats
1https://www.allianz-fuer-cybersicherheit.de
2https://www.blocklist.de
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and threat actors that provides a sufficient understanding of the containment of harmful
events" [2]. Chantzios et al. [5] go one step further and specify existing definitions by
describing CTI as something that goes beyond the mere description of data structures
that represent threats. According to this work, CTI allows the description of a process
representing the entire lifecycle of information processing that leads to an understanding
of threat situations. This process includes the identification of data sources, the acquisition
of data, the analysis of acquired data, their exchange, and a final review of continuous
improvement of the process, and it is outlined in Figure 1. With the processing and
exchange of CTI, several positive effects can be achieved. These include, for example,
a higher situational awareness of those involved, a deeper knowledge of threats, and
improved defense capabilities.
Figure 1: CTI lifecycle according to Chantzios et al. [5]
While CTI is a promising technology for increasing the level of protection, it never-
theless remains a very young field of research. As a result, its usage is accompanied by
various challenges and problems of implementation. A major obstacle in the exchange
of information is already apparent in the structuring of CTI. Existing approaches often
differ greatly from each other, suffer from incompatibilities, or demand a commitment to
proprietary software. In addition, existing data structures often only support low-level
information, while information on a semantically higher level cannot be represented. The
inclusion of human knowledge is also a major problem in this context. Although employ-
ees may possess valuable operational and strategic knowledge, the interaction of human
beings with the CTI lifecycle has hardly been investigated so far. Moreover, exchanging
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information is always connected to balancing the costs against the benefits for companies,
which can lead to information not being exchanged. Despite being well-known and highly
relevant for companies owing to legal requirements, solution approaches have hardly been
discussed in the literature so far. In this field of tension, the goal of this dissertation is to
address the problems described above and clarify important fundamental questions in the
field of threat intelligence processing and exchange. For this purpose, the research carried
out first examines the structuring possibilities of CTI. As a result, important findings are
provided that contribute to increasing compatibility in the exchange and to developing
a better understanding of the information among the participants. Building on this, the
possibilities of human interaction with this structured information are investigated. This
creates the basis for introducing contextual information into automated analysis processes
and thus considerably increasing the meaningfulness of the information. Based on these
findings, the dissertation finally proposes approaches to create incentives for the exchange
in the context of legally compliant reporting, thus laying the foundation for a sustainable
exchange.
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2 Research Questions
The exchange of threat intelligence is still a relatively young and barely researched
discipline in science. As a result, various problems, obstacles, and uncertainties can
be expected in its utilization. The central aspect of an exchange is the content of the
information to be transmitted. Only if the transmission is carried out in a uniform,
comprehensible, and meaningful form can the recipient make use of it. The scope and
complexity of CTI raises another problem. In order to be able to generate a benefit from
transmitted data, uniform access must be provided to evaluate the information contained
therein. In addition, such an exchange is associated with high costs and various legal
requirements. Legal reporting obligations must be complied with and legal requirements
for data protection must be taken into account. These factors and problems lead to the
central research question (RQ) for this dissertation:
RQ: How can Cyber Threat Intelligence be harnessed through a structured
exchange while overcoming exchange barriers?
This central research question is broken down and answered through six partial research
questions across three research areas. In the first area, possibilities for the structured
presentation of CTI are examined. Based on this, the second area examines the pos-
sibilities for involving individuals in the CTI operating process. Finally, in the third
area, possibilities for counteracting potential obstacles that may impede an exchange are
examined.
Structured representation of CTI
The first focus area of this work is the challenge of how CTI can be stored, represented,
and exchanged in a structured way. This is an essential factor for developing a common
understanding and further processing of the content. In practice, various exchange formats
and data structures already exist, such as Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)
[3], Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)3, Vocabulary for Event
Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS)4, and Malware Information Sharing Platform
and Threat Sharing (MISP) [27]. Although these data formats have been developed
largely independent of each other by different actors, all of them pursue the general goal
of providing comprehensive information about threats and incidents. Due to their origin
in different use cases and requirements, however, the underlying data structures often
differ considerably. They are already used to a limited extent in the security operations of
some companies and organizations. Because different data formats are used in different
versions, the exchange of data across company boundaries often poses a big challenge.
In the literature, studies have described some of these data formats in detail, including
the works of [25], [1], and [12]. However, in-depth analyses and qualitative comparisons
3https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5070
4http://veriscommunity.net/
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of these formats have not been carried out yet. This problem leads to the first partial
research question RQ1.
RQ1: How can CTI exchange formats be described and compared struc-
turally and qualitatively?
A further problem in this context arises from the differences between the individual data
formats. These are often the result of different requirements and different use cases
which lead to significant differences in syntax and semantics. Owing to these significant
differences in their characteristics, the data formats are often incompatible, making cross-
format data exchange very difficult. This problem leads to the second partial research
question RQ2.
RQ2: Which essential characteristics define CTI exchange formats and how
can they be standardized?
Integration of human beings in CTI processing
The second focal area of this dissertation is to provide individuals with access to the infor-
mation exchanged. Existing data formats usually use extensive serialization mechanisms
based on XML or JSON. These are generally not accessible for humans, especially if they
contain large amounts of data. Besides, the automated evaluation of threat information
quickly reaches its limits when the data to be analyzed is too extensive. In such cases, a
subsequent analysis by security experts is often indispensable. This requirement results
in the partial research question RQ3.
RQ3: How can experts be integrated into a CTI analysis and exchange
process?
In addition to dedicated analyses by security experts, the creation of a human-machine
interface for CTI opens up further opportunities. It also results in a great potential in the
area of data acquisition. Existing systems typically rely on the automatic collection and
analysis of threat intelligence from log files. With the integration of human actors and
their knowledge into the acquisition process, there is the potential to extend the scope
of existing CTI significantly. These considerations result in the partial research question
RQ4.
RQ4: How can employees with different knowledge levels be integrated into
the CTI exchange process?
Overcoming obstacles in CTI exchange
The third focal area of the work deals with possibilities to overcome potential obstacles in
the exchange of threat intelligence. Such exchanges are subject to legislation in different
countries which must be taken into account. This includes reporting obligations such
as those stipulated by the German IT security (ITSiG) law on the one hand and data
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protection requirements, for example, as defined by the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) on the other hand. These requirements and the resulting obstacles
lead to the partial research question RQ5.
RQ5: How can reporting obligations be fulfilled using CTI while complying
with applicable legislation?
In addition to possible obstacles due to the legal requirements, companies may also face
certain disadvantages and problems which arise from an exchange. Specifically, the
analysis and exchange of information about security incidents results in high costs, such
as through the provision of the necessary infrastructure and the corresponding specialist
personnel. Furthermore, an exchange always involves the risk of data leakage, which
could result in further costs. This may lead to a situation where companies are only
interested in passive participation in the exchange, as the risks of an active exchange may
be considered disproportionate. This problem leads to the partial research question RQ6.
RQ6: How can the exchange of CTI be incentivized?
Overall, the answers to the partial research questions RQ1-RQ6 and thus, to the central
research question RQ are intended to provide the scientific basis for an exchange of threat
intelligence. This dissertation therefore provides the necessary tools for the analysis
and evaluation of CTI data structures, the development of interfaces for humans to this
technology, and the minimization of possible obstacles in its use.
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3 Research Methodology
The previously defined research questions are answered in this dissertation with the use of
established research methods from the field of Wirtschaftsinformatik. For the purpose, this
section first classifies the research area of Wirtschaftsinformatik and important research
methods. Building on this, the applied research methodology is presented and the specific
application within this work is discussed.
The discipline of Wirtschaftsinformatik is often translated as "business and informa-
tion systems engineering," but the actual equivalent in the Anglo-Saxon world is the field
of "information systems research." Here, the two main research paradigms "behavioral
science" and "design science research" are applied [18]. Behavioral science has its
origins in the natural sciences. It mainly studies the explanation and prediction of phe-
nomena in the areas of analysis, design, implementation, and management of information
systems. The goal is to inform researchers and practitioners about interactions among
people, technology, and organizations to find out the "truth" about IT systems. This is
meant to ensure that IT systems can fulfill their purpose of increasing the efficiency of
organizations [13]. The approach of design science research, on the other hand, has its
roots in the field of engineering and fundamentally describes a problem-solving paradigm.
In this context, innovations should be generated on the basis of ideas, practices, technical
skills, or products to enable the efficient use of information systems. Specifically, existing
theories are applied, tested, modified, and extended to create artifacts. These are then
used to understand and solve problems [13]. The two research paradigms of information
systems research are used differently in the scientific community. While behavioral sci-
ence is the predominant research paradigm in the Anglo-Saxon community, the German
research community is more design-oriented [18]. Consequently, this dissertation is also
significantly influenced by the design science paradigm. More precisely, the work follows
the basic guidelines for design science as put forward by Hevner et al. [13] as well as
the methodological framework for design science proposed by Peffers et al. [19]. In
the following, the applied approaches are described in more detail with reference to the
contents of this work. According to Hevner et al., the fundamental principle of design
science research is to develop and apply an artifact to solve a problem [13]. The goal is to
create an understanding of and knowledge about a design problem and to solve it. Based
on this idea, Hevner et al. propose the following seven guidelines for design science
research [13].
Guideline 1. Design as an artifact
A central requirement for design science research is the creation of a useful and feasible
artifact to solve an important organizational problem. According to Hevner et al., artifacts
are defined as constructs, models, methods, or instantiations. They can manifest as
abstractions, representations, models, methods, algorithms, or specific practices. Such
artifacts are developed for each research question of this work’s three focal areas. Each
should contribute to the solution of the respective sub-problem and address the central
research question in its entirety. In order to ensure the usefulness of the artifacts developed,
Dissertation Florian Menges, 2020
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each of the focal areas of the work sets its own development focus. For example, questions
related to the representation of CTI are primarily answered by constructs, models, and
methods, while the integration of the human component and the addressing of exchange
obstacles are addressed by models and instantiations.
Guideline 2. Problem relevance
A further requirement in design science research is to develop technology-based solutions
that are important and relevant for previously unsolved business problems. The disser-
tation deals mainly with research questions from the relatively young research field of
threat intelligence sharing, which has become increasingly important in recent years [22].
The problems addressed may have already been identified as relevant in the literature,
show practical relevance in the business environment, or can be justified by the current
legislation. The relevance of the addressed problems and research questions is described
in detail in each of the research papers.
Guideline 3. Design evaluation
The design evaluation guidelines provide for the evaluation of the developed artifact
in terms of utility, quality, and effectiveness. The evaluation is to be performed using
established procedures and methods. The research papers produced in the course of this
work each contain dedicated evaluations of the results obtained. Different evaluation
methods were used, ranging from observational to analytical and descriptive. In addition
to the evaluations, the individual papers contain justifications for the selection of the
method used.
Guideline 4. Research contributions
Design science research tackles the question of what new and interesting contributions
could be made. A contribution can be the artifact itself, but it could also be an extension
to the knowledge base or an evaluation methodology. In the context of this dissertation,
several artifacts are provided as separate contributions — for example in the form of
prototypical applications. In addition, several contributions to the knowledge base are
made. This includes, for example, new findings in the area of CTI data formats and an
evaluation methodology for CTI data formats.
Guideline 5. Research rigor
Another essential part of design science research is the application of strict rules to the
construction and the evaluation of the developed artifact. It is important to apply the
available knowledge proficiently to create and evaluate an artifact using suitable methods.
The publications resulting from this work rely strictly on the available knowledge base
from the literature for the development of concepts, methods, and prototypes. For the
results obtained in this process, appropriate evaluation procedures are carefully selected
and applied.
Guideline 6. Design as a search process
Design can be described as a process for efficient problem-solving, taking into account
available resources, pursued objectives, and environmental conditions. Existing problems
Dissertation Florian Menges, 2020
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Figure 2: Process model according to Peffers et al. [19]
are often simplified or subdivided into sub-problems by reducing them to sub-areas,
which was also consistently pursued in this dissertation. The identified overall problem
is defined as a research question and split into three focal areas. Within these areas, the
individual research questions are covered by publications, which in turn are divided into
sub-problems. The solution of the defined sub-problems should finally lead to the solution
of the formulated overall problem.
Guideline 7. Communication of research
Research results from design science research are to be presented to both technology- and
management-oriented audiences. Technical presentations should highlight the advantages
of the artifact, the possibilities for expanding the scientific knowledge base, and the envi-
ronmental conditions under which the artifact was created. Management presentations,
on the other hand, should convey how an artifact can be used in organizational contexts.
The papers produced in the context of this dissertation offer extensive information for a
technical audience, while also addressing organizational applications where possible. All
resulting papers have been submitted or published in scientific journals and conferences.
The results have also been directly incorporated into the DINGfest research project5. Thus,
the research results are made accessible to a broad technically and management-oriented
audience.
The guidelines of Hevner et al. presented here describe the characteristics of well-
performed research and form the methodological foundation of this work. The applied
research process is based on these characteristics and follows the design science research
methodology and process model proposed by Peffers et al. [19]. Figure 2 outlines the
essential components of this process model which consists of six activities and four
possible entry points.
The research process begins in the first step with the identification of the problem and
the motivation. Here, the relevance of the presented problem as well as the necessity and
benefits of the solution are clarified. In the second step, specific goals for a solution are
defined. It either describes how a solution improves the state-of-the-art or how a new
5https://dingfest.ur.de
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artifact can contribute to the solution. The third step describes the design and development
of an artifact including the actual research contribution. After the artifact has been created,
the fourth step shows that it can solve one or more instances of the defined problem. On
this basis, an evaluation of the results can be performed in the fifth step. In doing so, it
can be observed or measured how well the artifact actually supports the solution to the
addressed problem. Finally, in the sixth step, the results of the research are communicated.
For this purpose, the problem and its relevance, benefits, novelty, design stringency,
and efficiency of the solution are communicated to researchers and other relevant target
groups. Since the process model is not built in a continuously linear fashion, it allows the
return to previous process steps and thus the multiple execution of process steps.
The model also provides possible entry points into the first four phases of the model.
Due to the problem-oriented structure of the publications within this dissertation, the
entry points are essentially located at process step 1. In the following chapter, the specific
research results of the individual works are presented.
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4 Results
4.1 Overview of Research Papers
The research questions posed in Section 2 were answered by a total of six research papers
which were published together with this dissertation according to the guidelines and
procedure model described in Section 3. To ensure that the results could be communicated
to a suitable specialist audience, all the papers have been submitted to renowned specialist
journals and conferences in the fields of IT security and information systems. An overview
of the individual research papers produced in this context can be found in Table 1. It shows
the six research papers listed in the order of the corresponding research questions outlined
in Section 2. Each paper is directly assigned to the respective research questions RQ1-
RQ6 by their numbering P1-P6. However, the order does not reflect the chronological
publication dates of the articles. In addition to the numbering assignments, the table
presents the full citation and the current submission status of the article. Moreover, the
type of each article is specified, indicating whether the contribution was submitted for
publication at a conference (C) or in a journal (J). At the time of writing the dissertation,
Papers 1-4 have been accepted and published, while Papers P5 and P6 are currently still
subject to a review process. The complete papers, more detailed information on the
submissions, and the proportion of contribution by the authors to the respective articles
are provided in Part II of this dissertation.
No. Publication Status Type
P1 Menges, F. and Pernul, G. A comparative analysis of
incident reportingformats. In: Computers & Security
73, 87–101 (2018).
published J
P2 Menges, F., Sperl, C., and Pernul, G. Unifying cyber
threat intelligence. In: Trust, Privacy and Security in
Digital Business, TrustBus. LNCS, vol. 11711, pp.
161–175. Springer, Cham (2019)
published C
P3 Böhm, F., Menges, F., and Pernul, G. Graph-based vi-
sual analytics for cyber threat intelligence. In: Cyberse-
curity 1, 16 (2018).
published J
P4 Vielberth, M., Menges, F., and Pernul, G. Human-as-
a-security-sensor for harvesting threat intelligence. In:
Cybersecurity 2, 23 (2019).
published J
P5 Menges, F., Latzo, T., Vielberth, M., Sobola, S., C.
Pöhls, H., Taubmann, B., Köstler, J., Puchta, A., Freil-
ing, F., Reiser, H. P., and Pernul, G. Towards GDPR-
compliant data processing in modern SIEM Systems.
Computers & Security (2020)
under review J
P6 Menges, F., Putz, B., and Pernul, G. DEALER: Decen-
tralized Incentives for Threat Intelligence Reporting and
Exchange, International Journal of Information Secu-
rity (2020)
under review J
Table 1: Overview of research papers within this dissertation
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As shown in Section 2, the dissertation consists of three consecutive topics. Figure
3 gives a graphical overview of the main topics and the categorization of the individual
research papers within these topics.
Paper 2Paper 1
Paper 4Paper 3
Paper 6Paper 5
Structured representation of CTI
Integration of human 
beings in CTI processing
Overcoming obstacles in 
CTI exchange
Research Area Contribution
Figure 3: Overview of research papers and corresponding research areas
The foundation for this dissertation is formed through the investigation of possibilities
for the structured representation of CTI with papers P1 and P2. Building on this, the
second focal area of the work is the creation of interfaces for humans to access the
structured CTI. To achieve this, the integration possibilities of domain experts as well as
of employees without IT security knowledge are examined in papers P3 and P4. On the
basis of this preliminary work, the final phase of the research examines how obstacles
in the exchange of threat intelligence information can be overcome. More specifically,
legal implications for CTI exchange procedures and possibilities for creating reporting
incentives are examined in papers P5 and P6. The results of the individual research areas
are presented in detail below.
4.2 Structured Representation of CTI
At the center of any exchange of threat intelligence are the data structures used to store
and transmit the information. Their specific properties, such as syntax, semantics, and
unambiguousness of the contents or machine readability, are essential influencing factors
for the usability of the data as well as its comprehensibility in the context of an exchange.
The compatibility of different data structures with each other is also a necessary condition
for any exchange process. For these reasons, it is essential that the data formats and data
structures used in an exchange are known, well-investigated, uniform, and understandable
for all participants. In order to provide such a methodical foundation, the first focus
of this work is to analyze existing CTI data structures and investigate the potential for
standardizing existing data formats.
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P1: A comparative analysis of incident reporting formats
Paper P1 of this dissertation describes the structural foundations of CTI data structures
and creates an evaluation basis for the components of threat intelligence. The result of
this work serves to answer research question RQ1 (see Section 2) and shows how CTI
exchange formats can be described and compared structurally as well as qualitatively.
An essential problem in the investigation of CTI data structures is that different data
formats are used for different application purposes. These range from data formats which
represent vulnerabilities and formats for data exchange between intrusion detection and
prevention systems to formats for the representation of complex attacks and security
incidents. In addition, the data structures used, even if the same application purpose is
pursued, sometimes differ significantly in syntax, semantics, and scope.
In order to enable the classification and comparability of threat intelligence data
formats, a multi-layered approach was followed in this paper. First, the most important
CTI data formats were identified, described, and classified. This made it possible to
establish a distinction to other IT security-related data formats. On this basis, in a second
step, essential features of the identified data formats were determined, translated into
models, and the criteria for qualitative comparisons were derived. In the final step, these
tools were used to perform a structural and qualitative comparison of the exchange formats.
The initial classification of existing CTI data structures was carried out in this work by
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Figure 4: Incident detection process based on Paper P1
identifying essential data types within an analysis process of security incidents. Individual
data formats within the data analysis were identified and translated into a process. The
process is outlined in Figure 4 and provides an overview of the development of CTI data
structures along the data analysis process. The process shows how unstructured raw data
is first acquired and converted into structured CTI data. The process comprises several
stages, beginning with the transfer of the raw data into partially structured actionable
observables, through the detection of indications of security incidents, to the transfer of
the information into fully structured CTI incident data. Enrichments using enumeration
objects, which can avoid ambiguities in the information exchanged, are also taken into
account within the process.
Based on these data structures, the next step of this work was to develop a pattern for
the generic representation of incident data structures. The resulting Universal pattern for
structured incident exchange (UPSIDE) shown in Figure 5 represents the essential CTI
data points on an object level.
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Figure 5: Universal pattern for structured incident exchange based on Paper P1
The starting point for this model was the existing scientific basis for CTI data formats
from the literature and established data formats from practice. Existing data formats
generally use nested XML or JSON data structures for data handling. In order to enable
an accurate representation of the data formats, a nested representation was also chosen
for the creation of the UPSIDE model. The model illustrates the relationship shown
in the process model — namely, that an incident object is composed of different indi-
cators. Indicators, in turn, transport the actual user data about the represented security
incident. This contains detailed information about the attacker involved, the attack, and
the methods used. In addition to indicators, information about the behavior and possible
countermeasures of the defender can be transported. Based on these findings, various
criteria for comparing CTI data formats were developed in the next step. On the one hand,
these include structural criteria resulting from the models presented. On the other hand,
qualitative criteria were developed which could be derived from literature, practice, and
the characteristics of existing data formats. Finally, a comparison of the most important
CTI data formats was carried out using the criteria determined here, thus providing a
comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art in CTI. With this analysis, the different
strengths and weaknesses of the analyzed data formats could be revealed. It turned out
that the STIX data format currently offers the most extensive representation possibilities,
while soft criteria such as extensibility showed a mixed picture.
Contribution of P1:
In summary, this work provided the basis for the identification, description, and compari-
son of CTI data structures. It was possible to classify the corresponding data structures
within the analysis process and to develop a pattern for a generic description of threat
intelligence. In addition, criteria were developed for comparing CTI data formats. The
application of these criteria has finally made it possible to compare the state-of-the-art
data formats.
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P2: Unifying Cyber Threat Intelligence
The comparability of CTI data structures has been established using Paper P1. Next,
Paper P2 focuses on the exploration of potentials for the standardization of these data
structures. While Paper P1 considers CTI data structures on the object and data format
level, Paper P2 examines data formats on the attribute and data type level. It describes the
structural properties of CTI exchange formats in detail and presents a methodology for
their standardization to address the research question RQ2 (see Section 4.2).
A major problem in the exchange of CTI is that different organizations and companies
have already integrated selected data formats into their processes and operational use.
This includes data formats such as STIX, IODEF, and VERIS, which are used for the
structured storage of CTI and have become widely used in recent years. To complicate
the situation even more, these data formats are often used in different versions in practice.
As a result of these differing data structures, an exchange across company boundaries is
often difficult or even not possible at all.
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Figure 6: CTI meta model based on Paper P2
This paper addresses the question of how such incompatibilities can be overcome
by creating a uniform data structure for the exchange. To make this possible, first an
in-depth investigation of the components within CTI data structures based on the results
of Paper P1 is carried out. In contrast to P1, where the focus was on the description of
CTI entities at the object level, P2 considers CTI data formats at the structural level. In
order to provide a complete and detailed picture of CTI data structures, the relationships
and attributes included are examined in detail. To achieve this structural view, a CTI
meta model was developed in this paper. It represents the characteristics of CTI data
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structures and serves as a starting point for a standardization of different data formats.
The model is based on findings from the literature on the one hand and on properties of
data formats from practice on the other. From a methodological perspective, it is based
on the abstraction concepts for the creation of meta models as per Sprinkle et. al. [24]
and is shown in Figure 6.
The model represents the possible structural relationships among objects, relations,
and attributes within CTI exchange formats. The three main CTI entity classifications —
indicator, intelligence and attribution have been translated into specific objects within
the model. In addition, the essential attribute types — attribute, enumeration and
scoring system — were identified and assigned to the individual objects within the
model. Furthermore, the model provides information on possible relationships between
the individual entities of the model. The structural properties of CTI data formats
presented here are intended to ensure re-usability of the results on the one hand and to
leave no room for interpretation when investigating CTI data formats on the other.
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Figure 7: Unified CTI data model based on Paper P2
In addition to the meta model, a methodology for the standardization of CTI entity
types was also developed in this work. For this purpose, a set of rules was defined which
allows to convert CTI data formats into a uniform and reproducible notation. In this
process, the essential CTI entity types were identified from the state-of-the-art CTI data
formats and converted into a uniform notation with the help of the rule set.
In the last step of the work, the knowledge gained from the previously developed
meta model and the unified CTI notation was used to develop a unified CTI data model.
The model is designed as an entity relationship model and shown in Figure 7.
The model integrates all CTI entity types identified in the course of this work and
labels each of them using the unified notation. In addition, the previously defined classi-
fications of attribution, intelligence, and indicator were introduced as separate layers
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within the data model. They allow the assignment of individual CTI entities to classifi-
cations defined within the meta model. In the next step, each of the standardized entity
types were integrated into the model. To preserve the expressiveness of the underlying
data formats, all available entity relations were also integrated into the model. Finally,
the included entities were extended by available complex attributes. These were extracted
from the corresponding entities within the underlying data formats. As a result, this
provides an overview of the structuring possibilities of the data formats and uncovers
possible structural weaknesses.
Contribution of P2:
With this work, a central definition for the essential attributes and properties of CTI
data formats was created which allows the merging of data formats on the data type
level. In addition, a set of rules was defined that enables existing notations and entity
types to be standardized. These tools allowed the state-of-the-art data formats to be
converted into a unified CTI data format. This allowed the functionality of the approach
to be demonstrated and contributed to the identification of possible weaknesses of the
underlying data formats.
4.3 Integration of human beings in CTI processing
After the previous section has provided the necessary fundamentals for the description
of threat intelligence, the second focal area of the dissertation addresses the practical
use of CTI information. Existing data formats offer a solid tool set for the structured
description and storage of information. However, the included data is often complex and
only available in data formats that primarily focus on the use case of machine processing.
These are usually difficult to access for humans, particularly in the case of extensive data
sets. However, since the human factor is an essential component of successful incident
detection, analysis, and response, this section examines ways of efficiently integrating
humans into the process. Specifically, two different perspectives are considered in this
work. While Paper P3 examines the integration of domain experts into the analysis
process, Paper P4 investigates possibilities for integrating employees without special
security knowledge.
P3: Graph-based visual analytics for cyber threat intelligence
In the area of the integration of human beings in the handling of CTI, Paper P3 first looks
at ways of involving security experts and thus directly addresses the research question
RQ3 (see Section 2). For this purpose, the paper demonstrates how complex CTI data
can be stored, processed, and made accessible to security experts. A major problem in
the management of threat intelligence is the way in which the information is provided.
Usually XML or JSON serializations are used which were primarily designed for machine
processing. However, especially large amounts of data often lead to very low human
readability and are therefore of limited use to security experts. This is problematic since
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security experts play a key role in incident detection and handling, and their success is
critically dependent on the available information base. Therefore, the main objective of
this paper is to provide experts with access to intelligence on threats, thus enabling the
integration of expert knowledge into the analysis process. At the same time, interactions
with CTI data lead to the additional requirement of ensuring the integrity of the underlying
data and tracking changes. This is important to allow the data to be used as evidence after
interactions with experts — for example, in subsequent court cases. In order to enable
such an integrity-protected integration of expert knowledge, the knowledge-assisted visual
analytics (KAVAS) approach for STIX was developed with this paper.
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Figure 8: KAVAS persistence mechanism based on Paper P3
KAVAS consists of two essential components. On the one hand, it allows to persist
threat intelligence data within a graph database and to ensure the data integrity. On the
other, hand it provides a visualization concept which allows interaction with the data and
knowledge exchange with the system. The concept was finally evaluated by an analyst
survey and several expert interviews. The basis for the data storage within KAVAS is a
concept for integrity-secured persistence of threat intelligence data by means of a graph
database. The data format STIX was chosen for the implementation because it is the most
widely used data format in the field of CTI [22]. A STIX dataset essentially contains
three object types — Bundle, STIX Relationship Objects (SRO), and STIX Domain
Objects (SDO). While the bundle object encloses the data set, the user data is represented
by SDOs and SROs. SDOs represent threat intelligence entities and SROs link individual
SDOs.
In KAVAS, the relationships between the STIX entities are implemented in a graph
database. These are illustrated in Figure 8a. SDOs, SROs, and the bundle object are
shown as nodes in the graph. The objects in turn can be connected by physical edges in the
graph. This type of data storage allows storing a history of changes in the graph without
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affecting the integrity of the initial dataset. More specifically, changes to the dataset can be
represented by additional history nodes, as shown in Figure 8b. The base data is treated as
inventory data, which is never changed. Actual changes to SDO or SRO objects are instead
stored in history nodes and attached to the graph by adding auxiliary edges. This enables
proving and reconstructing changes in the database retrospectively. In the second step
of this work, a user interface for the STIX graph data was developed and prototypically
implemented. Figure 9 shows the user interface, which provides an interactive graph that
allows security experts direct access to the STIX data. From a methodological point of
view, the user interface follows the knowledge-assisted visualization approach of Federico
et al. [11]. The interface therefore pursues the goal of reflecting the four knowledge
conversion processes of internalization, externalization, combination and collaboration,
as shown below.
Figure 9: KAVAS user interface based on Paper P3
Internalization refers to the conversion of explicit knowledge from the database into
tacit knowledge which corresponds to the user’s understanding. To achieve internalization
of the information provided, KAVAS offers a scalable representation of the STIX graph
structure. It is based on a node-link diagram, allows interactive exploration of the dataset,
and supports different filter options. Externalization refers to the transfer of expert
knowledge into explicit knowledge within the data stock. This conversion process is
achieved in KAVAS by providing the possibility to insert additional information, such as
new nodes. The application also allows the editing of existing elements and enriching
them with additional information. Because the explicit knowledge can be linked to
existing data, combination is also available as a conversion process in KAVAS. Finally,
the collaboration process is mapped by storing the information in one central graph
database. This means that the externalized knowledge of experts is stored centrally,
making it available to all other experts who may be working on the application. To
verify the validity and usefulness of the results, the application prototype was evaluated
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in the final step of the work. For this purpose, a questionnaire-based user survey was
first conducted among IT security analysts. It was demonstrated that the approach is
of practical relevance and an appropriate tool for the analysis and processing of Threat
Intelligence information. Subsequently, additional expert interviews were conducted
to validate specific functionalities of the application. It was shown that the application
clearly contributes to the understanding of threat intelligence for the user. Furthermore, it
became clear that there is a great interest in such a tool in practice.
Contribution of P3:
In summary, this paper provided an interface for security experts to interact with threat
intelligence in the STIX data format. At the same time, the integrity-protected data
storage ensures a complete history of the database. The validity of the presented approach
and the developed prototype was finally verified by an analyst survey and different expert
interviews.
P4: Human-as-a-security-sensor for harvesting threat intelligence
Subsequent to the presented methodology for the integration of security experts in the
analysis process, the second paper in this focal area deals with integration possibilities for
individuals who have no security background. It examines how employees with different
levels of knowledge can be integrated into the analysis and exchange process of CTI and
thus it directly addresses the research question RQ4 (see Section 2).
A major difficulty in the analysis of attacks and security incidents is the acquisition
of the necessary data. The data can either be obtained iteratively as part of system
monitoring or extracted as highly detailed system snapshots for forensic processing.
Although the data acquired in this way provides valuable information about system
statuses and actions performed, the scope is usually limited to the respective system. As a
result, only predefined events on specific systems can be recorded and detected; events
outside these systems remain undetected. From a data structure perspective, this data
contains mostly information from the indicator layer; contextual information from the
attribution or intelligence layers (see Section 4.2) is not available. Contextual information,
in contrast, can usually only be obtained from appropriate experts — for example, with
the help of interfaces such as KAVAS (see Section 4.3).
To solve these problems in the data acquisition, this paper proposes a methodology for
the integration of employees in the acquisition and analysis processes. The methodology
allows persons who lack special IT security knowledge to act as human sensors and
contribute additional information to the analysis process. This integration of humans
opens up new possibilities. For example, information about security incidents can be
made available that is either not visible at all or that becomes visible only at a later point
in time when evaluating log data. In addition, humans as a data source can provide
contextual information on the attribution and intelligence layers, thus expanding the
spectrum of data acquisition. For example, attackers can be attributed, physical attacks
can be detected, and the possible effects of a security incident can be evaluated in advance.
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These insights have been utilized in this paper to develop a methodology that allows the
information provided by individuals to be used in the analysis process. To achieve this,
possible interfaces to Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) processes
were first identified and a data model was developed to cover this additional data source.
Subsequently, a CTI data structure was developed and implemented on the basis of the
STIX data format. Finally, the concept was adapted into a prototypical application that
allows the capture of human sensor data and its translation into the proposed CTI data
structure.
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Figure 10: Incident model and taxonomy based on Paper P4
In the first step of the paper, SIEM systems were investigated for possible interfaces
that allow the integration of human sensor data into the analysis flow. The push and pull
approaches were identified. The push approach is based on findings of the individual
which are actively reported to the system and supplement data from the automated data
acquisition. The pull approach, on the other hand, describes a query from system to
human to acquire additional or missing information following an analysis process. In the
second step of this work, an incident model was developed which allows the acquisition
of automated log data in combination with human sensor data. This is a central point of
the present work, as only the application of this model makes it possible to capture the
insights of individuals completely. Figure 10 gives an overview of the developed incident
model, which is described in detail below. The incident model describes four major
risk factors as process steps — threat source, threat event, entity and impact. These
are derived from the works of Juliadotter and Choo [15] as well as from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines [14]. The risk factors also serve
as essential activities within the model. Each activity was in turn subdivided into different
areas to provide a detailed picture of the possible hazards. For the design of the individual
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activities, established guidelines and taxonomies of state actors as well as those from the
scientific literature were used. Overall, the incident model represents incidents, starting
with the definition of a threat source, through threat events which have occurred and
entities which have been affected, to the impact that may be expected. It also allows the
representation of traditional attacks as well as incidents that can be reported by human
sensors, such as technical outages or disaster events.
Figure 11: Human-as-a-security-sensor wizard based on Paper P4
In the next step, the presented incident model was transferred into an extended, generic
CTI data structure that allows representing both automatically collected information from
log files and additional information from human sensors. The developed data structure is
based on a comparison between the proposed incident model and the UPSIDE presented
in Paper P1 (see Section 4.2). The comparison performed here ultimately yielded two
results. First, it was possible to determine which aspects of human sensor messages are
already describable. Second, it was possible to determine components that could not be
represented within CTI data structures. Based on these findings, necessary extensions
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for the representation of human sensor data were identified, developed, and described
within the generic data format. This, for example, includes elements for the representation
of technical, environmental, and legal events, and thus supplements the representation
possibilities of traditional attacks. The resulting generic data format was subsequently
transformed into a tangible extension for the state-of-the-art CTI data format STIX to
illustrate the practicability of the concept. In this process, the components of the generic
data format were completely adopted through additional object types as well as extensions
for the underlying threat definitions. The resulting extension to the STIX data format was
additionally published with this work.
In the last step of this paper, the findings were prototypically implemented in the
form of a reporting interface for human sensors, as shown in Figure 11. In the reporting
process, employees are guided by a wizard that maps the four process steps of the incident
model and queries the respective components of the incident model. To handle complex
security incidents, the wizard also allows capturing several elements for each process step.
Overall, the prototype allows information to be collected from the employee and recorded
in the previously defined CTI data format for further processing in a SIEM analysis
process. At the conclusion of the work, the actual benefit of the provided human sen-
sor information was evaluated using the example of different use cases within a case study.
Contribution of P4:
In summary, this work showed that employees can be integrated into the SIEM analysis
process as an additional data source. With the development of the threat model, it was
possible to establish an extended CTI data structure that allows the findings of employees
to be recorded in a structured manner. By addressing the corresponding interfaces, an
additional integration possibility in SIEM data structures was demonstrated. As a result,
better results in the detection of security incidents can be achieved and higher-quality
incident data can be generated.
4.4 Overcoming obstacles in CTI exchange
The first two focal areas of this dissertation studied data structures for the representation
of CTI and approaches for the integration of humans in the acquisition and analysis
processes. Building on this work, the last focal area sought to examine how barriers to
the exchange of CTI could be removed, thus creating a sustainable basis for information
exchange. To achieve this, Paper P5 first examined how a SIEM analysis process could
be designed in accordance with the legal requirements. Subsequently, Paper P6 explored
possibilities for creating an incentive-based CTI exchange platform in compliance with
the legal requirements.
P5: Towards GDPR-compliant data processing in modern SIEM systems
In order to remove possible obstacles in the exchange of CTI, Paper P5 first discusses
the applicable legislation. A concept for SIEM systems was developed which allows the
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processing of threat intelligence as well as the fulfillment of legal reporting obligations as
per the GDPR. For this purpose, the central SIEM processes were examined individually, a
concept for legally compliant system was presented, and then it was evaluated technically
and legally. The architecture of the research project DINGfest [16] served as the basis
for this concept. Legal requirements regarding data protection can have a significant
impact on the analysis and processing of information and thus also on work concerning
threat intelligence. For example, the European GDPR [10] introduced in 2016 and the
German Federal Data Protection Act [8] introduced in 2017 define various regulations
and restrictions regarding the handling of personal data. At the same time, the collection
and analysis of data within SIEM systems fall within the scope of privacy legislation, as
it is usually not possible to fully prevent personal data from being processed.
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Figure 12: GDPR-compliant SIEM architecture based on Paper P5
Nevertheless, the aforementioned legislations allow the processing of personal data in
combination with privacy protection procedures, such as encryption or pseudonymization.
However, the use of such methods also creates new problems. Insufficiently protected
data may lead to the risk of legal violations and excessively strong protection may lead
to analyses which provide insufficient results. Hence, there is a tradeoff between the
legally compliant protection of data and the usability of the results. In order to address
this problem, a concept for SIEM systems was presented in this work which allows an
analysis of security incidents while still being compliant with the legislation. As a starting
point, the work focused on the essential questions that must be answered in order to
develop such a system. First, it must be clarified what level of protection is necessary
for the processed data to ensure conformity with the GDPR. This leads to the second
question of whether security incidents can be detected on protected data sets and how
this affects detection rates. Furthermore, it must be clarified under which circumstances
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and in which way protected data can and may be disclosed and reported according to the
reporting obligations. To address these questions, the paper provides a comprehensive
process model for legally compliant data processing within SIEM systems in combination
with a procedure for the data analysis of protected data. Figure 12 shows the developed
concept which combines both technical and organizational measures to enable a legally
compliant analysis and the reporting of security incidents.
The concept divides the analysis functions within SIEM systems into three areas:
data acquisition, data analysis, and reporting. The data within the areas is encrypted with
key A to minimize the risk of data leakage to the external actors. In the first area, data
is recorded in a structured form and the process is logged with integrity protection. The
integrity of the protocol is ensured by storing checksums on the blockchain in accordance
with Putz et al. [20]. In addition, the data is protected with the B key, which is provided
by a trusted third party (TTP). This ensures, that no data leaves the collection process. A
data protection officer (DPO) defines a policy that ensures the proper environment for
the encryption and protection of the data. The analyses are performed using forensic
fingerprint calculation as per Dewald [9] on the encrypted data. Only when a security
incident is detected can the decryption key be requested from the TTP according to the
data protection policy. Decrypted incident information can then be converted into a struc-
tured data format and persisted in long-term storage for incident information. From there,
the data can be prepared and reported to the corresponding authority in a pseudonymized
manner. The concept presented was evaluated twofold as part of this paper. First, a
technical evaluation was carried out which shows that analyses on pseudonymized data
lead to similar results to those on raw data, regardless of the reduced data pool. Second,
a legal evaluation has shown that the proposed concept fulfils the necessary balance
between freedom rights and individual protection interests, and thus follows the directives
of the GDPR.
Contribution of P5:
In summary, this paper presented a technical and legally evaluated blueprint for GDPR-
compliant data processing within SIEM systems. The entire processing cycle, starting
with the collection of raw data via the analysis and reporting of structured CTI, was
considered. The results showed that it is possible to simultaneously process information
within the SIEM system as well as provide GDPR-compliant data protection and incident
reporting.
P6: Decentralized Incentives for Threat Intelligence Reporting and Exchange
Papers P1-P5 established the foundations for the acquisition, representation, processing,
and reporting of threat intelligence. Paper P6 addresses the exchange process and the
general conditions that need to be met for the reporting. Specifically, a decentralized plat-
form was created that allows the reporting of security incidents in an integrity-protected,
non-repudiable form and provides incentives for the exchange of threat intelligence.
In the area of exchanging and reporting threat intelligence, companies are faced with
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various areas of tension. The legislation in various countries imposes reporting obligations
for IT security incidents, especially in the area of critical infrastructures. In addition to the
costs of detection and information processing, reporting obligations also lead to various
requirements that must be fulfilled within the scope of a report. Since reporting obligations
usually serve to protect the infrastructure of the respective community, there are increased
requirements for the availability of the associated reporting infrastructure. Most reporting
obligations are also accompanied by sanctions such as fines. It is also necessary to be able
to prove that a report has been sent and that its contents are correct. This can be directly
translated into specific requirements for the integrity and non-repudiation of reports. In
addition to mandatory reports, an exchange of threat intelligence can also take place
on a voluntary basis. This could strengthen the knowledge base of companies and thus
increase the level of protection. At the same time, an exchange is also associated with
costs and risks, such as unwanted information leaks. This could lead to companies either
not actively participating in the exchange or not participating at all. For this reason, it is
also important to provide incentives for active participation in an exchange.
With Paper 6, a decentralized ecosystem based on blockchain technology was de-
veloped which aims to address the problems discussed above. The system provides
functionality for reporting security incidents and exchanging threat intelligence. During
the development of the system, both the specific requirements for a reporting process and
possibilities for creating incentives within the framework of a voluntary exchange were
taken into account. The ecosystem designed for this purpose is shown in Figure 13. It
provides an overview of the system, which is explained in detail below.
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Figure 13: Decentralized ecosystem based on Paper P6
The center of this system consists of a CTI blockchain and a distributed database.
While the actual data storage is handled by the distributed database, meta data for all
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processes are stored on the blockchain in an integrity-proof manner. The system also
takes four main groups of participants into account. These include critical infrastructure
compounds and organizations as active participants in exchange and reporting, as well
as associated institutions as recipients of reports and participants in the CTI ecosystem
as service providers. The system thus supports two main use cases: incident report and
threat intelligence exchange. As part of a report, critical infrastructure associations can
report information on security incidents to associated institutions, such as responsible
authorities. Since the metadata for reports is stored on the blockchain, it is possible to
check both the reporting activity and the integrity of the report content at any time.
Figure 14: DEALER user interface based on Paper P6
The platform also allows organizations to exchange information on security incidents
with each other. For this purpose, a decentralized marketplace was developed that allows
CTI to be offered for sale and thus provides a financial incentive for CTI exchange. To
ensure the data quality of the information exchanged, it is also stipulated that the offers
provided are checked by the associated CTI ecosystem. In addition to the separate use
cases of reporting and exchange, the platform also allows them to be linked. This allows
the CTI intended for a report to be verified and offered for sale on the internal market at
the same time, thus allowing synergy effects to be harnessed. A major focus of the work
was also to ensure a fair exchange between the individual participants. For this purpose,
possible use cases and fraud possibilities were analyzed and addressed by appropriate
processes within the platform. In the second step of the work, the Decentralized Incentives
for Threat Intelligence Reporting and Exchange platform (DEALER) was implemented
as proof of concept of the designed system. The technical basis of the system comprises
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EOS6 as the public blockchain, IPFS7 as the data storage, and a NodeJs8 application
as the decentralized user interface. Figure 14 shows the user interface of the DEALER
platform, which is briefly described below.
The application provides three main functional areas. The BUY area allows orga-
nizations to purchase incident information on the marketplace, thus implementing the
incentive-based exchange of the platform. The SELL area allows critical infrastructures
or organizations to report information on security incidents, make it available for sale,
or combine both actions. This area is used to implement previously identified reporting
requirements. Finally, the VERIFY area is available to participants of the CTI ecosystem.
Here, offered data sets can be evaluated and thus the quality of the data inventory on the
platform can be ensured. The work was concluded with an extensive evaluation of the
platform. This included an assessment of the costs associated with the use of a public
block chain, as well as the fulfilment of reporting requirements and possible security
issues.
Contribution of P6:
This paper introduced a decentralized platform for CTI reporting and exchange. On
the one hand, this created the necessary basis for fulfilling the obligation to report
security incidents in an integrity-protected and non-repudiable form. On the other hand,
the implementation of the platform on the basis of blockchain technology allowed the
creation of trustless financial incentives within the exchange process. The results of this
work provided the basis for exchanging structured CTI with third parties and making this
information available as a report.
4.5 Complementary publications
In addition to Papers P1-P6, further research has been done in connection with this
dissertation. Although the additional papers A1-A3 are not directly included in the
present dissertation, they have influenced the results presented here in various ways and
are therefore briefly presented below. Table 2 gives an overview of these papers. It shows
the full citation of the publication, its submission status, and the publication type — (C)
for conference and (J) for journal.
With Paper A1, a basic architecture for modern SIEM systems was developed and
presented at the Sicherheit 2018 conference [16]. This work served as the basis for the
architecture proposed in Paper P5 which was extended by different concepts to achieve a
GDPR-compliant SIEM system.
In Paper A2, a blockchain-based infrastructure for auditing log data was developed
and published in the journal Computers & Security [20]. The paper proposes a mechanism
to allow the integrity-protected auditing of log data. Due to the implementation of the
concept with the help of blockchain technology, a trustless operation of the auditing is
6https://eos.io/
7https://ipfs.io/
8https://nodejs.org/en/
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No. Publication Status Type
A1 Menges, F., Böhm, F., Vielberth, M., Puchta, A., Taub-
mann, B., Rakotondravony, N., and Latzo T.: Introducing
DINGfest: An architecture for next generation SIEM sys-
tems. Sicherheit 2018: 257-260 (2018)
published C
A2 Putz, B., Menges, F., and Pernul, G. A secure and au-
ditable logging infrastructure based on a permissioned
blockchain. Computers & Security 87 (2019)
published J
A3 Schlette, D., Menges, F., Baumer, T., and Pernul, G. Se-
curity Enumerations for Cyber-Physical Systems. Data
and Applications Security and Privacy XXXIV, DBSEC
(2020)
accepted for
publication
C
Table 2: Overview of complementary research papers
possible. The results of this work have also been incorporated into the outcome of Paper
P5 and allow for a provably integrity-assured data acquisition within the SIEM system.
Furthermore, an enumeration for cyber physical systems was developed in Paper
A3. This work was accepted at the DBSEC 2020 conference and is expected to be
presented and published in 2020. The work addresses the problem that common threat
intelligence methods can represent IT systems but the available tools are unsuitable for
the representation of cyber physical systems. As a result of this work, an extension for
CTI data formats for the representation of cyber physical systems was presented. This
extension builds directly on the structural basics of the Papers P1 and P2, and extends
them using components for the representation of cyber physical systems.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The field of CTI is still a relatively young discipline with a limited research corpus.
Therefore, the goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the development of the
foundations for the use of CTI in general and the exchange of CTI in particular. In
order to achieve this goal, three main foci were set in the work. First, methodological
foundations for CTI data structures and data formats were developed. In the second step,
possibilities for involving individuals with different levels of knowledge in the practical
use of CTI data structures were investigated. Finally, possible obstacles for the use and
exchange of CTI were identified and solutions were proposed to mitigate their impact.
Taken together, the goal of the work was to create the methodological and technical basis
for sustainable use and exchange of threat intelligence.
In the course of this dissertation, several essential contributions to the research area of
threat intelligence sharing were created. First, the CTI data structures, and data formats
were comprehensively analyzed. This resulted in a process model for capturing structured
incident information, a generic object model for representing threat intelligence data
structures and a meta model for describing threat intelligence data types. With the
development of these models, this dissertation provides fundamental and comprehensive
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tools for the description of threat intelligence. In this context, process models were
developed for the analysis, comparison, and standardization of threat intelligence data
formats. These represent an additional tool for a uniform exchange between parties with
heterogeneous data structures.
Besides these methodological foundations, this dissertation also examined possibili-
ties for the involvement of humans in threat intelligence work. The first result in this area
was the interactive integration of experts into the analysis process of CTI data. This opens
up the possibility to validate analysis results and enrich them with contextual knowledge.
In addition, a procedure for the integration of people without a special IT security back-
ground into the data acquisition could be conceptualized and realized. Employees act
as so-called human sensors and extend the data acquisition as an additional data source.
This makes it possible to extend the database with additional contextual information and
to provide information which would potentially not be provided by log data.
Finally, the third focal area of the dissertation covers potential barriers to the pro-
cessing and exchange of threat intelligence and provides solutions to mitigate these
barriers. First, the impact of legal requirements on the processing of personal data and
on the reporting of security incidents were examined. Subsequently, a SIEM system was
developed that allows the processing of protected personal data as well as the reporting
of detected security incidents in accordance with legal requirements. In a second step,
requirements and threats resulting from the exchange of CTI were examined in detail and
addressed by a decentralized sharing platform. The platform allows essential reporting
requirements to be met, such as integrity assurance and non-repudiation. In addition, the
platform also enables the creation of incentives for the exchange of CTI, thus offering a
counterweight to possible risks associated with the exchange of information.
In summary, this dissertation provides the methodological foundations for structuring
threat intelligence, possibilities for integrating individuals into the analysis process, and
the basis for a legally compliant and incentive-based exchange of CTI. This covers the
entire cyber threat intelligence lifecycle, right from the collection and processing of threat
intelligence, through expert analysis of the data to the incentive-based reporting and
review of identified security incidents, as outlined in Section 1.
In addition to the immediate results, various starting points for future developments
and research were identified in the course of the dissertation. It has become apparent, for
example, that the existing CTI data formats do not adequately reflect certain information,
such as impact assessments or countermeasures to security incidents. Although basic
information can be represented in most data formats, there is often considerable potential
for improvement in the respective level of detail. In addition, this work has provided
a model for the standardization of CTI data structures and thus represents an advance
toward a unified standard. However, the long-term success of such a standardization
depends largely on its implementation in practice and thus on active use.
The studies concerning the integration of humans into the analysis process provided
different starting points for future research. The expert interviews conducted have shown
that the approaches developed in this work are promising but that there is still a great
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need for further research in this area. This includes, for example, in-depth research
into the possibilities for extensive cooperative work on security incidents as well as the
consolidation of structured threat intelligence. The work on the integration of employees
as human sensors has also raised new questions in addition to the actual results of the
research. On the one hand, these include possibilities for creating incentives for active
participation on the sensor platform. On the other hand, aspects of data protection law and
implications of possible mutual accusations of employees on the human-as-a-security-
sensor platform can also serve as starting points for future work. Moreover, with the
work on the implementation of a GDPR-compliant SIEM system and the incentive-based
platform for the reporting of security incidents, a possible practical implementation of
reporting obligations and voluntary exchange was shown. However, the actual acceptance
of the procedures among employees in practice still needs to be proven.
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A B S T R A C T
Over the past few years, the number of attacks against IT systems and the resulting inci-
dents has steadily increased.To protect against these attacks, joint approaches, which include
the sharing of incident information, are increasingly gaining in importance. Several inci-
dent reporting formats build the basis for information sharing. However, it is often not clear
how to design the underlying processes and which formats would fit the specific use cases.
To close this gap, we have introduced an incident reporting process model and the generic
model UPSIDE for basic incident reporting requirements. Subsequently, we have identified
state-of-the-art incident reporting formats and used the introduced models to conduct a
comparative analysis of these formats. This analysis shows the strengths and weaknesses
of the evaluated formats and identifies the use cases for which they are suitable.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The number and complexity of IT systems as well as the
number of potential vulnerabilities compromising these systems
have been steadily growing over the last years. This growth
comes along with a likewise increasing number of potential
threats to the systems. These threats range from autono-
mous self-replicating malwares with various obfuscation
characteristics, which are not only restricted to affecting soft-
ware but also infect hardware components with highly
sophisticated targeted attacks. Altogether, this leads to a no-
ticeable increase in successful cyberattacks resulting in both
economic damage and loss of data (McAffee Corporation, 2016).
Moreover, the implications that arise from such threats are not
necessarily restricted to the IT landscape; they can also reach
entities within the physical area and therefore can, in a worst-
case scenario, even influence the critical infrastructure of a
region, country or the whole society.
In the last decade, there have been significant research and
development efforts in the area of threat intelligence. These
include activities to mitigate damage in case of already oc-
curred harm. However, it can be observed that traditional
isolated defense approaches only provide security under certain
conditions and therefore mostly do not meet the require-
ments to protect systems and infrastructures against today’s
threat landscape (Symantec Corporation, 2016). Since this can
mostly be attributed to an incomplete information basis, one
possible approach for improving the current situation and thus
the overall security of systems is the sharing of threat infor-
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mation along with cooperation between victims and authorities
(Johnson, 2003). Cooperative approaches can substantially
strengthen the information basis. Such approaches accord-
ingly allow the improvement of threat detection andmitigation
of current as well as future attacks due to the enhanced knowl-
edge of every single participant.Therefore, it can be presumed
that threat exchange technologies will prospectively develop
into one of the key cyber threat defense technologies within
companies.
Such information exchange has recently been stipulated by
law for critical infrastructure operators in various countries such
as the European Union (European Commission, 2016), Germany
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2015), and the USA (Congress of the
United States of America, 2014). The exchange of informa-
tion itself can take place between companies, CERTs, and
governmental institutions.
The key element within threat intelligence-sharing tech-
niques is the utilized data formats because they pre-define
which information would be shared.Additionally, the used data
format implicitly defines requirements for the information
density of the respective data elements. In the area of data ex-
change, the formats for an automated exchange and the
processing of information about threats and incidents are widely
anticipated (SANS Institute, 2015).
Even though there are different approaches to automated
threat intelligence-sharing, the body of literature is still quite
limited.To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive analy-
sis of data formats in use gathering all significant aspects was
performed in the past. In particular, the current versions of the
twomost important data formats, namely STIX and IODEF, have
not been adequately covered within the academic literature
yet. Owing to the increasing importance of incident report-
ing, we believe that a thorough analysis of all relevant formats
is an essential factor for future research.
Against this background, the remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the
related work in the area of incident reporting formats. In Section
3, we propose a general model for an incident reporting process
and incident reporting formats. Based on this, we provide a
comprehensive overview of contemporary available incident
reporting formats in Section 4. This is followed by the devel-
opment of criteria for the comparison of reporting formats in
Section 5. In Section 6, we provide an evaluation of the iden-
tified reporting formats that aims to support the decision
processes and the selection of an appropriate exchange format.
The paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Related work
Even though a lot of work has been done in the area of inci-
dent management and incident response in recent years, only
a handful of researchers have focused on the data structures
and processes for the exchange of security incident informa-
tion. To get a detailed picture of available work in this area,
we conducted a literature review on incident reporting and re-
porting formats. Next, we examined the available information
for each of the identified reporting formats.
ENISA (Dandurand et al., 2014; ENISA, 2013) and Kampanakis
(2014) provide descriptive overviews of the formats that can
be used in an incident reporting process.Althoughmost of these
formats do not show any practical or scientific relevance nowa-
days, they give a broad overview of the different available format
approaches. By contrast, our work identifies currently rel-
evant formats and focuses on these while still considering less
relevant formats.
Besides these descriptive works, there are some compara-
tive approaches. Fenz et al. (2008) analyze the semantic potential
of exchange standards.They provide a brief comparison based
on semantic usability, information complexity, and distribu-
tion. They also provide a synopsis of the strengths and
weaknesses for each of the examined formats.This work from
2008 mostly covers formats that have little relevance today.
However, it provides a good starting point for comparing the
current standards. Steinberger et al. (2015) analyze different
exchange standards and introduce several comparative crite-
ria. Their work provides valuable suggestions for comparing
the reporting formats, even though most of these standards
have little relevance today and the work does not specifically
focus on reporting formats. Asgarli and Burger (2016) propose
an approach that applies a quantitative comparison of the re-
porting formats by comparing the amount of classes and
properties available within a format.This approach was applied
to the first versions of STIX and IODEF. Although this type of
analysis only covers specific aspects for the reporting formats,
it provides additional informative value. In this work, we also
apply a comparative approach by focusing on the currently rel-
evant formats. Therefore, we evaluate the criteria introduced
by related work and apply them, if appropriate. Additionally,
our comparison is based on a combination of qualitative and
quantitative criteria.
Furthermore, a lot of work has been done in the area of de-
scribing incidents and their components (e.g. Howard and
Longstaff, 1998; Cichonski et al., 2012; Blackwell, 2010). However,
neither possible relationships within incident reporting formats
nor necessary adjustments for this type of use have been
covered. Similarly, there have been different suggestions for
representing an incident detection process. Such suggestions
mainly originate from incident management and response (e.g.
Prosise and Kevin, 2003; Deniz and Celikoglu, 2011; Munteanu
et al., 2014) as well as computer forensics (e.g. Freiling and
Schwittay, 2007; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Yusoff et al., 2011).This work
considers many different aspects of the incident detection
process. However, specific characteristics that enable a detec-
tion process to properly prepare contents for any information
exchange are not covered. Therefore, we consider these
characteristics.
To sum up, we want to close gaps within the related work
by proposing a general process and model for incident report-
ing, followed by an identification of today’s state-of-the-art
incident reporting formats. Thus, we analyze the properties,
strengths, and weaknesses of the identified formats.This analy-
sis is based on our general model, the methods derived from
the literature, and the newly proposed methods.
3. A general model for incident reporting
As the foundation for building a model for incident reporting
formats, the basic entities are determined in this context. Sub-
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sequently,we take a closer look at the incident detection process
and data structures within this process. Based on the deter-
mined entities and data structures,we establish a generic model
for an incident reporting format.
3.1. Basic elements of an incident reporting process
To form a basis for the development of a generic incident re-
porting model, it is necessary to start with a closer look at the
corresponding terms and definitions within the incident re-
porting process. Based on Howard and Longstaff (1998) and
Cichonski et al. (2012), the terms event, attack, indicator, and
incident in the context of the security incident reporting process
will be explained below. Following their classification, an event
is defined as observable occurrence within a system or network
that can cause a discrete change of state or in the status of a
system or device. The term attack refers to one or more such
events on a computer or network; it results in something that
is not authorized to happen. Attack consequences in turn can
either lead to an incident, which is defined as the violation or
the imminent threat of violation of computer security poli-
cies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices, or
at least, to an indicator. An indicator is defined as a sign that
signals the possible occurrence of an incident. Accordingly, an
incident represents an actual occurrence, while an indicator only
represents a possible occurrence.
3.2. Data structures in the incident detection process
Based on the above-mentioned definitions, the incident de-
tection process will be closely examined in this section. For
this purpose, the necessary steps within this process, start-
ing with collecting system events through to the detection of
an attack or incident, will be considered. In particular, the tran-
sitions between the relevant data structures will be illustrated
to create a better understanding of incident reporting.
The detection of security incidents usually begins with the
collection of events, which have to be obtained as raw data from
various heterogeneous sources such as log data from the ana-
lyzed systems, the capture of the network traffic and the states
of systems, processes or devices. Hence, the data pool for analy-
sis consists of highly heterogeneous data structures with varying
semantics. At this point, it is necessary to normalize the ob-
tained data to enable further detection and processing. This
can be achieved by using a structured mark-up format for the
representation of events as actionable observables. The ex-
amples of standardization approaches are the Cyber Observable
Expression language CybOX1 and applications such as Logstash2
that enable the transfer of log data into a structured format.
After establishing a standardized data pool, it can be ana-
lyzed to determine the indicators of possible security-relevant
occurrences from one or multiple events. The indicators can
be differentiated by indications for possible events in future
(precursors), indications for a possible compromise of the current
system (indicators of compromise), indications for specific attacks
on the system (indicators of attack), and other security-related
information (indicators of interest) (IBM Corporation, 2015; Pirc,
2016).
Subsequently, specific incident entities can be identified by
combining the previously detected indicators with detailed
analyses. Depending on the data format, incidents can be en-
riched by additional information such as information about the
attacker or the affected system. In addition to the core com-
ponents of an incident detection process, enumerations can be
used to arrive at a common understanding of threats and the
involved components. Such enumerations represent unique
definitions of systems or patterns that can be attributed to the
indicators or incidents (MITRE Corporation, 2011).After the iden-
tification of a known attack pattern resulting in an incident,
the pattern can be matched with an enumeration online avail-
able such as Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC)3 and attributed to the incident.This pre-
vents misunderstanding within the detection process and can
lead to a faster incident handling. Fig. 1 shows the compo-
nents and event types within the incident detection process.
3.3. A generic model for incident reporting
After determining the basic elements and a generic process
for incident detection, the generic representation of an inci-
dent will be established in this section.The basis for this model
is the incident definitions and the incident detection process
given above. Additionally, it is necessary to take a closer look
at the actual components of an incident, which can be repre-
sented as a causal chain describing the root causes of an
incident along with the resulting effects, as shown by ENISA
(2010). A causal chain originates from an attacker or a male-
factor that can have different aims including financial profit.
An attacker performs attacks by using methods and tools that
exploit the given vulnerabilities in the target system. These
attacks are represented as actions. Finally, the results of an attack
are represented by a victimized object as well as the attack’s
unauthorized result. Moreover, the casual chain can be ex-
tended by adding a defensive category (Blackwell, 2010). All the
1 https://cyboxproject.github.io/
2 https://www.elastic.co/products/logstash
3 https://capec.mitre.org/
Fig. 1 – Incident detection process.
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components discussed are essential for a general incident re-
porting format.We have chosen an interleaved representation
(see Fig. 2), which we call UPSIDE (a Universal Pattern for Struc-
tured InciDent Exchange).We also use this model to create the
evaluation criteria for incident reporting formats in Section 5.
The base structure of UPSIDE is represented by an inci-
dent, in combination with an indicator which builds the frame
for further components. An indicator can be characterized as
a combination of information about the attacker and the attacks
performed. The attacker is basically defined by its base attri-
butes and specific objectives pursued. An attack in turn can be
specified as a combination of the observed events on the one
hand and the identified methods that use vulnerabilities to
achieve a certain result on the other hand. Events represent
a relationship between an action and an affected target in this
context, both of which represent the base structure for any de-
tection process. Finally, the section defender represents the
counterpart for an indicator, which performs reactions based
on the detection results with the objective of preventing or miti-
gating damage.
Fig. 2 illustrates that an incident is built out of indicators,
which in turn refer to specific attacks. It is shown that an attack
is always based on events that are enabled by methods and
tools that exploit vulnerabilities with a certain result. The at-
tacker entity is represented with its attributes and objectives.
Moreover, the defender entity (suggested by Blackwell (2010))
is represented with its corresponding reactions to an attack.
Consequently, this model covers all elements from the inci-
dent detection process through the active attacker and defensive
measures.
4. Incident reporting formats
As argued above, some studies on the formats for threat
intelligence-sharing can already be found in the literature.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no publica-
tion available that covers all relevant reporting formats or
examines important formats in depth.To close this gap, we give
a contemporary overview of today’s incident reporting format
landscape in this section.The data exchange formats given in
the literature cover the formats for the exchange of raw system
data, the formats for the exchange of structured event data,
the formats for sharing vulnerability information, and formats
that represent the full spectrum of incident information.
We focus on the formats for the representation of inci-
dents and thereby define an incident data structure as the
minimum requirement. Formats that do not fulfill this require-
ment, such as formats that represent only actionable
observables, are excluded. Furthermore, we constrain the de-
tailed illustrations to formats that have a certain relevance.
These are STIX, IODEF, VERIS, and X-ARF. Additionally, we
examine the two major releases of the most important formats
STIX and IODEF separately. Since these have been published
most recently, it can be assumed that their earlier versions still
show a high degree of relevance till date.
Fig. 2 – UPSIDE (a Universal Pattern for Structured InciDent Exchange).
Table 1 – Most relevant incident reporting formats.
Name Release Last Update Issuer License Serialization Validation Latest Version
STIX v.1 2012 2017/03 MITRE Corp. BSD license XML XML-schema 1.2.1
STIX v.2 2017 2017/03 Oasis CTI Oasis Open JSON JSON-schema 2.0 CSD
IODEF v.1 2007 2016/11 IETF IETF TLP XML XML-schema IODEF-SCI
IODEF v.2 2016 2016/11 IETF IETF TLP XML XML-schema 2.0
VERIS 2010 2017/02 Verizon Inc. CC BY-SA 4.0 JSON JSON-schema 1.3.1
X-ARF 2011 2016/10 abusix GmbH Open source YAML JSON-schema 0.2
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Table 1 gives a short overview of all formats that have been
examined in this paper.This includes basic information about
their first release and information about their latest updates
as a first indicator of the sustainability of the formats. More-
over, any information about the format issuer in combination
with the release license indicates possible dependencies on spe-
cific companies. In addition, information about the used
serialization as well as validation languages is outlined to high-
light the possible performance aspects of each format.
Starting from this overview, each of the formats will be in-
troduced, followed by a detailed overview of its specific
components. After the examination of the relevant formats,
formats that are classified as less relevant will be discussed
at the end of the section.This includes a brief introduction and
makes the justification for their classification as less relevant.
4.1. Major incident reporting formats
4.1.1. STIX: Structured Threat Information eXpression
(version 1)
STIX is an approach to standardize the sharing of informa-
tion relating to cyber threat intelligence in a holistic way. By
using a heavyweight XML format, in combination with an XML-
schema validation, it provides extensive incident reporting
capabilities. STIX represents the components in a hierarchi-
cal structure with pre-defined attributes and fields; it provides
indicators of compromise, threat intelligence, corresponding
countermeasures, and reporting capabilities for incidents.More-
over, it supports external references such as enumerations.
Additionally, STIX defines each component with a confi-
dence level to indicate the reliability of its findings. It acts
together with its own sub-language that represents low-level
system events called CybOX.With a share of 46%, STIX is the
most commonly used format for incident reporting within and
between companies.Therefore, it is entitled as the de facto stan-
dard for describing threat intelligence data (Sauerwein et al.,
2017). Moreover, according to the project issuer, the STIX format
definitions are already supported by more than 60 IT-security
software products.
Components: The main STIX components describe an in-
cident in combination with the detected indicator objects. The
representation of the attacker is realized by a threat actor object.
The attacks in turn are represented by using TTP (tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures) on the attacker side,while the exploit target
is on the victim side and observable objects represent the spe-
cific events within an attack. STIX also supports the
representation of the defender’s perspective by employing course
of action objects to express the intended as well as realized de-
fensive measures.
CybOX observables represent raw system events in an au-
tonomous format. CybOX is integrated in the STIX data format
and intended to be used in combination with STIX. However,
this separation of the event and incident formats allows the
use of alternative presentation forms for system events. The
observables form the basis of all further STIX components and
are intended to be flexible enough to represent all kinds of mea-
sured system events as well as more abstract patterns.Threat
actors are characterizations of attackers or malefactors within
systems. These include their motivation, objectives, and in-
tended effects in the context of an attack as well as information
about the sophistication level of the attacker. STIX also pro-
vides the possibility to represent historical information about
threat actors as well as relating to them, thereby leading to the
expression of entire attack campaigns.As a counterpart to threat
actors, STIX describes exploit targets uncoupled observable en-
tities as potential targets for an attack, which basically describe
assets such as systems, software or networks. This structure
also includes information about vulnerabilities, weaknesses and
system configurations, each of which can be referenced to spe-
cific enumerations for distinct identification. STIX designates
the enumerations provided by MITRE and third party enu-
merations. STIX also provides capabilities to capture threat
intelligence both for the attacker and the defender. In this
context, TTP entities provide the possibility to capture pat-
terns, exploits or malware, resources such as persons, tools and
infrastructure used by the attacker and the intended effect of
the attack. Course of action provides capabilities to capture the
countermeasures taken by the defender as well as informa-
tion about the likely impact caused by the incident.
The structures that have been presented so far build the
basis for the indicators in the STIX format which are created
from the analysis of one or more observables. Once an indi-
cator is detected, it is defined by establishing relations with
the corresponding entities. Therefore, it can be interpreted as
the connecting piece between STIX incidents and all further
included entities (Barnum, 2014).
4.1.2. STIX: Structured Threat Information eXpression
(version 2)
STIX2 is a dynamic approach for the standardization of cyber
threat intelligence-sharing based on STIX. Using JSON serial-
ization mechanisms, it provides data transfers with little
overhead. STIX2 provides a dynamic approach for represent-
ing relationships between the entities by introducing a
relationship object that can be used to connect any entities
within the STIX framework. Additionally, CybOX as an inde-
pendent language has been removed from the standard and
merged into the STIX language as observable objects.Along with
these substantial changes, there have also been changes to the
core data model, as shown below.
Component changes: In addition to the relationship object,
STIX2 introduces several further top-level elements such as in-
trusion set, identity, attack pattern, malware, tool, and sighting. STIX
has already introduced the threat actor as a representation of
an attacker, which in turn can be associated with attack cam-
paigns. This relationship is extended in STIX2 by an intrusion
set as well as by an identity.
An intrusion set object represents the behaviors and re-
sources that can be attributed to threat actors and campaigns.
This allows a more precise specification of attackers and their
intentions. In addition, an identity object represents individu-
als, organizations, or groups, to which threat actors could be
attributed. Moreover, the TTP object is replaced by the enti-
ties attack pattern, malware, and tool, which are included in
STIX as the sub-elements of TTP. This referential change sup-
ports the dynamic approach for creating relations within STIX2,
thus allowing the expression of additional coherences.
Moreover, a new object sighting is introduced. It repre-
sents an extension to observable objects that enables more
dynamic referencing between the observables and any other
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top-level object. This, for example, enables the references
between an indicator, specific attackers, and their specific attack
methods at the same time, while every top-level element speci-
fies its own references to specific observables within the
specification of STIX (Wunder et al., 2017).
4.1.3. IODEF: Incident Object Description Exchange Format
(version 1)
IODEF defines an approach for an attack-centric exchange of
incident information. Using XML as the data representation as
well as XML-schema for data validation, it prescribes a base
structure for representing an incident. IODEF offers pre-
defined attributes and fields along with free-text fields for
additional non-structured information within the base inci-
dent structure. However, IODEF does not provide explicit
definitions for the use of external references such as enu-
merations. Addressing this was one of the main intentions of
introducing IODEF-SCI as an extension to IODEF. It maintains
the base structure of IODEF and extends it by adding fields for
external referencing such as an enumeration for system con-
figurations. IODEF provides the components for the
representations of actual occurrences within an incident in-
cluding the used methodology and a representation for the
impact assessment. According to the SANS Institute (2015),
IODEF is used by 23% of those companies that share threat in-
formation and is practically relevant for threat intelligence-
sharing platforms (Sauerwein et al., 2017).
Components: The main IODEF components for describing
an incident are event data, flow, method, assessment, additional
data, and history. The basic data structure for representing in-
cidents is described by event data. It consists of base attributes
such as event description and date. It also describes the actual
occurrences by using the so-called flow objects, which repre-
sent the technical event details such as hosts, networks,
services, or system states.Method basically describes the meth-
odology used by an attacker to reach its goals by using a list
of free-text fields in combination with optional URL fields.These
URL fields can, for example, be used to reference information
about the detected malware or a used vulnerability. Further-
more, with the use of the IODEF-SCI extension, these properties
can be enriched by using enumerations for a unique identifi-
cation of the respective entities.Assessment can be considered
as a result of the incident and includes various types of in-
formation about the incident impact including the information
about the confidence in the respective assessment. In the
analogy to the method, the assessment can also be attrib-
uted to the incident and specific event data.
Moreover, IODEF provides the possibilities to express non-
structured additional data for each of the defined entities.
Finally, the history element provides information about the han-
dling of previous incidents.
4.1.4. IODEF: Incident Object Description Exchange Format
(version 2)
IODEF2 is an approach for the exchange of incident informa-
tion; it introduces several extensions for the core model of
IODEF. In addition to the attack information focused by IODEF,
IODEF2 introduces data structures for indicators, attackers, and
defensive measures. This changes the attack-centric view of
IODEF to a more holistic approach. Furthermore, IODEF2 adopts
the capabilities for the external referencing introduced in
IODEF-SCI.
Components: IODEF2 extends IODEF by the entities indica-
tor, threat actor, campaign, and course of action. The additionally
introduced indicator implies a change in semantics toward
IODEF. IODEF allows the expression of incidents that only
provide the confidence levels for the respective impact as-
sessment, while IODEF2 supports the differentiation between
incidents and evidence for threats or incidents. The indicator
elements are intended to be a direct sub-element of inci-
dents. Threat actor as a representation for an attacker entity
is introduced with a supplementary campaign object, thereby
providing a representation for the attack series attributed to
the threat actors. Additionally, both the history and event data
items are extended by course of action elements. The assess-
ment entity is extended by a mitigating factor; this represents
defensive measures and information. All in all, these changes
lead from an attack-centric model to a full-scale representa-
tion of incidents.
4.1.5. VERIS: The Vocabulary for Event Recording and
Incident Sharing
VERIS is a framework for representing information security
incidents based on the concepts of risk management. Accord-
ing to the SANS Institute (2015), VERIS is used by 20% of
companies working with threat exchange technologies and
therefore exhibits a significant practical relevance. Apart
from describing actual incidents, it also covers the represen-
tation of estimations for possible impacts. Such additional
information is intended to help determining the occurrence
probabilities of specific incidents within certain companies.
Therefore, an assessment of the risk level is supported too.
VERIS is serialized by using a lightweight JSON format.
Moreover, it provides various language-specific enumera-
tions that enable unique definitions of components and
fields such as types of malware.
Components: The base component of VERIS is the incident
that describes the relation between threat actors, actions per-
formed by those actors, information on affected assets, attributes,
and an impact assessment. The threat actor is defined by a com-
bination of its origin, motives and relation to the company. In
this context, a differentiation between internal, external, and
partner actors is introduced.Actions performed by those actors
are specified by tools used for the attack combined with the
actual attack vector and vulnerabilities exploited.Affected assets
and attributes represent the counterpart to attacks by speci-
fying information about the victimized objects as well as the
protection goals that have been violated in this context. The
impact assessment component provides a categorization of
losses, loss estimations, and a rating of occurred impacts.
Besides the description of incidents,VERIS provides the ad-
ditional intelligence components victim demographics,
discovery, and response.Victim demographics provide further
information about the origin of victims affected by an inci-
dent. This can, for example, define the geographical origin or
an affiliation to a specific company or department. Discovery
and response in turn provide the capability to express inci-
dents, information about the discovery, identified root causes,
attackers’ intentions and defensive measures.
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4.1.6. X-ARF: Extended Abuse Reporting Format
X-ARF is an approach for sharing threat information in a human
readable form with the focus on performing the exchange
process exclusively by using email. The practical relevance of
this format can be derived from blocklist.de4. It is a free service
that collects incident information in the X-ARF format and
claims that the platform has close to 4000 reporting users till
date. X-ARF is intended to be a lightweight and easy-to-use
format that includes incident descriptions and built-in en-
cryption capabilities. It uses email MIME extensions for the
transport, YAML data structures to represent the informa-
tion, and the JSON-schema to validate the contents.
Components: X-ARF defines very basic data structures that
represent incidents as a combination of a basic incident de-
scription, incident category, information about the attacker as
well as the reporting entity, the affected system, and the number
of occurrences. These definitions are either defined as free-
form text fields or text fields combined with basic enumerations
defined within the format specification. Moreover, X-ARF mes-
sages support the Traffic Light Protocol5, which can be used to
ensure that information is shared with the appropriate audi-
ence. X-ARF also allows the inclusion of raw data, such as log
files, to be transferred within incident reports (Kohlrausch et al.,
2011).
4.1.7. Further incident reporting formats
In this section, we cover additional incident reporting formats
having a certain relevance based on our point of view as well
as the corresponding usage indicators that can be found in the
literature. These formats are less relevant due to reasons like
a minor practical usage or discontinued development and
maintenance.
CISL (Common Intrusion Specification Language (Eckmann
et al., 2002)) was defined as a format to exchange security-
relevant information between intrusion detection systems. It
was specified in 1998 within the Common Intrusion Detec-
tion Framework (CIDF) by a group of the University of Southern
California. According to the authors, it is no longer an active
area of work. However, some concepts have influenced other
formats such as IODEF.
CAIF (CommonAnnouncement Interchange Format (Goebel,
2005)) was defined as an extensible format for exchanging se-
curity announcements. It was specified in 2002 by a group called
RUS-CERT of the University of Stuttgart. According to the
authors, the development stopped in 2007.
ADeLe (Attack Description Language for Knowledge-Based
Intrusion Detection (Cédric Michel, 2001)) was developed as a
format for the structured exchange of threat information
between intrusion detection systems. Alongside this ex-
change, the format was also designed to share system
configurations to counter similar attacks. ADeLe is based on
a concept from 2001, introduced by a group from the Supélec
University in France, which is also the latest reference to this
format that can be found in the literature. Therefore, it can be
assumed that there is no further development in this area.
STATL (an Attack Language for State-based Intrusion De-
tection (Eckmann et al., 2002)) is also a format to exchange
information between intrusion detection systems. However, the
focus lies on the representation of specific system states as
well as transitions that connect the system states. STATL was
specified by a group from the University of Virginia in 2002.
ARF (Abuse Reporting Format6) was first introduced in 2005
by Yakov Shafranovich and then added to various IETF RFCs.
This format allows the reporting of IT-security incidents in a
structured manner and contributions were made in the recent
past. However, since this is a highly specialized format for the
reporting of email-related incidents, it will not be considered
further within the scope of this work.
5. Criteria for evaluating incident reporting
formats
The previous chapter introduced an overview of the relevant
formats for the reporting of IT-security incidents.Within this
chapter, we develop criteria for the comparison of these formats
to build the basis for a later analysis. For this purpose, we
propose criteria derived from the previously introduced UPSIDE
pattern. Furthermore, we adapt criteria from the academic lit-
erature, adjusting them, wherever reasonable, to fit the specific
purpose of incident reporting formats. Finally, we propose
complementing criteria that are necessary for a comprehen-
sive analysis from our point of view. This section concludes
with a short overview of the developed criteria.
5.1. Structural evaluation criteria
While analyzing incident reporting formats, one basic aspect
is the examination of the relationships between format’s base
structures and their components. This is especially impor-
tant as these structural definitions specify all entities that can
be represented. Therefore, they also define the contentual ca-
pabilities of each format and the use cases that can be covered.
On these grounds, it is reasonable to derive criteria based on
structural definitions and entity representations.
Previous work (Asgarli and Burger, 2016) showed that em-
ploying a quantitative analysis enables the qualification of
statements about the contentual coverage of reporting formats.
This includes basic information such as the extent, capacity,
and granularity of the underlying data structures. From our
point of view, this approach is reasonable for getting a general
overview of the examined formats. Therefore, we adapt this
criterion to our analysis. However, we think that qualitative
aspects should also be considered for a comprehensive analysis.
Correspondingly, we propose to extend this quantitative ap-
proach by a qualitative format analysis by using the UPSIDE
model. For criteria development, we first examine the core en-
tities.Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether an explicit
or implicit representation for the entity in question is present
within a format. Implicit representations can, for example, be
established by the combination of multiple entities. A further
aspect in developing the criteria is to determine the granu-
larity of the representations of each of the entities. Added
together, they result in criteria that describe the core entities
4 https://www.blocklist.de
5 https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp 6 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5965
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of the UPSIDE model regarding their presence and coverage.
These include the entities indicator, attacker, attack, and de-
fender at the top level as well as their respective child elements.
The entity incident, however, will be excluded because it is
already a necessary condition for reporting formats, as stated
before.
From a methodological point of view, the sole presence of
the basic reporting format elements, as described in UPSIDE,
is a hard criterion with little room for interpretation. There-
fore, it can directly be adapted as criterion for each element.
In contrast, it is difficult to qualify general statements about
the individual contentual coverage for each of the examined
elements. Although UPSIDE defines the generic requirements
for reporting formats and therefore allows an analysis and com-
parison of their core elements, a more detailed direct
comparison of these components is questionable inmany cases.
This can be attributed to the deviating structures and ap-
proaches within the different reporting formats on lower level
elements. Consequently, an individual contentual coverage will
be defined for each of the elements described within UPSIDE.
In addition, the quantitative approach introduced before gives
an outline of the total structural depth and granularity of the
formats.
5.2. General evaluation criteria
The previous section introduced the criteria to analyze inci-
dent reporting formats based on our generic incident model.
Building on these criteria, we examine additional criteria for
a later analysis.
Fenz et al. have analyzed the semantic potential of ex-
change standards and accordingly proposed several criteria for
a comparison of these formats considering semantic aspects
(Fenz et al., 2008). One of these aspects is the semantic us-
ability that examines whether formats use structured formats
like XML and thereby ensure the machine-readability as well
as the presence of clear and unambiguous semantics. Al-
though all the formats analyzed within this work are based
on structured formats, it is still reasonable to adapt these cri-
teria and distinguish between readability and semantics.
Machine-readability is one basic assumption that has to be
made to enable automatic sharing of incidents. Although a
format is based on a standardized language, it is necessary to
inspect the structural extent of the applied format. This can
be attributed to the fact that machine-readability can be con-
siderably constrained by using, for example, free-text fields that
allow the inclusion of unstructured information.
Human-readability is a criterion with a limited signifi-
cance regarding automated threat sharing. However, since
certain use cases require user interactions, this is also an im-
portant factor in case of a comprehensive analysis. This is
especially the case if no tools for the evaluation of an inci-
dent reporting format are available, and therefore, a manual
analysis is required.
Unambiguous semantics is another important criterion to
be adapted to this analysis. Ambiguity within transferred data
structures can have negative effects onmachine-readability and
interpretations of data.
Some further criteria for a comparison of security event ex-
change techniques have been suggested by Steinberger et al.
(2015). These can also be adapted to the evaluation of inci-
dent reporting formats. These include the metrics
interoperability, extensibility, aggregability, practical applica-
tion, and human-readability, which will be shortly defined in
the context of incident reporting formats.
Interoperability describes the capabilities of transferring data
from one format into another without losing content or se-
mantics.This is especially important since the sharing of threat
information by definition requires multiple actors; these in turn
might support deviating format standards. A low interoper-
ability can therefore lead to problems while sharing incident
information or even impede such sharing in various cases.
Extensibility describes the possibility of enriching the given
exchange formats by additional data that has not been in-
cluded in their base definitions. Additional data are an
important factor as they enable the extension of formats with
information about particular use cases that would otherwise
have exceeded the format’s capabilities. However, it must be
considered that increased extensibility is always accompa-
nied by drawbacks relating to machine-readability.
Aggregability describes the capabilities for the represen-
tation of multiple incidents and relations between them. It,
therefore, indicates whether the exchange process could only
cover isolated incident information or an overall view of the
situation. Moreover, aggregating incident information gener-
ates additional information about incident coherences and thus
can lead to improved incident handling in the long term.
Practical application refers to available tools that support
an incident-sharing format and institutions that employ the
respective format. Analogous to interoperability, practical ap-
plication is a factor that indicates the operational capabilities
of reporting formats. However, for some use cases, a high value
in practical application increases the probability that the re-
spective sharing partner would utilize the same format, which
lowers the interoperability needs.
In addition to these criteria, Kampanakis (2014) have pro-
posed the use of capabilities for the expression of external
dependencies as a further criterion; we consider this reason-
able and therefore adapt this criterion.
External dependencies are important as they create a
common knowledge base for all participants in an incident-
sharing process. This prevents any misunderstanding and
ambiguities in the transferred data structures.
5.3. Additional evaluation criteria
In addition to the criteria based on the UPSIDE model as well
as the introduced general criteria, we propose further criteria
that are necessary for a complete analysis of reporting formats.
Licensing terms can have significant influence on the de-
cision process for a format as well as on the usage of the format.
This can be attributed to licensing terms that specify certain
regulations for the utilization of the format. Such regulations
may, for example, prohibit the customization of the format con-
tents, thereby having a direct influence on the format’s
structural flexibility.
Maintenance efforts also constitute an important aspect in
the analysis of reporting formats. Since the attacks and the vic-
timized IT systems are evolving, it is necessary that
representations for incidents evolve as well. Therefore, an
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ongoing development of formats ensures the continuous ca-
pability of representing current threats. Maintenance efforts
can be measured by the frequency of the released updates for
the formats.
Documentation also has important implications for the
implementation and usage of a format. Clearly documented
structures ensure a syntactically and semantically correct com-
munication between sharing partners and simplify
implementations.
5.4. Evaluation criteria summary
Summarizing these findings, Table 2 illustrates an overview of
the evaluation criteria introduced in this section.The columns
of this table are arranged in accordance with the introduced
criteria classification.
This overview is divided into the structural, general, and ad-
ditional evaluation criteria. The column ‘Structural evaluation
criteria’ shows the UPSIDE model base entities that have been
supplemented by the contentual coverage as a further struc-
tural criterion. The column ‘General evaluation criteria’ gives
an overview of those criteria that have been derived from the
related literature. Conclusively, the column “Additional evalu-
ation criteria” shows the supplementary criteria proposed within
this paper. These criteria form the basis for the comparative
analysis in the following section.
6. Comparative analysis of incident reporting
formats
In the previous sections, we have introduced a generic model
for incident reporting and important incident reporting formats.
Moreover, we developed a set of structural criteria to compare
incident reporting formats based on the UPSIDE model and cri-
teria from the literature as well as the additionally proposed
criteria. In this section, we apply the structural criteria, fol-
lowed by the general and additional criteria, to each of the
identified formats.
6.1. STIX
6.1.1. Structural analysis
STIX provides the representations of all components de-
scribed in UPSIDE. Incident and indicator objects cover the root
elements for an incident. The attacker component is de-
scribed through the threat actor object, which can be attributed
to single incidents or attack campaigns. It covers basic attri-
butes and information about the attacker’s current identity and
objectives. Objectives are expressed as a combination of the
underlying motivation and the intended effect supported by
a measure of estimating the attacker’s sophistication level. Al-
though STIX does not express any direct representation of an
attack object, representations for all defined attack compo-
nents are provided. Events are expressed by observable objects
by using the integrated CybOX language, which contains the
representations of actions taken and target objects. Methods
and tools are covered by TTP objects that describe attack pat-
terns, malwares or exploits used within an attack.TTP objects
also cover additional information about targeted victims and
affected assets. Additionally, the exploit target object pro-
vides a representation of the assets exploited by these methods
including the specifications for used vulnerabilities and weak-
nesses.An attack result can be defined within an incident object
including a summary of the direct and the indirect impact as
well as loss estimations. STIX also provides comprehensive rep-
resentations of the defender reactions. These are represented
by course of action objects, which define the actions for pre-
venting or mitigating damage and information about the
impact, cost, and efficiency of the performed actions.
Finally, STIX allows the representations for 286 object prop-
erties and datatypes (Asgarli and Burger, 2016); it, therefore,
provides, especially compared to other format approaches, a
comprehensive contentual coverage of incident information.
6.1.2. General analysis
The comprehensive contentual coverage and sparse use of free-
text properties within STIX result in highmachine-readability.
However, these also result in weaknesses concerning the
human-readability due to the inherent complexity. STIX ex-
hibits clear structures and distinct object representations for
incidents, indicators, and associated object entities, as de-
scribed above.Therefore, it shows, depending on the use case,
a very low potential for ambiguous representations. Condi-
tioned by the comparatively large number of object properties
and representations, STIX basically allows the expression of
incidents and findings described in other formats. However,
owing to format peculiarities, this is usually associated with
the loss of information. The STIX repository also provides
various tools for converting other formats into STIX. Alto-
gether, this leads to a good interoperability valuation. Since STIX
focuses on the automated sharing of threat information, it pro-
vides many invariant object properties. For these, no extension
capabilities are intended due to a possible loss of compatibil-
ity, which in turn leads to low extensibility. Alongside the
Table 2 – Evaluation criteria summary.
Structural evaluation criteria General evaluation criteria Additional evaluation criteria
Indicator Machine-readability Licensing terms
Attacker Human-readability Maintenance efforts
Attack Unambiguous semantics Documentation
Defender Interoperability
Contentual coverage Extensibility
Aggregability
Practical application
External dependencies
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incident information, STIX also provides definitions of entire
reports which can include multiple incidents, thereby inher-
ently providing a good aggregability for incident information.
Moreover, STIX is the de facto standard in incident sharing,
as shown above, and is used in over 50 software products.7
Therefore, it has the highest practical application of the ex-
amined formats. STIX also provides comprehensive support for
the integration of external dependencies such as enumera-
tions or incidents within remote systems or formats.
In addition, STIX provides a permissive license without
copyleft restrictions. A precise and extensive documentation
is available on the project’s website. Moreover, the format re-
pository is still actively maintained by OASIS. However, these
efforts decreased with the introduction of STIX2.
6.1.3. Summary
STIX contains object representations for all UPSIDE compo-
nents, including various additional elements, and therefore a
comprehensive expression for each of the components. Only
the references between elements and the representation for
attacks do not fully match the model due to some differ-
ences within the base structure. STIX also fulfills most of the
general criteria. It only shows weaknesses in areas of human-
readability and extensibility due to structural guidelines defined
within the language. Moreover, maintenance efforts have evi-
dently decreased with the introduction of STIX2.
6.2. STIX version 2
6.2.1. Structural analysis
STIX2 provides data representations analogous to its prede-
cessor and therefore structurally matches the UPSIDE model.
STIX2 additionally provides an intrusion set element, which
represents the attacker’s behaviors and procedures. It matches
the UPSIDE attack component, which cannot be directly rep-
resented by STIX. This is especially possible due to the
introduced dynamic references of STIX2, which allows the ex-
pression of incidents aligned to the UPSIDE structure. Moreover,
the implemented structural changes also result in additional
top-level elements such as attack pattern, tools, and vulner-
ability, all of which are more accurate representations of UPSIDE
components methods and tools as well as of vulnerability.
STIX2 provides a dynamic referencing structure that com-
plicates an exact quantitative evaluation in terms of contentual
coverage. However, owing to the use of the STIX base objects
in combination with the dynamic referencing, it can be stated
that STIX2 supports at least as much representation cases as
STIX.
6.2.2. General analysis
The high number of possible representations in STIX2 leads
to highmachine-readability and low human-readability of the
format. The use of dynamic references also enables the align-
ment of the format to specific use cases and therefore
minimizes the potential of ambiguities. Similarly, this also
enables the alignment of the format to the structure of other
formats, thereby additionally increasing its interoperability.
Analogous to STIX, there are no extensions for object entities
intended. However, the use of dynamic references enables the
coverage of additional use cases; this leads to a higher valu-
ation of the extensibility.The aggregation of incidents is likewise
supported. Owing to the recent release of STIX2 as well as the
fact that only release candidates are currently available, it is
unlikely that there is a practical application of the format at
present. However, based on the wide propagation of STIX as
well as the improvements made in the format structure, it can
be assumed that STIX2 will soon gain significant practical im-
portance. Analogous to its predecessor, STIX2 also supports
external dependencies.
Furthermore, STIX2 provides a permissive license, high
maintenance efforts, and a comprehensive documentation, all
of which are identical to its predecessor STIX.
6.2.3. Summary
Introducing additional components and dynamic referenc-
ing, STIX2 allows the generation of incident representations
that cover all UPSIDE components including the dependen-
cies between them. STIX2 also fulfills most of the stated general
criteria. Exceptions are human-readability and practical ap-
plication. However, it is likely that the practical application will
increase in the near future. In contrast to STIX, the dynamic
structure of STIX2 provides a higher interoperability and
extensibility.
6.3. IODEF
6.3.1. Structural analysis
IODEF does not support the representations of attacker or de-
fender information, as shown in UPSIDE. Moreover, there is no
utilization of indicator objects intended. However, IODEF pro-
vides multiple objects for the representation of attacks, which
are directly integrated into the base object incident. This in-
cludes the representations of event actions and a description
of the affected target by using system objects that allow a de-
tailed specification of network nodes, systems, or services. IODEF
provides an object method, which allows the expression of
methods and tools used for an attack and basic information
about the used vulnerability. Since the method object is speci-
fied as a free-text form element, the automatic processing of
such information is aggravated. Moreover, IODEF utilizes an as-
sessment object for representing an attack’s result by expressing
structured impact estimations based on various factors such
as monetary and time factors.
IODEF provides the representations for 99 object proper-
ties and datatypes (Asgarli and Burger, 2016), and thereby
offering a significantly lower contentual coverage compared
to the STIX formats.
6.3.2. General analysis
IODEF extensively uses free-text representations for express-
ing additional incident information. This significantly lowers
machine-readability capabilities, while human-readability is
increased. IODEF provides overlapping elements such as in-
cident and event data with similar representations (Fenz et al.,
2008). Thus, it exhibits ambiguity problems concerning the
format semantics. The extensive use of free-text fields leads7 https://wiki.oasis-open.org/cti/Products
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to a high interoperability and extensibility of the format, since
data structures that are not defined within IODEF can also be
expressed. However, this leads to further losses in the struc-
tural expressiveness and automation capabilities. The format
also supports the encapsulation of multiple incidents into one
report and therefore provides a high aggregability analogous
to STIX. As shown above, IODEF exhibits a high practical ap-
plication with a share of 23% within sharing CERTs. One
important drawback of this format is the missing support for
external dependencies. Although it is theoretically possible to
refer to enumerations within free-text fields, the approach
allows no structured reference definitions.
IODEF is published under the IETF Trust Legal Provisions
(TLP) license, which is an open source license based on the BSD
license and hence offers unrestricted usage. Moreover, accord-
ing to the format repository site8, there were intense
maintenance efforts, which have stopped with the introduc-
tion of IODEF2.The IODEF standard is entirely specified as IETF
RFC. However, only little further documentation is available.
6.3.3. Summary
IODEF allows the expression of attack information within an
incident, providing structured information about events and
their results as well as additional unstructured information
about the attack methods and vulnerabilities. However, indi-
cators and perspectives for attackers and defenders are not
covered. Moreover, IODEF moderately fulfills the stated general
criteria. It shows the strengths for the criteria interoperabil-
ity, extensibility, and aggregability especially due to the use of
free-text fields, while it reveals the weaknesses concerning the
criteria maintenance efforts and the integration of external
dependencies.
6.4. IODEF version 2
6.4.1. Structural analysis
IODEF2 maintains the base structure and components of IODEF,
which is extended by several additional objects and refer-
ences. These include the representations of the attacker and
defender perspectives in addition to the attack representa-
tions in IODEF.Attacker information can be expressed by using
threat actor objects that are defined by free-text descriptions
and can be consolidated into attack campaigns. However, at-
tackers’ objectives, as defined in the UPSIDE model, are not
covered. By introducing the course of action properties, the ex-
pression of the defender perspective is also supported. However,
in a free-text representation, IODEF2 introduces indicators that
express detailed information about occurrences as well as pos-
sible attack phases and confidence levels. Moreover, the
specifications of an attack result are extended by more de-
tailed incident impact descriptions such as monetary or
business impact.
IODEF2 provides similar object representations compared
to its predecessor that were extended to a more holistic ap-
proach, as described before. IODEF2 provides 250 object
properties and datatypes; this shows a huge increase in
contentual coverage compared to the first version. This in-
crease can be partly explained by the introduction of very
specific event entities such as representations for digital
signatures.
6.4.2. General analysis
IODEF2 clearly provides more extensive object representa-
tions that are still combined with free-text properties. Hence,
it offers better machine-readability along with drawbacks in
human-readability due to its increased complexity.This version
also offers various changes to prevent ambiguous represen-
tations that were described for IODEF. Moreover, IODEF2
introduces the use of external references. Analogous to STIX2,
it has also been published recently indicating a low practical
application. Since this version is essentially an extension to
its predecessor IODEF, the criteria interoperability, extensibil-
ity, and aggregability are to be evaluated analogously.
IODEF2 provides a TLP license and only little documenta-
tion are analogous to IODEF. However, owing to the replacement
of IODEF, the IETFmaintenance efforts changed over to IODEF2.
6.4.3. Summary
IODEF2 extends IODEF by additionally addressing the at-
tacker and defender sides. Furthermore, it introduces the
representations of indicators. It, therefore, nearly matches the
UPSIDE model definitions except for expressing attackers’ ob-
jectives. In contrast to IODEF, IODEF2 fairly fulfills most of the
stated general criteria. It only shows the weaknesses in the cri-
teria human-readability, documentation, and practical
application.
6.5. VERIS
6.5.1. Structural analysis
VERIS provides the representations of attackers by using actor
objects including specific attributes, suspected motives, and
the attacker’s origin. VERIS also supports the expression of
attack information by using action objects, which distinguish
between various types of attacks such as malware or hacking.
The types of attacks in turn express free-text information about
the attack, attack vectors, and the utilized vulnerabilities.VERIS
also defines an attack result by using information about the
compromise of assets and information about the estimated
impact.The types of attacks provide an expression for the attack
component, as described in UPSIDE. However, information other
than the attack result is characterized by a few details. VERIS
also covers information about the defender and its reactions.
These include the discovery, evaluation, causes, and correc-
tive actions.VERIS does not support the expression of indicator
information within the base schema. However, the referenc-
ing of external indicators is possible for reasons of
interoperability.
VERIS provides the representations of 137 object proper-
ties and datatypes that are divided into partly free-text
properties and partly internal enumerations defined by the
format. This leads to a structure that exhibits an average
contentual coverage compared to the formats described before.
6.5.2. General analysis
As a result, the criteria machine-readability and human-
readability can also be evaluated as average. VERIS provides8 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mile/documents/
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concise and clear information about attacks and the at-
tacker. However, it provides comprehensive definitions for
impact information, which can lead to ambiguities to a certain
degree. It, for example, defines an overall impact amount as
well as an impact loss amount, which inherently offers po-
tential of ambiguity. Moreover, based on the application of free-
text properties,VERIS partly offers a good interoperability and
extensibility similar to the IODEF formats. However, there are
some drawbacks due to sparsely defined attacks and very spe-
cific risk management properties.The aggregability of multiple
incidents is not intended. With a propagation of 20%, VERIS
offers a wide practical application similar to IODEF. Although
the format definitions do not support external dependen-
cies, the specification contains multiple internal enumerations
for distinct definitions of incident information. However, these
enumerations only represent generic information such as the
malware definition “Worm”, but they do not contain further
information. Similar to IODEF, further information can be ex-
pressed by free-text properties, albeit without a pre-defined
structure.
VERIS is published under the Creative Commons ShareAlike
(CC BY-SA) 4.0 license. In contrast to the above-presented
formats, it contains a strong copyleft that restricts possible use
cases for the format. Referring to the format’s repository, a con-
tinuous maintenance can be abstracted, although updates are
performed in cycles of several months. Furthermore, VERIS
offers a format specification included in its repository as well
as a dedicated and comprehensive documentation on the
format website.
6.5.3. Summary
VERIS allows the expression of all elements within the UPSIDE
model with a focus on the representation of information about
the attacker and the caused impact. It provides only superfi-
cial information about attacks. VERIS only moderately fulfills
the stated general criteria. In particular, it shows special weak-
nesses in the areas of aggregability and external dependencies.
However, it is worth highlighting that VERIS provides a com-
prehensive documentation.
6.6. X-ARF
6.6.1. Structural analysis
X-ARF is an approach that focuses on a simple implementa-
tion and therefore provides very basic capabilities for the
representation of structured data. It allows the representa-
tion of basic attack information as well as information about
the attacker. Indicator elements and information about de-
fensive measures are not supported. Attacks are represented
by a free-text description of the attack in combination with a
description of the victimized system. Methods and tools are
represented by a pre-defined X-ARF term such as ‘fraud’. Using
the traffic light protocol9, the severity of an incident’s result
can be indicated. The attacker is expressed by identified in-
formation about the attack source such as the used IP-address.
X-ARF also provides capabilities for appending information
sources, such as log files, for a manual evaluation of incidents.
X-ARF represents the least extensive format with the lowest
contentual coverage of 29 object properties and datatypes
mostly expressed as free-text properties.
6.6.2. General analysis
X-ARF only provides very limited capabilities for an auto-
mated exchange of security information and low machine-
readability, which is attributable to its minor complexity.
However, this also leads to very good human-readability. Fur-
thermore, the low level of complexity also leads to very low
potential for ambiguous representations. Although basic in-
formation from other formats could be expressed, the
interoperability can be valuated as very low as most informa-
tion about extensive formats have to be expressed as free-
text.These free-text fields also allow an extension of the format.
However, extending basic information is only reasonable as-
suming a human receiver. Moreover, the format is intended to
report single incidents; this implies that the aggregation of mul-
tiple incidents is not expressible. X-ARF also does not support
external dependencies. It has a very high practical applica-
tion with 3790 reporting users and 140,000 reported attacks on
a daily basis.
X-ARF is published under a license without any restric-
tions. Despite the wide propagation, the format is only
maintained on a yearly basis, and superficial documentation
is provided.
6.6.3. Summary
X-ARF provides only basic elements for the representation of
attacks and the attacker in combination with source file at-
tachments. It is, therefore, not suited to express detailed incident
information. X-ARF only poorly fulfills most of the stated general
criteria. It only shows strengths in areas of human readabil-
ity, ambiguous semantics, practical application, and licensing
terms. However, owing to its extent and human-readability, it
is well suited for a non-automated exchange.
6.7. Summary of the analysis
Summarizing the findings of this section, Table 3 illustrates an
overview of the analysis results. It shows that the evaluated
criteria as rows and the examined formats as columns. The
analysis values are expressed as pie charts divided into four
quarters, thus indicating the degree of fulfillment for each
criterion.
This overview emphasizes that both STIX and STIX2 provide
a comprehensive data model, low potential for ambiguity, a few
extension capabilities, and high machine-readability.They are,
therefore, best suited for an automated exchange of incident
information. However, owing to the high complexity and low
human readability, a manual interpretation is only reason-
ably supported by a software-based approach.They also provide
a very high practicability due to the high interoperability, un-
restrictive license terms, continuous maintenance and practical
application of STIX, and presumably, STIX2 in future. More-
over, subsequent threat analysis efforts are supported by the
utilization of external dependencies and the aggregability of
threat information.
IODEF in turn explicitly enables the exchange of attack in-
formation in a semi-structured manner. This leads to an9 https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp
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automated evaluation of the incident information that has to
be followed by a manual analysis by domain experts. The
manual analysis is especially necessary because of the wide
use of free-text fields, the ambiguity problems described above,
and the extension capabilities. The format documentation is
restricted to the specification within the RFCs. IODEF also pro-
vides a high practicability, unrestrictive license terms, and
continuous maintenance efforts. Moreover, missing capabili-
ties for external referencing impede subsequent threat analyses.
IODEF2, in contrast, extends the format to a more holistic
approach for threat information sharing. Analogous to its pre-
decessor, the semi-structured information processing has to
be conducted both automatically and manually. Moreover, a
high value in practical application of IODEF2 in future can be
assumed. Supporting external references as well as the ag-
gregation of incidents, IODEF2 is also suited to support
subsequent analyses of threat data.
The VERIS approach focuses on the representation of the
attacker, defender, and impact information with little regard
for attack information based on semi-structured informa-
tion.Thus, it is primarily suitable for the exchange of incident
impact information and has to be evaluated both automati-
cally and manually. Although VERIS covers specific use cases
by providing limited interoperability under restrictive licens-
ing terms, a considerable practicability can still be assumed.
This can be attributed to good documentation in combina-
tion with continuous maintenance as well as the coverage of
risk management use cases that cannot be represented in this
granularity by other formats.
In contrast to these comprehensive formats, X-ARF pursues
a leaner approach. It provides only basic information about the
attacker and the attacks performed; it does not support the
representations of indicators and defender information. Owing
to the minor data structure complexity, X-ARF provides the best
human readability of the examined formats and is therefore
suitable for threat exchange followed by manual analyses. Al-
though X-ARF provides little documentation and no continuous
maintenance, it still has a highly practical relevance that cor-
relates with the cost-effective implementation of the format.
This, in combination with unrestrictive licensing terms, indi-
cates a high practicability of the format.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a comparative analysis of the
most important incident reporting formats. We have devel-
oped a general model for an incident reporting process and
introduced important terms in incident reporting as a first foun-
dation. Next, we have developed a generic model for incident
reporting formats as the basis for a later structural compari-
son of the examined formats. Furthermore, we have given an
overview of incident reporting by exchange format approaches.
Within this overview, we have identified important formats and
analyzed their component structures. In addition, we have dis-
cussed comparatively less-important formats that are not
included in this analysis. Based on this overview, we have de-
veloped several criteria to compare among incident reporting
Table 3 – Analysis of incident reporting formats.
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formats by considering both explicitly structural and general
aspects. Using these criteria, we have also conducted a com-
prehensive analysis for each of the examined formats, followed
by a final overview and format classification.
The analysis reveals strengths, weaknesses, and addi-
tional information for the comparison of the formats. It also
explains that each format has a use case that it fits in the best
possible manner and therefore has a right to exist. Based on
these findings, our future work will focus on the research on
approaches and methodologies for the automated process-
ing of incident reporting formats as well as the application of
exchanged data.
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Florian Menges, Christine Sperl, and Gu¨nther Pernul
University of Regensburg, Universita¨tsstraße 31, 93053 Regensburg, Germany
Abstract. The threat landscape and the associated number of IT secu-
rity incidents are constantly increasing. In order to address this problem,
a trend towards cooperative approaches and the exchange of information
on security incidents has been developing over recent years. Today, sev-
eral different data formats with varying properties are available that
allow to structure and describe incidents as well as cyber threat intelli-
gence (CTI) information. Observed differences in data formats implicate
problems in regard to consistent understanding and compatibility. This
ultimately builds a barrier for efficient information exchange. Moreover,
a common definition for the components of CTI formats is missing. In
order to improve this situation, this work presents an approach for the
description and unification of these formats. Therefore, we propose a
model that describes the elementary properties as well as a common no-
tation for entities within CTI formats. In addition, we develop a unified
model to show the results of our work, to improve the understanding of
CTI data formats and to discuss possible future research directions.
Keywords: Incident reporting · Incident management · Incident re-
sponse · Reporting formats · STIX · IODEF · VERIS.
1 Motivation
In the age of digitization, information systems play a more integrated and im-
portant role in modern society than ever before. This also applies to critical
infrastructures that are essential for the functioning of society today. At the
same time, however, these systems are becoming increasingly complex and vul-
nerable to attacks. It can be observed that today’s systems are mostly defended
by traditional security measures that only provide basic protection against com-
mon threats. In contrast, reliable protection of systems against sophisticated
and targeted attacks remains a problem and continues to intensify the arms race
between threat actors on the one side and security experts on the other. To be
ahead in this game, a trend towards the exchange of Cyber Threat Intelligence
(CTI) information has emerged to be aware of threats at an early stage. This
can either strengthen threat prevention or contribute to the mitigation of already
occurred incidents and improve the overall system security.
The benefits of CTI exchanges are recognized and promoted by various gov-
ernments, industry and research. This has already led to legal reporting obliga-
tions for industries that are relevant to the functioning of the society in different
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economic areas such as the United States1, the European Union2 and Germany3.
At the same time, the industry has started to introduce a wide range of threat
intelligence platforms such as the Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF)4 and
community solutions like Open Threat Exchange (OTX)5.
But while sharing CTI undoubtedly can create benefits, there are issues on
how to conduct the exchange of threat intelligence. The structure as well as the
content of threat intelligence reports are essential aspects for a mutual under-
standing of the shared information and, therefore, for the success of the exchange
itself. To support the exchange process, several organizations have developed
competing formats and standards to represent CTI, which are already used by
companies to some extent. The formats differ in their focus on certain CTI ar-
eas, notations and presentation concepts while actually serving similar purposes.
This can lead to several issues, such as incompatibilities or comprehension prob-
lems, which may even question the whole exchange process. Uniform definitions
and notations and a common understanding of the data structures is therefore
an important success factor for the exchange CTI information. With this work,
we make the following contributions as a step towards unification of CTI data
structures:
– We introduce a meta model that describes the key elements of threat intel-
ligence formats
– We propose a common notation for CTI base elements to support the mutual
understanding for available components
– We apply our findings to a unified model, which serves as a basis for the
understanding and discussion of future opportunities in the area of threat
intelligence sharing
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we cover the
Related Work. Section 3 introduces a meta model and unified notation for CTI
data structures. Section 4 introduces a unified CTI model based on the meta
model and the unified notation as well as a discussion about possible starting
points for improving the current situation based on this model. The paper is
concluded in section 5.
2 Related Work
In the field of threat intelligence and cybersecurity, a lot of research has been
conducted in the last years. However, the number of publications covering ap-
proaches for modelling and unifying CTI is limited. This stands in a contrast to
the fact that exchanging CTI has become more urgent to face security incidents
[19]. It can be observed that especially research work that considers available
1 https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3696
2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148
3 http://tinyurl.com/y44jmaz4
4 https://csirtgadgets.com/collective-intelligence-framework
5 https://otx.alienvault.com/
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CTI data formats and the underlying data structures is rare. Most common in
the area of modelling and unifying CTI are ontology proposals that clarify terms
and their relations to each other in a defined area. Ontologies that can be found
in literature can be distinguished in specialized and generic approaches.
Specialized approaches describe specific aspects or elements of threat intelli-
gence as shown in the following. Falk and Way present an ontology that focuses
on threat actors [6] and Grgio et al. propose an ontology that describes suspi-
cious behavior of malware [9]. These works focus on particular threat intelligence
aspects, while the big picture of CTI is not covered.
Generic approaches on the contrary have a broader scope. Fenz et al. perform
valuable fundamental work prior to the establishment of most of the CTI shar-
ing formats. They define syntax relations of different security concepts based on
existing guidelines like the German IT Grundschutz Manual [7]. Falk proposes
a threat intelligence ontology utilizing the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain
in combination with events and threat actors. Although providing a broader
scope, this work also does not fully cover the aspects of CTI or its data struc-
tures [5]. Iannacone et al. create a graph-based ontology for representing threat
intelligence information, which provides a broader view on different aspects of
threat intelligence. However, it shows a clear focus on specific attacks and lacks
important CTI concepts such as attacker techniques and campaigns and does
not consider underlying data formats other than STIX6 [11]. Oltramari et al.
focus on combining human and machine elements to create a cyber security on-
tology offering a detailed description of the included elements. Nevertheless, the
research lacks a specific relation to CTI as well as the consideration of relevant
data formats [18].
Other research work focuses on common specifications in the field of threat
intelligence. First Howard and Longstaff establish a widely known and accepted
language for computer security incidents where basic terms of an incident are
defined [10]. Burger et al. create a taxonomy model for cyber threat intelligence
sharing which organizes the different formats like IODEF7 and STIX in the cate-
gories Transport, Session, Indicators, Intelligence and Attributes [4]. Mavroeidis
and Bromander develop a model to compare the different taxonomies, ontologies
and sharing formats to enable the finding of further research areas [14]. How-
ever, these approaches neither cover the basic properties of CTI formats nor
their specific notation elements, as we provide in this paper.
A further research direction focuses on approaches that incorporate specific
data formats for representing CTI information. Obrst et al. utilize different stan-
dards such as MAEC8, CEE9, Cybox10 and STIX, to create a comprehensive
cyber ontology. Although, this research gives a broad overview on CTI data
structures, it is limited to formats related to STIX. Moreover, data types, at-
6 https://stixproject.github.io/about/STIX Whitepaper v1.1.pdf
7 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5070
8 https://maecproject.github.io/
9 https://cee.mitre.org
10 https://cyboxproject.github.io/
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tributes and notation issues are not covered [17]. Zhao et al. propose a unified
representation of CTI using an ontology based model for threat intelligence built
on the study of security incidents and on elements of STIX211. This model al-
lows a more specific representation of threat intelligence data. However, as it only
incorporates STIX2, it does not cover differences between CTI data formats [23].
Summarizing, it can be stated that the literature for CTI models is limited.
Predominant are ontologies, which can be categorized in specialized and holistic.
Other approaches focus on structuring and comparing different concepts. Some
works cover data formats but a comprehensive view on CTI data structures from
different sources is lacking. Moreover, attempts in finding a common notation and
creating a unified models don not incorporate all the relevant incident sharing
data formats. Even though all these approaches contribute their part to generate
insight to threat intelligence information, a comprehensive view on CTI data
structures from different sources has not been conducted yet. A meta model
considering the syntax from different threat intelligence sharing formats and a
holistic view with integrated data formats both are currently missing. Moreover,
there is no academic work covering key elements of CTI sharing formats or
unifying their notations to the best of our knowledge.
3 A standardized representation for Threat Intelligence
Information
A successful exchange of cyber threat intelligence strongly depends on a mutual
understanding of contents shared by the parties involved. The heterogeneous na-
ture of sharing formats is one of the main barriers in sharing this data. Therefore,
it is important to find an agreement on basic terms as well as unified definitions
for shared elements. To build a foundation for such an agreement, we propose
a meta model as a guidance for the modelling, classification and comparison of
CTI formats in this section. We also propose a standardization of threat intelli-
gence elements. This includes a unified nomenclature and classification for CTI
elements as a step towards the homogenization of CTI data formats.
3.1 Meta model for threat intelligence information
As a first step we aim to create a common understanding of relevant concepts for
the representation of CTI. Therefore, we introduce a meta model that provides
a comprehensive specification, covering both the basic structuring elements and
coherences that can be used to express intelligence information. The model is
intended to support the verification and extension of existing models as well as
the creation of further model instances. It also serves as a basis for understand-
ing elements and relationships within existing formats.
From a methodical perspective, the developed model is following the archetypal
abstraction concepts for meta modeling by Sprinkle et al. [20]. According to this
11 https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/
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concept, the elements Class, Association, Specialization and Constraint are used
to compose the model. To realize a more accurate representation for CTI con-
cepts, Association elements are further detailed into the elements Composition
and Aggregation. This allows an additional differentiation between mandatory
and optional relationships and therefore increases the models expressiveness.
The meta model (see figure 1) is developed based upon the characteristics of
state-of-the-art formats for structured CTI representation STIX1/2, IODEF and
IODEF212, VERIS13 and X-ARF14 as outlined in Menges and Pernul [16]. Fur-
ther formats that can be found in literature, such as MISP15, openIoC 16 are
excluded from the development process. This is mainly due to their limited
data model and focus on threat intelligence events and indicators as outlined by
Burger et al. [4]. The model development process is realized in two consecutive
steps. First, the relevant literature in the areas of CTI in general and state-of-the-
art formats is reviewed. Within this review, important concepts for representing
CTI are identified. In the second step, the structures and characteristics of these
formats are analyzed to validate and supplement the insights gained from the
literature review. This process results in the identification of fundamental con-
cepts such as elements, properties and relationships of CTI. These concepts are
then translated into appropriate meta-types that are finally combined to build
the CTI meta model.
First, we discuss the different aspects important for representing CTI that
are derived from the literature. These aspects are translated into the first meta
model building blocks. All of the examined formats define a set of base enti-
ties, each of which represents one of its core components in an object oriented
way as shown by Bourgue et al. [2]. The resulting Object entities enable the
fundamental representation of CTI data and attributes. The formats also define
capabilities to introduce Relationships between these objects. In addition, the
examined formats define one distinct root element that collects all base entities
into a reportable collection, which we define as Report in the proposed model.
Burger et al. show that basic CTI objects can be assigned to the three differ-
ent categories Indicator, Intelligence and Attribution [4]. For the development of
our model, we translate these assignments into three kinds of classes that inherit
from the base class Object that are defined in the following.
Indicator objects describe patterns or behaviors that show the likelihood that
an incident is occurring, has already occurred or will probably occur in the fu-
ture. This includes representations for genuine system observations as well as
indication objects for structuring observations and assessing the probability of
them being part of an incident.
Intelligence objects are used to represent specific knowledge about threats or
incidents. This includes the combination of findings from indicators or past oc-
12 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7970
13 http://veriscommunity.net
14 http://xarf.org/
15 https://www.misp-project.org/
16 https://github.com/mandiant/OpenIOC 1.1
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Fig. 1. CTI Meta model
currences to derive a specific threat behavior or attack pattern. Moreover, the
intelligence objects also define specific actions and countermeasures for known
threats that can be performed for the prevention of incidents or impact mitiga-
tion.
Attribution objects describe the source, the target as well as the circumstances
of an incident. More precisely, the source defines both information about entities
involved in an incident and their possible location, objectives or interests. The
target includes entities affected by an incident including vulnerabilities that are
used to compromise the entity. Moreover, Attribution also describes the circum-
stances of an incident, including information such as the effects of an incident
or the start and end of an attack.
The described objects serve as a structural foundation for describing CTI infor-
mation. To cover all aspects of representing CTI information, the defined object
attribute definitions also have to be examined and differentiated in detail. As
shown by Burger et al. [4], Steinberger et al. [21] as well as Menges and Pernul
[16], the specification and usage of object attributes is decisive for the interop-
erability of CTI formats. More precisely, there are two main types of attribute
definitions: Constrained Attributes and Free-text Attributes. Constrained At-
tributes usually lead to structured and comprehensible information due to their
underlying guidelines. Free-text Attributes without guidelines, however, lead to
unpredictable and non-structured information that reduces the format interop-
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erability and automation capability. Besides these attributes, the model also
includes an Interface Attribute, which is derived from the format specifications
and, therefore, introduced with the specification analysis of this section.
Another vital aspect for CTI formats is the integration of interoperability
frameworks to ensure a mutual understanding of the represented contents. Syed
et al. [22] consider interoperability frameworks as integral elements within their
proposed threat intelligence ontology. Mavroeidis and Jøsang [15] also underline
the central role of these frameworks for structuring threat information. The
frameworks include Vocabularies, Public Enumerations and Scoring Systems,
which are tied to CTI objects. In the following, we provide a short description
of these frameworks underlining their contribution for CTI interoperability and
automation capabilities.
Vocabularies (also internal Enumerations) represent lists of predefined con-
tent for object attributes that are supplied with CTI formats. An example for a
vocabulary is SecurityCompromiseVocab provided by STIX. It defines the pos-
sible values Yes, Suspected, No and Unknown as allowed attribute contents for
the attribute SecurityCompromise within an incident object. It therefore pro-
vides a clear field definition based on predefined values, preventing ambiguities.
This enables a common understanding for contents that are expressed using
vocabularies. A more detailed introduction to the application of vocabularies
within the exchange of CTI is given by Fransen et al. [8], while emphasizing
their contribution to the automation capabilities of CTI.
Public Enumerations provide publicly available registers that can be used
to clearly specify particular CTI aspects such as configurations, platforms, weak-
nesses or vulnerabilities. An exemplary enumeration is Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE)17, which provides a broad collection of uniquely iden-
tifiable vulnerability definitions and descriptions for different systems. CVE is
publicly administered and therefore available for any participant in an intelli-
gence exchange process. Using this enumeration, vulnerabilities can be clearly
described within a CTI format using a reference to its unique identifier provided
by the enumeration. The importance of integrating enumerations into CTI for-
mats and the accompanying benefits of interoperability and automation capa-
bilities are described by Brown et al. [3].
Scoring Systems provide a consistent method to capture the character-
istics of particular threat intelligence aspects, mapping them into quantitative
descriptions. More precisely, numerical values are generated from the underlying
information, enabling the assessment and comparability of the information. An
exemplary system is the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)18. It al-
lows to capture and assess the characteristics of a vulnerability. CVSS provides
different calculation rules that quantify the gathered vulnerability information
and translates it into a numerical score reflecting the severity of the vulnerability.
Integrated into threat intelligence standards, Scoring Systems provide a struc-
tured way to express ratings and assessments in a common understandable and
17 https://cve.mitre.org/
18 https://www.first.org/cvss/
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interoperable form. The importance of these systems is also shown by Brown et
al. [3] and Kampanakis [12] underlining their contribution to the interoperabil-
ity of CTI. The literature based elements of the meta model, are now validated,
supplemented and relationsships are established using the specifications of the
considered CTI formats.
When comparing the defined objects with the format specification, the cen-
tral role of the Report element is confirmed. It serves as the base component to
reference the core CTI objects. Since the specifications basically allow to create
empty reports, the relationship between Report and the core objects is defined
as an aggregation. Although, all formats allow to build relationships between
objects, there are particular differences between them. Comparing the formats,
there are two different types of possible relationships. On the one hand, relation-
ships can be expressed as single objects that provide attributes for defining the
objects to be connected, which is for example the case for STIX2. Their relation-
ship is defined as a composition, since relationship objects cannot exist without
their referenced entities. On the other hand, references can also be defined using
attributes within the objects to be connected, which is for example the case for
IODEF. This relationship on the contrary is defined as aggregation, due to the
optional nature of their references.
The specifications also confirm that the base elements of the formats con-
sidered can be categorized into Indicator, Intelligence and Attribution, while
inheriting from the base Object. Vocabularies and Public Enumerations both
of which inherit from the enumeration entity, show different usages within CTI
formats. While Vocabularies find usage within any CTI object in different man-
ifestations, Public Enumerations are restricted to the layers Intelligence and
Attribution. The Intelligence layer can for example be provided with CAPEC19,
an enumeration for defining particular attack patterns, whereas the attribu-
tion layer can be provided with the previously described enumeration CVE for
defining particular vulnerabilities within targeted entities. The Scoring Systems
implemented within the examined formats are restricted to the attribution layer.
More precisely, applied Scoring Systems such as CVSS and CWSS20 describe the
severity of vulnerabilities, whereas systems such as CCSS21 describe the severity
of configurations issues on specific targets. Since both targets and vulnerabilities
are allocated to the Attribution layer, this also applies to Scoring Systems that
describe their severities.
Finally, the CTI attribute definitions will be examined more closely. As stated
above, a clear distinction between constrained and free-text attributes has to be
made for a description of CTI formats. Considering the specifications, a great
deal of both types of attribute can be identified. The considered formats define
numerous free-text attributes such as description or notes allowing to insert arbi-
trary contents. Similarly, the formats also provide various constrained attributes
such as DateTime enforcing a specific format. In addition to these types, the
19 https://capec.mitre.org/
20 https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss v1.0.1.html
21 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/IR/nistir7502.pdf
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analysis of the specifications reveal another important CTI attribute enabling
the attachment of structured external information to an incident description. An
example for this is the AdditionalData element within the IODEF specification.
It enables the encapsulation of entire XML documents that confirm with another
schema. This type of attribute is also included into the meta model and called
Interface Attribute due to its capabilities of interfacing other formats. Putting
all this together, the developed model defines the elements and relationships
of threat intelligence formats beginning with its core object types and defini-
tions of possible attribute types to integration capabilities for interoperability
frameworks.
3.2 A unified notation for threat intelligence elements
After developing the meta model for describing the fundamental elements within
CTI formats, we aim to create a common understanding for their core compo-
nents in this section. When looking at CTI formats, one obstacle towards the
interoperability between them is the usage of different notations. As a conse-
quence, comparable or identical threat situations are often expressed in different
terms. This leads to misunderstandings and hampers the comparability and com-
patibility of threat information. To counteract possible misunderstandings, we
propose a unified notation for threat intelligence information in this section.
Therefore, we first identify the component types for representing threat intelli-
gence information and classify them in accordance to the meta model definitions.
Following this, we match the component types to the corresponding components
of the CTI formats considered. In the last step, we propose a rule set to create a
unified notation for threat intelligence components and apply it to the identified
components. Table 1 gives an overview on the results of this unification process,
which is described in the following.
Central CTI Components and Classifications: The first step of this
process is the identification and classification of the component types that are
essential for describing threat intelligence information from the literature. The
basis for this is the incident taxonomy provided by Howard and Longstaff [10].
It defines the Attackers, their Targets, used Vulnerabilities as well as the Result
of an incident, all of which can be classified as Attribution components. This
work also defines the term Action, representing activities within an attack that
can be classified as an Indication element. Alongside this fundamental incident
description, additional terms for describing threat intelligence information can
be derived from the work of Mavroeidis and Bromander [14]. This includes the
element Indicator also classified as indicator element and the terms Method,
Course of Action and Incident classified as intelligence components.
Matching with CTI formats: In the second step of the process, each of
the state-of-the-art CTI formats is analyzed to identify the components corre-
sponding to the previously defined component types. Table 1 provides columns
for each formats showing its component assignments to the corresponding com-
ponent types. The formats IODEF and IODEF2 were combined into one column
IODEF 12, since both formats use identical notations for the base component
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types. The assignment is done by semantically matching the component type
definitions from the literature with the component specifications of the respec-
tive formats and is shortly described in the following. All assignments relate
to components that allow clear allocations to the respective component types.
Wherever no component type is available or the comparison results in incomplete
or ambiguous matchings, the respective field is left blank.
A ruleset for creating a common CTI notation: In the last step, we
propose a common notation for each of the components. To achieve this, we
firstly propose a ruleset that defines how to derive notation elements from the
previously matched components. The ruleset enables the reproducibility of no-
tation elements as well as the derivation of notation elements for possible future
extensions of the notation. The most important factor for this notation is full
coverage for all characteristics of the CTI base components. According to this,
the first rule defines that the component representing the according component
type in the most general manner is mapped to the notation. This ensures a high
degree of expressibility for the notation elements. Another important factor is
the practicability of the notation, since the success of intelligence sharing for-
mats depends on a widespread usage and therefore user acceptance. As a result,
the second rule defines that, if a component notation is already used by different
formats, it is mapped to the notation. Finally, the third rule defines that if none
of these rules apply, the component type definition from the literature will be
mapped to the notation. The defined rules are applied for the mapping of all CTI
components in ascending order provided that the first matching rule determines
which component will be mapped. An example for the mapping according to
the first rule is the component type Target. Its mapping candidates are Exploit
Target, System, Asset and Destination. Asset matches the first rule, since it is
the most general representation of these candidates. It enables the description of
systems, services etc. regardless of their role within the incident. In contrast to
this, Exploit Target implies an assets role within an attack, whereas System and
Destination only allow a limited view on affected entities. An example for the
second rule is the attribute Campaign, which provides the mapping candidates
Campaign and Related Incidents, both of which are equally general representa-
tions for the component type. As a result the second rule applies and Campaign
is mapped as the attribute that is already used by multiple formats. Finally, Ac-
tion is an example for the third rule. None of the candidates for Action provides
a more general representation and none of them is used in multiple formats.
Therefore, the component definition Action is mapped to the notation.
4 Towards unified threat intelligence data structures
In the previous section 3 we developed a meta model and a unified notation for
the description of essential CTI elements. These findings are applied to develop
a unified base model for the representation of CTI data formats in this section.
The model illustrates the results of this work, contributes to the understanding
of CTI data structures and serves as a basis for a discussion of future possibilities
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and challenges for CTI data formats. The unified CTI model is shown in figure
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Fig. 2. Unified CTI data model
2 and described in the following. The essential components of CTI data formats
defined in Chapter 3 are the model’s foundation and have been translated into
entity types for the development of this model. As a next step, the relationships
between the entities are defined. In doing so, we refrain from consolidating re-
dundant relationships, since the formats do not only represent data structures for
the storage of information, but they may also be used as a tool for the expression
incident information as for example shown in Bo¨hm et al. [1]. A reduction of rela-
tionships also leads to reduced expression capabilities. Therefore, the integration
of the relationships within the data model is achieved by obtaining existing re-
lationships between entities from underlying formats and transferring them into
the unified model. As a result, the relationships within the unified model are a
superset of the relationships obtained from the underlying formats. The identi-
fied CTI entity categories Attribution, Intelligence and Indicator, as shown in
chapter 3.1, are mapped as classification swimlanes to illustrate the entity classi-
fication assignments. In addition to the integration of entities, relationships and
classifications, the entities are populated with structured properties according
to the meta model. Therefore, vocabularies, enumerations and scoring systems
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are assigned to the entities according to their occurrence within the CTI formats
under consideration. Based on these properties, several entry points for possible
improvements of CTI data formats are identified in the following and presented
according to their classification lane.
Within the Attribution Layer, entity types Actor and Campaign only pro-
vide internal vocabularies for their structured description. External resources
and scoring systems are not available for these types. As a result, properties
and information about actors need to be collected and specified each time an
incident is detected. An online resource, like an enumeration that collects infor-
mation about attackers and allows to map it to an incident would be conceivable
as a possible extension. Asset entities are described by vocabularies as well as
by enumerations. One possible extension would be an additional scoring system
to evaluate the criticality of the assets, as for example pointed out by Kim and
Kang [13]. Moreover, the asset itself can be specified using the CPE22 and CCE23
enumerations, defining the software platform configuration and even allow the
mapping of CVE vulnerabilities. However, since assets allow the relationship to
single enumeration items, more complex systems with different components, such
as cyber-physical systems, can hardly be described. Impact Assessment entities
provide different internal vocabularies for the structured description of an as-
sessment, as for example values for a subjective impact qualification rating from
”low” to ”high”. Although, results of impact assessments may vary widely across
different companies, a common calculation base for a more informative exchange
would be conceivable. This could for example be achieved using an impact assess-
ment scoring system that allows the integration of environmental variables like
the industry sector of a company and thus may provide a common calculation
basis for the gravity of incidents. Within the Intelligence Layer, the entity
Course of Action offers different possibilities for extensions. On the one hand,
there are no metrics or scorings available, that would allow a transparent evalua-
tion of the countermeasures conducted. Moreover, an external enumeration that
for example provides known procedures for the treatment of specific incidents
could contribute to the expressiveness of the course of action objects. Beyond
that, the association of vulnerabilities with course of action entities could pro-
vide additional value. Similar to this, Incident and Attack Pattern entities, also
do not allow the integration of scoring systems. The Indicator Layer lastly
represents system observations without the use of contextual data. Therefore,
enumerations or scoring systems are not available for these entity types, which
the meta model has shown already.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an approach for finding a common ground on de-
scribing CTI information. The developed meta model shows the syntax relation
of various extant data formats to improve the structural understanding of CTI
22 https://nvd.nist.gov/products/cpe
23 https://nvd.nist.gov/config/cce/index
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data formats. It also allows the distinction between enumerations and scoring
systems for precise data representations and different attribute types that allow
a certain degree of freedom when describing threat information. We also iden-
tified the key elements for CTI data formats, defined a ruleset for the creation
of a unified notation to facilitate a common understanding for CTI elements. In
the last step, the insights gained from the meta model and the unified notation
were applied to create a unified base model for CTI data structures. Overall,
the results of this work contribute to a common understanding for CTI data
structures, serve as comparison tool for CTI formats and point out different
future opportunities in this area. The developed meta model also represents a
tool that allows the evaluation of CTI data format components and that allows
to establish comparability between the components. It therefore represents one
essential building block for future research, such as for the development of data
quality metrics for CTI data. Ultimately, the results of this work support the
creation of an industry standard for representing threat intelligence data. In this
context, the developed rule set and the unified notation can be used as a basis
for the integration of component definitions from different formats into one. The
unified model serves as an initial model for the creation of a standardization for
CTI data formats as well as for data format optimization within the integration
process.
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Abstract
The ever-increasing amount of major security incidents has led to an emerging interest in cooperative
approaches to encounter cyber threats. To enable cooperation in detecting and preventing attacks it is an
inevitable necessity to have structured and standardized formats to describe an incident. Corresponding
formats are complex and of an extensive nature as they are often designed for automated processing and
exchange. These characteristics hamper the readability and, therefore, prevent humans from understanding
the documented incident. This is a major problem since the success and effectiveness of any security
measure rely heavily on the contribution of security experts.
To meet these shortcomings we propose a visual analytics concept enabling security experts to analyze and
enrich semi-structured cyber threat intelligence information. Our approach combines an innovative way of
persisting this data with an interactive visualization component to analyze and edit the threat information. We
demonstrate the feasibility of our concept using the Structured Threat Information eXpression, the state-of-
the-art format for reporting cyber security issues.
Keywords: Cyber threat intelligence, Visual analytics, Usable cybersecurity, STIX
Introduction
Over the last years the number of IT security inci-
dents has been constantly increasing among compan-
ies. In order to keep pace with this development,
there is a necessity for ever-improving protective
measures. As single entities are no longer able to
handle the vast amount of possible attack scenarios
acting collaboratively against such attacks is an emer-
ging trend. It is widely believed that cooperative
approaches, in particular those based on the exchange
of threat intelligence information, can contribute signifi-
cantly to improve defensive capabilities (Shackleford
2015). A key factor for realizing cooperative approaches
are the underlying threat intelligence data formats. They
offer a semi-structured representation of identified threats
and ensure a common understanding of security-related
observations. As they document incidents using general
mark-up languages, a common characteristic of these for-
mats is a good machine-readability.
However, text-intensive and semi-structured data is
of very little use for security experts due to its extent
and lack of human-readability. This is a major prob-
lem when taking the role of security experts in to-
day’s companies into consideration. As the success
and effectiveness of incident prevention, detection,
and reaction rely heavily on the knowledge of security
experts (Shackleford 2016; Luttgens et al. 2014), they
need to understand what happened, how to react ap-
propriately, and how to prevent new outbreaks of
cyberattacks.
Structured threat intelligence is of great value for
experts as it enables them to understand threats and
attacks. However, this is only possible when experts
are able to read and analyze this information. It is
further crucial for experts to easily edit it in order to
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include any additional or missing information. The
interaction requires an integrity-proof approach to
persist original data in order to ensure the availability
of untampered evidence for possible subsequent court
cases.
We propose KAVAS, a knowledge-assisted visual
analytics concept for the Structured Threat Informa-
tion eXpression (STIX). KAVAS enables security ex-
perts to analyze and enrich cyber threat intelligence
(CTI) data. We combine a novel way of persisting
this semistructured data in a graph-based database
with an interactive visualization. To demonstrate the
feasibility of KAVAS we utilize the state-of-the-art
format for structuring CTI information, STIX 2. Our
work aims to improve the accessibility of cyber threat
intelligence for security experts and to include them
in the process of creating a comprehensive documen-
tation for security incidents.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces the background of our work with
regard to related research fields. In Section 3 we analyze
related work and reach out for introducing the ad-
dressed research gap. This chapter is followed by the de-
scription of applied concepts and design decisions we
made for KAVAS in Section 4. After introducing the
main concepts of KAVAS we proceed to showcase how
our approach works in Section 5. Section 6 qualitatively
evaluates the applied approach to make threat
intelligence accessible to security analysts. We conclude
in Section 7 by discussing our concept and identifying
future work.
Background
This section provides an overview of the Structured
Threat Information eXpression format STIX, which is
the state-of-the-art project for semi-structured represen-
tation of cyber threat intelligence information. Further-
more, a general view on knowledge and its role in the
field of visual analytics is given.
Structured threat information eXpression (STIX)
As argued above, structured formats are a key element
within the threat intelligence exchange process because
they pre-define which information can be shared.
Additionally, these formats define requirements for the
information density of the data to be shared. Depending
on the specific use-case and the required contentual ex-
tent, the literature provides several formats that sup-
port structuring threat intelligence information.
Examples for such formats are IODEF,1 VERIS,2 and
STIX.3 The primary focus of IODEF is the exchange of
incident information between Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERTs), whereas VERIS focuses the
measurement and management of risks involved in
incidents. STIX 2, in contrast, is not bound to a specific
use case and provides a comprehensive tool set for the
representation of various information about incidents.
As it is the format with the broadest possibilities in ap-
plication (Menges and Pernul 2018), we focus our work
on STIX 2 as the most recent version of STIX. This
choice is further substantiated by STIX being the
de-facto standard format for the exchange of threat
intelligence information at present, which can also be
anticipated for its successor STIX 2 in the near future
(Shackleford 2015; Sauerwein et al. 2017). It provides
the most extensive data structures among the available
formats as shown by Asgarli et al. (Asgarli and Burger
2016) as well as by Menges and Pernul (Menges and
Pernul 2018). This allows a wide ranging integration of
expert knowledge into the analysis process. STIX 2 also
provides highly flexible data structures allowing inter-
actions of domain experts with very few limitations.
Regarding the content, STIX 2 provides a holistic rep-
resentation for incident information, which is structured
using the lightweight JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
file format. The data format provides two core compo-
nent types: A STIX Domain Object (SDO) describing
the characteristics of an incident and a STIX Relation-
ship Object (SRO) describing relationships between
those characteristics.
In its current version, STIX 2 specifies SDO ele-
ments for the representation of the attacking entity,
event data describing the occurred incident as well as
countermeasures initiated by the victim entity. The
representation of the attacking entity includes infor-
mation about the threat actor, the objectives, tools
and attack patterns used within an attack. It also sup-
ports the description of entire attack campaigns and
the attribution of attackers to such campaigns. The
lateral movement of an incident can be represented
using information such as exploited vulnerabilities,
detected malware or digital identities involved in the
incident. Actions taken to prevent an attack as well
as responses to an attack can also be represented and
associated to corresponding incidents afterwards.
Furthermore, STIX 2 specifies SRO elements to dy-
namically connect SDO elements. These connections
can be realized using Relationship and Sighting Objects.
Relationship objects indicate dependencies between
SDOs, whereas Sighting objects refer to observed occur-
rences of SDOs. This allows building highly flexible rep-
resentations for incidents only limited by the SDO
definitions that are available within the data model (Pi-
azza et al. 2017a; Piazza et al. 2017b). To encapsulate
fully captured incidents, STIX 2 specifies an additional
bundle element encapsulating all SDO and SRO ele-
ments captured in the course of an incident. Listing 1
gives a short example of a STIX 2 bundle.
Böhm et al. Cybersecurity            (2018) 1:16 Page 2 of 19
3. GRAPH-BASED VISUAL ANALYTICS FOR CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE 66
Dissertation Florian Menges, 2020
This listing shows the two SDO elements threat-actor
and malware as well as the SRO element relationship,
which connects the SDO elements using its properties
source ref and target _ref. This example intends to illus-
trate the notation for objects and dependencies within the
format as well as to give an impression of the possible
complexity considering more extensive STIX 2 files.
Whenever the term “STIX” is used in the following
sections, we actually refer to STIX 2.
Knowledge-assisted visual analytics
Visual Analytics (VA) is a combination of two important
analytic reasoning processes: interactive visualization
and automated analysis both striving to gain new
insights (Keim et al. 2010). Keim et al. (Keim et al. 2008)
define the creation of insight or knowledge as the final
step in their widely accepted process for VA. This defin-
ition and other VA processes describe knowledge as a
solely human artifact. However, not only humans own
knowledge but a specific type of knowledge also exists
for any automated analysis method included in VA
(Fayyad et al. 2002; Sacha et al. 2014).
Therefore, knowledge-assisted visual analytics
distinguishes the terms explicit and tacit knowledge
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Polanyi 1983). Explicit
knowledge can be defined as machine knowledge
which can be read, processed, and stored by ma-
chines. Tacit knowledge is very specific to the individ-
ual and specialized as only humans are able to extract
this knowledge type. In the context of knowledgeas-
sisted visual analytics, tacit knowledge can be subdi-
vided into smaller notions: 1) operational knowledge
and 2) domain knowledge (Chen 2005). By having the
appropriate operational knowledge a user knows how
to interact with a visual analytics system. Domain or
context knowledge is the ability of a user to interpret
the visual representation regarding a specific context.
Only a combination of these two types of knowledge
enables users to understand the message told by a
visual analytics system and thus to derive new know-
ledge (Chen 2005). Knowledge-assisted visual analytics
aims to support the exchange of all these different
knowledge types.
These exchanges can be formally described using
knowledge conversion processes (Nonaka and Takeuchi
1995). Chen et al. (Chen et al. 2009) adapt these pro-
cesses for information visualization. Wang et al. (Wang
et al. 2009) as well as Federico et al. (Federico et al.
2017) further substantiate the concept of knowledge
conversion to visual analytics with a special focus on ex-
plicit knowledge. The four conversion processes are
namely: Internalization, Externalization, Combination,
and Collaboration.
Internalization in knowledge-assisted visualization en-
compasses the transformation of explicit knowledge to
tacit knowledge through visual interfaces. It supports
humans in order to understand and transform explicit
knowledge into domain knowledge (Wang et al. 2009).
From a visualization perspective, this process is similar
to the concepts of sensemaking (Pirolli and Card 2005)
and insight or knowledge generation (Sacha et al. 2014;
Chang et al. 2009). Internalization in terms of
visualization can be described as follows: explicit know-
ledge is visually represented and through interactive ex-
ploration users gain tacit knowledge. Internalization is a
high-level description of the generation of insight which
is the primary goal and process of any visualization
(Chen et al. 2009; Chang et al. 2009).
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Externalization describes the transfer of knowledge
along the opposite direction in contrast to internaliza-
tion. It is a process where tacit knowledge is translated
to explicit knowledge based on the insight of a user.
There are existing prototypes in the visualization com-
munity showing that visualization tools taking
externalization into consideration is suitable and effect-
ive for persisting and making use of experts’ domain
knowledge (Federico et al. 2017). Externalization can be
applied using two main approaches. First, the more fre-
quently applied approach is enabling users to directly
transfer their knowledge. There exists a range of possi-
bilities for implementing direct externalization. Exam-
ples are adjusting machine learning algorithms’
parameters (Theron et al. 2017), adding patterns and
rules to a knowledge database (Wagner et al. 2017) or
changing an ontology used by automated analysis
methods (Wang et al. 2009). Second, the other way to
implement externalization is an implicit one by inferring
explicit knowledge based on interactions of users with
the visualization (Endert et al. 2012; Zhong et al. 2018).
For example, dragging a node to a different location
could be used to update and adjust the model of a clus-
tering algorithm to fit the new position of the node.
Collaboration characterizes the exchange of tacit
knowledge between humans (Wang et al. 2009). This
process does not explicitly rely on computers and
visualization as the most common form of sharing
tacit knowledge is direct communication. However,
collaboration can be supported through visual inter-
faces and the possibilities to externalize tacit know-
ledge and therefore, making it accessible for others at
any time, supporting them to improve their own
knowledge (Coleman et al. 1996).
Combination is a process where explicit knowledge
from different sources is incorporated into an existing
explicit knowledge system. It helps to improve available
knowledge and to combine different bodies of explicit
knowledge. This process is mostly independent from any
visual representation of the explicit knowledge (Wang et
al. 2009). However, users are integrated into this process
by supporting the combination, identifying relations and
finding inconsistencies or redundancies.
The development of knowledge-based interfaces and
the representation of knowledge generated throughout
the entire analytical process has been declared a key
challenge for visual analytics research (Thomas and
Cook 2005; Pike et al. 2009). However, in the domain of
cyber security this is still underdeveloped.
Related work
Only few scientific publications tackle the problem of
making threat intelligence information understandable
for security experts by using visual interfaces. Even less
work is available in the area of visual analytics systems
specifically designed to display STIX.
Leichtnam et al. (Leichtnam et al. 2017) introduce a
visualization approach for heterogeneous data sources.
To transform the diverse data into a normalized model
they derive a proprietary data model inspired by STIX.
They build a visualization for their proprietary format.
However, a visual representation for complex threat
intelligence information documented with STIX itself is
not provided.
A visualization displaying STIX in its full comprehen-
siveness is built by the STIX community itself.4 This
visualization builds a visual representation of a STIX
bundle but lacks clear and structured design principles.
Especially the functionality for security experts to con-
vert their domain knowledge into machinereadable
threat intelligence knowledge is missing.
While there is ongoing research in the area of struc-
tured formats for cyber threat intelligence (e.g. STIX)
(Sauerwein et al. 2017) as well as knowledge-assisted vis-
ual analytics (Federico et al. 2017), there are, to the best
of our knowledge, no efforts towards combining these
two concepts in order to make threat intelligence infor-
mation accessible for security experts.
In order to address this research gap, we define the
following three requirements for our solution:
 R1 - Handling complex threat intelligence data:
Enable integrity preserving storage and management
of STIX as a notion of explicit knowledge in an
appropriate database system rather than processing
JSON files.
 R2 - Visual representation of STIX: Create an
interactive visualization for STIX-based CTI infor-
mation allowing security experts to derive know-
ledge and gain insights from an incident
documentation.
 R3 - Conversion of experts’ knowledge: Allow the
exchange of explicit knowledge and security experts’
tacit knowledge. Domain knowledge can be made
available in the semi-structured STIX description of
an incident by externalization. Therefore, the inci-
dent can be described more comprehensively and
experts can benefit from each other’s knowledge.
Our concept can be interpreted as a knowledge view
in the information visualization framework introduced
by Shrinivasan and van Wijk (Shrinivasan and van Wijk
2008) in 2008 to support analytical reasoning.
Concept and design
This section introduces the concept and design decisions
made for the two main components of KAVAS: its per-
sistence layer called Cyber Threat Intelligence Vault
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(CTI Vault) to store and manage STIX as well as the
corresponding visual analytics component to enable
users to understand and interact with complex threat
intelligence information. These concepts are aligned to
the previously defined key requirements for KAVAS.
CTI vault
Hereinafter, we propose a concept for the persistence and
handling of STIX cyber threat intelligence information.
R1 - handling complex threat intelligence data
STIX is designed as a graph-based model, which defines
its domain objects as graph nodes and their relationships
as edges. Therefore, we have chosen a graph database, as
underlying technology in order to persist intelligence
data appropriately.
The CTI Vault serves as an extensible knowledge
base, providing access for domain experts to the
threat intelligence information, which can be seen as a
notion of explicit knowledge. It represents a
structured data storage for gathering captured
incident data, which originate from individual files in
JSON format. It serves as a technical foundation for
storing incident information and additional domain
expert knowledge, such as perceived similarities,
differences and relationships between the different
incidents.
Due to the dynamic data structures of STIX, the storage
needs to provide capabilities for persisting data in a way
that allows the integration of arbitrary relationships be-
tween the stored entities. Another essential requirement
for the data storage is to assure integrity for the cap-
tured incident information. This is of special importance
as the threat intelligence information could serve as
piece of evidence in possible subsequent court cases.
Therefore, it has to be ensured that interactions with do-
main experts will not distort any of the captured data,
while preserving capabilities for enriching the captured
data with additional information simultaneously.
To achieve these requirements, a differentiation be-
tween inventory data and appended data has to be
made within the data storage. The inventory data, which
represents the data foundation for incident information,
describes all data that has been captured within an inci-
dent. The threat information contained in the stored en-
tities as well as their relationships may not be changed
after their initial storage and can consequently be con-
sidered constant. Therefore, this data has to be
read-only. However, this is different for the use of
appended data. These entities may be inserted, altered
and deleted at any time and are intended to be con-
nected with inventory data. Whenever information is
edited, it has to be ensured that none of the operations
performed on appended entities will influence the integ-
rity of the inventory data.
The proposed concept is influenced both by the de-
fined data structures within the STIX specification and
the requirements for an interaction of domain experts
with these data structures. However, the base require-
ment for the concept is the alignment to the STIX speci-
fication, to ensure the compatibility with the STIX data
structures. This preserves the ability to exchange threat
information with any endpoint compatible to STIX.
Considering the requirements defined above, we firstly
introduce an approach for persisting inventory data. This
will be achieved by mapping the data available in the
STIX data format, into a database representation.
The concept is subsequently extended by an approach
for enriching the inventory data with appended data
allowing the association of threat information to domain
expert knowledge. Summarizing, the concept for hand-
ling complex threat intelligence data is based on the fol-
lowing two requirements, which will be specified in
more detail afterwards.
 R1.1 - Structured storage for threat intelligence
data: The collected data is stored in a structured
way within a graph database as inventory data. The
data storage has to be aligned to the STIX
specification, allowing arbitrary relationships
between the stored entities.
 R1.2 - Integrity-proof storage and enrichment of
persisted data: A further requirement for the
storage of threat intelligence data is to guarantee
data integrity from insert operations onward.
Moreover, subsequent update operations of the
inventory data must not endanger its integrity.
Therefore, it is mandatory to introduce a
provenance process for every performed
enrichment.
R1.1 - structured storage for threat intelligence data
To realize a concept of storing inventory data into the
database, it is necessary to take a closer look at the STIX
specification as well as to consider possibilities for the
representation within a graph database.
The specification of STIX defines SDOs for the repre-
sentation of threat intelligence information on the one
hand and SROs defining relations between domain ob-
jects on the other hand. Both SDO and SRO are speci-
fied as stand-alone objects in STIX that allow to store
multiple properties. According to the specification, SRO
objects represent the relationships within the model by
holding additional properties pointing to a source and
target reference, each of which has to be a SDO. The
combination of SDOs and SROs builds a directed graph,
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in which the first ones represent graph node objects and
the latter ones represent edges connecting these nodes.
In contrast to this type of representation, graph data-
bases allow the use of object types for creating nodes,
whereas edges cannot be represented using object types.
This leads to the necessity of adjusting the type of repre-
sentation within the database in order to properly trans-
late STIX into the database representation. Our
approach for adjusting these interrelations between the
STIX objects is visualized in Fig. 1(a) and described in
more detail afterwards.
Our concept defines the representation of both SDO
and SRO as physical nodes within the graph database.
While SDOs act as self-sufficient nodes, SROs represent
the relationships between SDOs and, therefore, act add-
itionally as logical STIX edges. Finally, information
about the source and target attributes of the relationship
is transformed into physical edges realizing these rela-
tionships within the database. This leads to a representa-
tion that fully maintains the structural integrity of the
STIX data model on the one hand and allows to map re-
lationship properties into logical edges on the other
hand. Conclusively, this results in a logical representa-
tion for the directed-graph structure of STIX, which is
stored using a physical non-directed graph structure
within the database.
In addition to this, the STIX specification defines de-
tected incident information to be pooled in relation to a
root bundle element. Since the physical graph is
non-directed, the bundle element can be connected to
every SDO contained within an incident to achieve the
pooling. This element can serve as an entry point for the
traversal of incident information at the same time.
R1.2 - integrity-proof storage and enrichment of persisted
data
Within the process of storing data into the CTI Vault,
the integrity of captured data is essential to preserve its
evidential significance for any subsequent forensic ana-
lyses or even for court cases. The proposed concept pro-
vides two different mechanisms to guarantee the
integrity for stored incident information. On the one
hand, the integrity of incident information has to be en-
sured when it enters the system for the first time, on the
other hand, changes on persisted information have to be
conducted in an integrity preserving manner. The integ-
rity of inserted information is preserved using controlled
redundancies. Inserted information will intentionally not
be checked for redundancies to prevent any possible dis-
tortion of this data. The insertion of redundant data is
possible, since the graph database assigns an internal
unique identifier for every element inserted. This, in
turn, prevents objects with the same content from pro-
ducing collisions. However, delimitation for redundant
b
a
Fig. 1 CTI Vault of KAVAS. a Persisted Inventory Data (b) Enriched
Inventory Data
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objects remains still possible due to the pooling of ele-
ments and their affiliation to their root element, namely
their bundle. The only exception for this are insertions
of redundant elements within one bundle. However, this
would only be the case if the elements contain identical
STIX unique identifiers, which makes them both syntac-
tically and semantically identical and consequently leads
to a unification of these elements.
In addition to the concept of integrity-proof persisting
for inventory data, the CTI Vault is designed to provide
capabilities to store additional data that enriches the
available information with domain knowledge of experts.
Therefore, it needs to enable the extension of existing
objects and relationships of inventory data. Since the en-
richment of data with domain expert knowledge is not
necessarily a singular event, the database also needs to
provide capabilities for historicization of all performed
changes.
As stated above, the concept of enriching inventory
data is based on two main requirements. It has to be en-
sured that the inventory data will not be altered at any
time and that the enriched data is still fully compatible
to the STIX 2 specification. Consequently, the concept
for enriching inventory data is also based on the STIX
data structures.
According to this, only valid SDO or SRO elements
that meet the STIX specification may be appended to
the inventory data. Similar to the persistence of inven-
tory data, appended data is also structured based on
SDO nodes that are connected using logical and physical
edges respectively. This results in a consistent database
structure.
Figure 1(b) shows an exemplary SDO element within
the inventory data extended by two subsequent changes,
which are realized using a versioning structure within
the database. In this process, supplementary nodes are
added for each change. To indicate that nodes have been
overwritten, the CTI Vault flags the respective former
versions as “revoked” according to the STIX specifica-
tion (Piazza et al. 2017b).
The first change is realized by creating a version
SDO-v1 that extends the information within the original
SDO, which is part of the inventory data. SDO-v1 in
turn is connected to its base entity using a newly created
relationship object SRO-v1. The second change is real-
ized by creating a further version SDO-v2 and a corre-
sponding relationship SRO-v2. It is important to
maintain the order of succession for all changes per-
formed. As a result, this concept enables every node
within the inventory data to carry its own chain of edi-
ted data.
The presented concept for persisting cyber threat
intelligence information in the STIX format fulfills
therefore our requirement R1. This concept is the basis
to support the Combination process as we interpret the
STIX information stored in the CTI Vault to be explicit
knowledge (Chen et al. 2009; Ackoff 1989).
Visualization design
The visual analytics component enables security experts
to analyze, understand, and edit threat intelligence infor-
mation. As described in Section 2.1, STIX is a powerful
but text-intensive and semi-structured threat intelligence
format. A single bundle can easily reach thousands of
lines for complex incidents. This makes the documenta-
tion very hard to analyze and understand for security ex-
perts. This gets even worse when an expert appends
information to the STIX file. In order to externalize do-
main knowledge, the complex structure of the format in-
cluding all possible objects, relationships, their
attributes, and allowed values for the attributes has to be
known. To support the tasks of analyzing and enriching
threat intelligence documented in STIX, we developed a
visual analytics component on top of the previously in-
troduced CTI vault.
Figure 2 shows the visualization component in the
overall context of the system and defines the relations
between KAVAS and security experts: the visualization
uses the explicit knowledge stored in the CTI vault and
maps this knowledge into an interactive view using the
specification. The security experts can perceive the dis-
played knowledge to gain insight and situational aware-
ness (Yen et al. 2014). At the same time they can use
their operational knowledge to interact with the
visualization in order to adjust the view specification or
to enrich the information stored in the CTI vault.
R2 - visual representation of STIX
As STIX is designed to be a connected and directed
graph of nodes and edges we are using a directed
node-link diagram to represent knowledge persisted in
the CTI Vault (Piazza et al. 2017a). This visualization
technique is well suited for understanding threat
intelligence as it reveals interconnections using nodes
and edges (Severino 2018; Heer et al. 2010). Revealing
the relationship between specific nodes (e.g. threat ac-
tors, used attack patterns and the targeted entities) is a
crucial task of experts analyzing STIX. This makes the
node-link diagram appropriate for the data structure at
hand. However, Marty (Marty 2009) as well as Card et
al. (Card et al. 1999) identify two main challenges when
using node-link diagrams. To address those and to en-
sure the design of a suitable visual representation of
STIX, we need to fulfill the following more specific
requirements:
 R2.1 - Render complex threat intelligence: The
cyber threat intelligence persisted in the IoC Vault
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is displayed in a suitable visual representation. The
visual representation is fully capable to parse, map,
and render all information provided in STIX bundles
according to the STIX specification.
 R2.2 - Scalable visual display: As STIX bundles
can contain hundreds of objects and even more links
between these objects, the visual display has to be
scalable. This can be assured by an appropriate
layout algorithm and interactions for the users to
adjust the layout.
 R2.3 - Exploratory analysis: To allow that users
can deduce tacit knowledge from the displayed
explicit knowledge, the visual representation must
provide interactions supporting the analytical
process of users.
R2.1 - render complex threat intelligence
The first challenge is to identify an appropriate way for
positioning the nodes and links in the visualization
space. SDO and SRO are abstract data constructs and do
not have any natural position like on a geographical
map. The InfoVis pipeline introduced by Card et al.
(Card et al. 1999) is a process for creating views based
on abstract data. By applying this process to SDOs and
SROs, we are able to generate a visual representation of
STIX. The following paragraphs describe our adaption
of the InfoVis pipeline.
Originally, the pipeline starts with a data analysis re-
sponsible for data cleansing or interpolating missing
values. We omit this step in our visual component as
the CTI Vault is designed to persist only semantically
and syntactically correct STIX bundles. Therefore, our
view generation process starts with filtering the data to
be visualized, as shown in the Visualization-box in Fig. 2.
Filtering is realized by receiving a single userselected
STIX bundle from the vault. This ensures that the ana-
lyst only sees information related to the bundle of inter-
est. According to the InfoVis pipeline this single STIX
bundle and the corresponding objects are referred to as
focus data (Card et al. 1999).
The STIX objects in the focus data do not have any
available positioning in the visualization space yet.
Therefore, we need to transform the STIX-specific data
structure into displayable nodes and edges in a
mapping-step. As the STIX format defines SDOs to be
nodes and SROs to be links in its graph-based structure,
we adopt this definition. However, we had to make ad-
justments to improve the comprehensibility of a visually
represented STIX bundle. We are displaying not only
SROs as links in the node-link diagram but also import-
ant relationships embedded into SDOs referencing other
objects. These embedded relationships are important to
understand underlying connections in the threat
intelligence information. For example, when an incident
report is documented with STIX, embedded relation-
ships of the report highlight which objects the report re-
fers to. This and similar information can be important to
an expert when analyzing an incident. To allow a fast
perception of embedded links, we decided to include
embedded relationships of SDOs as specially denoted
edges into the diagram.
Additionally, we had to adjust the way STIX Sighting
objects are represented in our visualization to retain a
visually understandable way of representing STIX. These
objects denote the insight that an attack, threat actor,
campaign or other domain object was seen (Piazza et al.
2017b). They are used whenever an already documented
attack is identified at another entity as well. Therefore,
they are applied to track who was targeted as well as
which attacks were performed. A Sighting object is spe-
cified to be a relationship. This means it would appear
as a link in the visual representation although a Sighting
is only connected to other SDOs via embedded relation-
ships. We decided to include Sightings as nodes which
are connected to SDOs via their different embedded re-
lationships in the visual STIX representation to improve
the perception of Sightings. These design decisions en-
able rendering all STIX objects as nodes and links on
the canvas.
R2.2 - scalable visual display
Another issue of node-link diagrams is their limited scal-
ability in terms of large numbers of highly connected
nodes. They tend to resemble hairballs which makes it
hard for users to understand the displayed information.
Fig. 2 High-level structure of KAVAS
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STIX bundles with large numbers of SDOs and SROs
hamper a fast visual perception of relationships between
the objects. However, a well-chosen layout algorithm
and interactive functionalities for experts to adjust the
layout can reduce this problem (Marty 2009). These
functionalities are of great importance to ensure that a
user is able to customize the visual representation of the
STIX bundle. To arrange the information appropriately
on the visualization canvas we apply a force-directed
graph layout (Kobourov 2010). This algorithm creates a
node-link diagram driven by different forces (e.g. gravity
of node clusters, strength of links), which avoids over-
lapping as far as possible. However, due to the possible
size and complexity of highly-interconnected STIX inci-
dent representations, it is necessary to provide inter-
active functionalities for security experts to adjust the
layout themselves. This is especially necessary, when the
automated force-directed algorithm is not capable to
render a feasible layout anymore. In KAVAS we imple-
ment interactions allowing users to drag and drop single
nodes and pin them to the desired position. Additionally,
users can browse into specific parts of the STIX bundle
by zooming. If the amount of nodes is overstraining the
user, filters can be applied to show and hide the different
types of SDOs and SROs.
R2.3 - exploratory analysis
Our concept allows security experts to interactively ex-
plore visually represented incident documentation. This
exploratory analysis follows the Information Seeking
Mantra defined by Shneiderman: “Overview first, zoom
and filter, details on demand” (Shneiderman 1996). The
Overview is provided by the initially generated node-link
diagram based on the STIX intelligence information.
With common interaction patterns like Pan-and-Zoom,
hovering actions, filtering and Drag and Drop, security
experts can adjust the view (Heer and Shneiderman
2012). This fulfills the Zoom and filterrequirement of
Shneiderman’s mantra. Details on demand are displayed
when an element of the node-link diagram is selected.
By analyzing the visual STIX representation users
broaden both their operational knowledge and their do-
main knowledge (Chen et al. 2009).
By implementing R2.1, R2.2, and R2.3 in our ap-
proach, we are able to provide an interactive visual rep-
resentation of the explicit knowledge embedded in the
threat intelligence.
R3 - conversion of experts’ knowledge
KAVAS allows the enrichment and editing of cyber
threat intelligence while preserving the integrity of the
original information at the same time. The enrichment
and editing is necessary to externalize any additional or
missing information from the user’s domain knowledge.
Preserving the integrity throughout this editing action
allows the intelligence to serve as piece of evidence. In
our approach, security experts are able to externalize
their domain knowledge either through changing the at-
tributes of existing SDOs and SROs or through adding
new nodes and links. This functionality covers the
Externalization process as users are able to transfer their
domain knowledge to the CTI Vault, where it is pre-
served as explicit knowledge.
Our concept supports the Collaboration of several se-
curity experts by transforming it to explicit knowledge.
This explicit knowledge can then be displayed to other
users, which could further support them in their analysis
of the incident. Thus, experts editing existing intelligence
implicitly make their domain knowledge accessible for
other users.
Visualization architecture
We adopted the classical Model-View-Controller
(MVC) design pattern for the visual analytics compo-
nent (Krasner and Pope 2000). This divides the appli-
cation into three main interconnected parts to
separate the internal representation of information
and business logic from the visual presentation to a
user. Figure 3 shows a high-level view on the MVC
structure of the KAVAS visualization component. The
MVC-structure of KAVAS shown in the figure is also
aligned with the different steps of the InfoVis pipeline
described earlier.
The Database Connector is the interface towards the
available web services of the CTI vault enabling the
visualization to retrieve threat intelligence data. It also
enables the visualization to send updates to the database
in case a security expert edited the STIX documentation.
The visualization exchanges STIX-based documentations
in JSON format with the vault.
The STIX Parser receives the JSON file from the
Database Connector. It is responsible for parsing the
file into instances of the SRO and the SDO data
models. Both these models inherit a number of com-
mon properties every STIX object must contain. The
models are specified in accordance with the STIX 2
specification (Piazza et al. 2017b). In addition to the
simple attribute values, our models define the data
type of the property and a description for the proper-
ties. They also define whether a property is required.
All this information is extracted from the STIX speci-
fication to be able to parse CTI information from the
vault and to create valid STIX documentations based
on changes made by security experts. The model in-
stances are held by the parser in two different lists;
one containing relationship objects and the other
containing domain objects. Parsing JSON into object
instances has two main advantages: easy mapping and
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rendering of objects into a node-link diagram as well
as assuring compliance of processed STIX objects
with the specification.
As pointed out earlier the abstract STIX data has no
position in the diagram yet. The STIX Mapper maps the
parsed STIX objects onto the visualization canvas. It
wraps every instance of the beforehand described STIX
models with a NodeType or LinkType. These data models
contain additional properties (e.g. position, movement
speed, etc.) to enable the NodeLink Controller to render
the NodeLink View, which displays the interactive visual
STIX representation. The View Specification tells the
NodeLink Controller important settings such as the
current zoom factor, gravity, link length, node radius
and others.
The details of any STIX object can now be shown by
handing over the selected NodeType to the ObjectDetails
Controller. This controller then queries the object lists
of the STIX Parser to receive the corresponding STIX
object instance. This instance is forwarded to the
ObjectDetails View for displaying details-on-demand.
When an expert edits the STIX description, the parser
receives the changes from the controllers, changes the
model if necessary and forwards the changes through to
the Database Connector to the CTI vault.
Prototype
In the following paragraphs we explain applied technolo-
gies for implementing KAVAS and give some detail of
its functionalities with a short and small-scaled working
exemplary bundle. A prototype of KAVAS is available
here: http://bit.ly/2v9mSna (Sauerwein et al. 2017).
Please note that KAVAS is currently an academic proto-
type. The linked version serves as a proof of concept.
We are aware of required improvements to allow the op-
erative use of KAVAS. The most emergent improve-
ments are scoped for further versions of KAVAS and are
described at the end of this article.
Applied technologies
The KAVAS visual analytics component is exclusively
based on open-source web technologies forming a
client-server web application in combination with the
CTI vault (see Fig. 4). The CTI vault serves as back-end,
providing the underlying data storage as described in
Section 4.1 in combination with an API that enables
data access for the front-end application. The vault is re-
alized using the Java-based graph database Neo4j
(Asgarli and Burger 2016) as base technology. Conse-
quently, we also chose Java as language for realizing the
access to the database as well as the related business
logic managing the access. This layer assures the compli-
ance to the object constraints predetermined by STIX,
such as the specified object definitions and relationships.
This is necessary, since the graph database does not
provide such capabilities. In order to provide web-based
access to the storage application, the actual Java imple-
mentation is running on a JavaEE5 based application ser-
ver. This allows us to provide REST webservices that
can be accessed from the front-end application. The
main technologies on the front-end are Angular.io6 and
Angular Material7 which are frameworks on top of
Fig. 3 MVC-based architecture of KAVAS’ visualization
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HTML5, CSS3 and JavaScript. The interactive node-link
diagram is implemented using the D3.js8-library.
Interactive exploration
Figure 5 displays different views of the visual interface of
KAVAS. The bundle shown in the figure is part of the
official example data sets for STIX 2.9 Figure 5(a) shows
the main view of the KAVAS visualization: an overview
of a STIX bundle displayed as node-link diagram. The
bundle itself documents an advanced persistent threat
targeting the Branistan Peoples Party (BPP) which is one
of the political parties of Branistan, a fictional country.
The BPP’s homepage is hit by an attack named Oper-
ation Bran Flakes where adversaries deploy Content
Spoofing trying to insert false information into the BPP’s
web page. The campaign is rolled out by a Fake BPP
which is most certainly sponsored by the Franistan
Intelligence service, whereby Franistan is considered an-
other fictional country. The MITRE Corporation de-
tected and documented the attack.
An expert gets an overview (see Fig. 5(a)) of the STIX
description in the node-link diagram after selecting the
STIX bundle in the tool-bar’s drop-down menu. The se-
lected bundle is then received from the CTI vault,
parsed and transformed for the visual display. To get a
first glance of the documented incident, the expert can
Pan-and-Zoom the diagram as well as drag and pin
nodes to a fixed location on the canvas. Panning and
zooming allows for interactive exploration. Dragging
nodes across the canvas and pinning them to specific lo-
cations helps the analyst with adjusting the node-link
diagram to be well arranged even for large numbers of
nodes and edges. Whenever the mouse is moved over a
node, KAVAS highlights the nearest neighbors of this
node (see Fig. 5(b)). With enabling experts to select a
node or link of the diagram and displaying the detailed
properties of this STIX object (see Fig. 5(c)), KAVAS
fully implements the Information Seeking Mantra for
threat intelligence information.
Embedded relationships are not displayed as separated
edges in Fig. 5(a). This is another functionality imple-
mented in the visualization component. As described
earlier, we map the embedded relationships of STIX ob-
jects as specially denoted edges. However, displaying all
embedded relationships leads to incomprehensible dia-
grams very fast. Therefore, the embedded links as well
as all other node or link types can be hidden or dis-
played interactively by the user.
Editing and enriching CTI information
Analysts can enable editing whenever they want to
change or add any information to the bundle. When this
mode is activated the view itself stays the same to keep
the analyst in the existing visual metaphor. However, the
interaction behavior is different. Clicking on the blank
canvas now triggers the process for adding a node to the
diagram. The first step in this process is selecting the
STIX object type as it defines the properties of the SDO.
KAVAS adds the node to the SDO list in the STIX
parser and displays it on the canvas. Afterwards, the tool
brings up the details-on-demand window and the user
can now edit the information for the newly added
object.
Instead of dragging a node as described earlier, click-
ing and moving the mouse with a node triggers the
process of adding an SRO while in Editing-mode. If the
mouse is released on a node, a new edge, with the start-
ing node as source and the ending node as target is
added to the canvas. From here on, the process for add-
ing the SRO to the parser and the canvas is similar to
adding a SDO. Finally, the user sees the newly created
link highlighted and the editable details-ondemand
window.
By clicking an existing node or link in editing mode
the properties of this STIX object can be changed except
for some properties, which by definition should not be
element to any changes throughout the whole life-cycle
of an object (e.g. its ID).
After the user clicks to save in the details-on-demand
window, the input is checked for its conformity with the
STIX specification. If the object is conform it is parsed
into a compliant JSON. This happens regardless of
whether a new object is added or an existing one is
changed. Afterwards the JSON is sent to the CTI vault
where the data is persisted.
When an expert starts editing a STIX bundle, this spe-
cific bundle is locked in the IoC Vault. Other users can
still load the bundle from the vault to analyze the corre-
sponding node-link diagram. However, they cannot
switch to editing mode and they are notified that the
bundle is currently edited by another user if they try to
edit the bundle. When the editing user finishes the work
on the bundle or closes the browser, the bundle is
unlocked in the vault. This is possible as changes to the
bundle are only possible on the level of SDOs and SROs
which have to be saved separately after they were
Fig. 4 Technologies used in KAVAS
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Fig. 5 Phases of Information Seeking Mantra in KAVAS A prototype of KAVAS is available at http://bit.ly/2v9mSna. The displayed bundle’s id is
bundle–81,810,123-b298-40f6-a4e7-186efcd07670 and it can be accessed via the drop-down menu in the toolbar of KAVAS. a Overview (b) Zoom
and Filter (c) Details on Demand
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changed. Other users are now notified that the bundle is
not locked anymore. When they activate the editing
mode, the bundle is reloaded from the vault to ensure
that they are working on the most recent version. They
also can reload the bundle manually without switching
the mode of action when they do not want to edit any-
thing but still want to analyze the latest version of the
STIX bundle.
Embedded knowledge processes
The KAVAS prototype is designed and implemented
after a knowledge-assisted visualization approach.
Therefore, the four knowledge conversion processes can
be clearly identified within KAVAS’ functionalities:
 Internalization: This knowledge conversion process
describes the transfer of explicit knowledge into tacit
knowledge through visual interfaces supporting
humans to understand the explicit knowledge.
KAVAS provides an interactive visual representation
of explicit knowledge encompassed in the threat
intelligence. In our system, internalization mainly
happens through the interactive exploration of
users. The node-link diagram and interaction
functionalities aligned with the Information Seeking
Mantra help users to inspect the knowledge and further
support the discovery of unknown relationships and
patterns which can become new domain knowledge.
 Externalization: Our concept allows tacit knowledge
of domain experts to be externalized and persisted
as explicit knowledge. Users can insert domain
knowledge that does not yet exist in the threat
intelligence information. Regardless of where the
missing domain knowledge is originating, once
acquired by the user, it can be directly inserted into
the STIX bundle to augment threat intelligence.
KAVAS allows this process through implementing
means for users to directly edit the displayed STIX
objects or add missing ones. Newly added
information is persisted in the CTI Vault. After
previously existing intelligence is changed, the
original information is kept and linked to the
updated version to ensure traceability of any
changes to the STIX bundle.
 Collaboration: This process emerges when a user
analyzes intelligence, which contains the
externalized knowledge of other users. All available
STIX information is persisted in the central CTI
Vault and all intelligence displayed to the users is
retrieved from this central intelligence storage.
When one domain expert changes an incident
description by editing existing intelligence or adding
new pieces of information, this externalized
knowledge is available for all other experts.
Accordingly, having the CTI Vault as a centralized
storage structure for all STIX intelligence and
enabling users to externalize their domain
knowledge, KAVAS supports the collaborative
generation of tacit knowledge among its users.
 Combination: This process encompasses the
insertion of new explicit knowledge into our existing
knowledge base (CTI Vault), which is able to
process any valid STIX bundle and to persist it. As a
first step, it is highly important that the original
bundle is stored regardless whether its information
elements overlap with existing bundles. Hence, the
bundle can be held in its original form and remains
useful as possible evidence in court. After the initial
storage of the original intelligence, further measures
can be applied to detect and remove inconsistencies
or redundancies. Currently, those measures are not
yet part of the CTI Vault. However, the combination
of existing explicit knowledge with new knowledge
can be realized with our concept of the CTI Vault.
Evaluation
To validate our prototypical implementation of KAVAS
and to provide first evidence of its usability and suitabil-
ity to support knowledge conversion, we followed a
two-fold research approach. An anonymous analyst sur-
vey validates the general suitability of the visualization
approach for the addressed problem and eliminates us-
ability issues of the interface. The survey is followed by
expert interviews to confirm that KAVAS can facilitate
knowledge conversions between domain experts and
cyber threat intelligence.
Analyst survey
This survey intends to validate the relevance of the ini-
tial problem and the suitability of our design approach.
Although, the survey cannot validate that the
visualization facilitates all four knowledge conversion
processes, it provides some hints whether the process of
internalization is appropriately tackled.
Participants
The survey involved twelve security analysts from differ-
ent academic institutions and companies such as inter-
net service providers and security consultancies. The
participants have a general understanding of threat
intelligence. However, none of them is currently working
with structured formats like STIX.
Design & Procedure
Staheli et al. (Staheli et al. 2014) propose a set of differ-
ent aspects to evaluate visualizations for cyber security.
Many of these aspects would need a more thorough user
study. However, our survey is meant to give a first
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indication on the suitability of KAVAS for making cyber
threat intelligence accessible for human analysts. Based
on the definitions proposed by Staheli et al. (Staheli et
al. 2014) we assess the dimensions User experience, Us-
ability and Learnability, Insight generation, and Feature
set utility. The questionnaire encloses questions with in-
formal character. Nevertheless, all questions are an-
swered on an interval Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5
with the first and last numerical value being labeled with
a textual description indicating the scale from 1: not at
all to 5: quite a lot. The questionnaire includes the fol-
lowing five questions:
 Q1: Is the analysis and understanding of incidents
relevant for your company/institution?
 Q2: Is the proposed visual tool effective for an
investigation of threat intelligence information?
 Q3: Is the proposed visual tool clear and
understandable?
 Q4: Is the proposed visual tool adequate to display
and enrich the available incident information?
 Q5: Does the tool overall help to understand what
happened during the described incident?
An additional open field allows participants to report
any further comments or suggestions on the tool.
Before the beginning of the survey, the analysts are in-
troduced to the tool, its features and our motivation to
build it. Subsequently, a JSON representation of a syn-
thetic incident as described in Section 5.2 is shown. By
using the JSON representation we are able to highlight
the main problem with STIX-based intelligence, which is
the low readability and accessibility of the format. After-
wards, the participants explore the incident freely and
are asked to fill out the questionnaire.
Results
Considering Fig. 6 and Table 1 we derive the fact that
the addressed problem is relevant for the respective
company or institution of the analysts. The high
standard deviation leads to the conclusion that the
need for sharing, exchanging, and analyzing threat
intelligence is not prevalent throughout the participat-
ing organizations yet. The feedback on Q2 shows that
a visual representation of threat intelligence is highly
preferred over a text-based representation. From the
answers to our third question about the usability of
the proposed tool, we can conclude that the tool is
indeed usable. However, we received some suggestions
for improvement. Especially the analysts who
answered Q3 with a score of 3 or lower, provided
helpful feedback. For instance, one comment recom-
mended that nodes should not bump back to their
original position after dragging to adjust the layout of
the node-link diagram permanently. This and further
received feedback was implemented into the subse-
quent version of KAVAS after this survey and before
the expert interviews. Feedback to the tool’s suitability
and adequacy with respect to editing threat
intelligence information (Q4) is very positive, as well.
Moreover, the feedback to Question Q5 shows that
KAVAS improves the understanding of incidents
within the target group.
Expert interviews
In order to get in-depth insight into the support of the
knowledge-assisted concepts in KAVAS, we implemented
the suggestions for improvement from the survey and
used the revised prototype for interviews with security ex-
perts to conduct a more detailed evaluation. The main
goal of these interviews is to validate that KAVAS helps
security experts to understand threat intelligence and that
existing information can be enriched with expert domain
knowledge. By showing the fulfillment of our prototype in
terms of these two requirements, we can confirm that
KAVAS indeed facilitates the internalization and
externalization knowledge conversion processes. The
remaining knowledge conversion processes, combination
and collaboration, both are implicitly implemented in
KAVAS: Threat intelligence can be inserted into the CTI
Vault at any time through an API (Combination).
Additionally, experts can collaboratively gain knowledge
through externalizing their knowledge and making it ac-
cessible for other users (Collaboration). Therefore, our in-
terviews focus on the internalization and externalization
knowledge conversion process.
Participants
The interviewees are represented by five security experts
from different sectors. We conducted interviews with a
Chief Information Security Officer and a security analyst
of an international machine manufacturer, with a Chief
Technology Officer of a SME operating in the area of se-
cure cloud services, with a consultant from a security
consultancy as well as with an academic researcher in
the field of IT security. None of the experts participated
in the previous survey. Each participant has a medium
to high knowledge regarding threat intelligence, while
three of them deal with threat intelligence and related
structured formats like STIX on a daily basis. However,
none of the interviewed experts obtains a visual repre-
sentation to facilitate this work.
Design & Procedure
The interviews with the experts are designed to follow a
semi-structured approach according to Lazar et al.
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(Lazar et al. 2010). The interviews are separated into the
following four phases:
 Phase 1) Introduction: At the beginning, every
participant is questioned about their experience,
such as their knowledge on CTI in general and on
STIX. Afterwards, each expert receives a brief
introduction into the STIX format and its problem
of readability and accessibility. Thereby, the experts
are asked to criticize any potential issues throughout
the following interview phases. Next, each
interviewee is guided to our prototypical web
application. During the whole interview, the screen,
of the participant using the tool, is shared with the
interviewers.
 Phase 2) Internalization: To be able to test the
intuitivity of the explorative analysis capabilities of
KAVAS, the different interactive functionalities are
not introduced in detail. The participants are asked
to open a synthetic, previously designed STIX
bundle (7 nodes, 8 links)10 and to try to understand
what happened in this bundle using the visual
representation. In this phase, we pay special
attention to the usage of interactions as well as to
how the expert try to gain insight. After this first
contact with KAVAS, the focus of the interview
switches to a much more extensive bundle (65
nodes, 90 links).11 With this bundle, we aim to
discuss the scalability of the visual display in terms
of the layout algorithm and the available interactions
to adjust the layout. To conclude this phase of the
interviews we ask for the experts’ opinion on the
tool so far and whether it supported them in
understanding the threat intelligence information.
 Phase 3) Externalization: The focus of this phase is
to test KAVAS’ suitability to facilitate the
externalization of domain knowledge, or more
specifically, the insertion of new information and the
modification of existing intelligence. To validate this
with the interviewees, we provide a number of
additional pieces of information and ask them to add
this information to the previously explored smaller
bundle. Again, we request them to give us feedback
and criticize the tool whenever they have problems
in understanding how it is working.
 Phase 4) Wrap-Up: The last phase of the interviews
is dedicated to a summarizing discussion. Here, we
discuss with the participant whether a more
advanced version of KAVAS would be applicable to
operative deployment and the conditions thereto.
Finally, we collect a list of features and functionalities
the interviewees find useful for improving the
prototype.
Results
The interviews lasted between 45 to 70min, which was
mainly due to the summarizing discussion, where the ex-
perts brought up a lot of interesting points reaching
from possible improvements of STIX itself to functional-
ity features of KAVAS necessary for operative deploy-
ment in an organization. The results of the conducted
Fig. 6 Box plot reporting the KAVAS evaluation results. Solid lines mark the mean while dashed lines highlight the median
Table 1 KAVAS survey results
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
# Answers 12 12 12 12 12
Mean 3.83 4.67 4.17 4.58 4.17
Std dev 1.34 0.49 0.94 0.51 0.58
Min 1 4 3 4 3
Median 4 5 5 5 4
Max 5 5 5 5 5
Böhm et al. Cybersecurity            (2018) 1:16 Page 15 of 19
3. GRAPH-BASED VISUAL ANALYTICS FOR CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE 79
Dissertation Florian Menges, 2020
interviews are presented in the following, divided ac-
cording to the four phases described before.
 Phase 1) Introduction: At the beginning of each
interview the participants are asked general
questions to obtain basic data about the
interviewees. Therefore, they are asked about their
company as well as their exact role within the
company. Furthermore, they are asked about their
knowledge of Cyber Threat Intelligence and the
STIX format in particular to determine their level of
expertise. This first phase showed, that even though
interviewees are familiar with threat intelligence
information in general, they are rather unfamiliar
with the specifics of the STIX format in most cases.
Table 2 gives an overview on these general
information about the interviewees.
 Phase 2) Internalization: Within this phase, the
interviewees are asked to take a look at a predefined
STIX bundle and to understand the contents of the
presented incident. The interviews showed that
KAVAS supports users to quickly understand an
incident without having any previous knowledge.
Especially the included filter functions of KAVAS
turned out to be particularly helpful in this context.
The consistently positive feedback within this phase
showed, that the chosen representation is both
suitable for representing incident information and
makes it easily available for the user.
However, this phase also revealed some
disadvantages and problems with the graph
visualization in general and the realization in
particular. While hassle-free usage was possible
on large resolution displays, it turned out that
problems arise when working on lower resolution
displays, especially for handling larger datasets. The
interviewees also missed some functionalities. For
instance, they asked for advanced filter functions
for different use-cases such as filtering the k-
nearest neighbor nodes within specific tree sections.
The interviews further revealed that existing filters
and possible interactions with the user interface to
re-structure the layout prove themselves as very
useful features. It was also shown that the interface
could be improved by implementing some add-
itional features, such as on-demand windows dis-
playing further information for objects with their
associated relationships and an improved initial
structuring of the presented graph representation.
Altogether, the interviews show that KAVAS has a
high utility for security specialists to convey and
understand incident information. This manifested
both in the assessment of the approach in general
and the usability of the tool itself. However, it was
also stated that a special training for employees
might be necessary to cope with the complexity of
STIX data. The interviewees also considered the
tool to probably be helpful for practical usage. In
this context they could for example think of a feed
service to obtain incident information from a cen-
tral authority, which could be used to understand
attacks and prevent them from happening.
 Phase 3) Externalization: Within this phase, the
interviewees are asked to use KAVAS to enrich
the incident representation with additional,
predefined knowledge made available by the
interviewers. The process of editing information
overall turned out to be mostly intuitive and easy
to use for the experts.
Adding and editing nodes was perceived as
intuitive by all participants, whereas some
participants argued that editing relationships was a
bit counter-intuitive when working with the tool
for the first time. The fact that KAVAS distin-
guishes between explore and edit mode was per-
ceived differently by the participants. While some
accentuated the benefits of this clear separation,
others found it cumbersome. However, the tool
could be helpful to collect and enrich forensic evi-
dence in e.g. CERT or incident response teams
reconstructing how an incident compromised an
organization. In this context, it was envisioned
that this tool could especially be helpful within
team meetings to collaboratively collect and edit
threat intelligence information. It was also accen-
tuated that there is most likely a need for
integrity-proof intelligence data in the foreseeable
future. Altogether, the enrichment of intelligence
data was overall easy to use for the participants
and mostly intuitive. The interview reveals that
editing intelligence information is equally import-
ant to analyzing it. Moreover, the interviewees
highlighted that there is an actual need for this
feature within companies.
 Phase 4) Wrap-Up: Within the last phase, possible
scenarios and conditions for an operative deploy-
ment of KAVAS and possible improvements for the
prototype were discussed.
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One key problem revealed by the interviews is the
question how threat intelligence data can be
acquired. This concerns both the acquisition from
external sources and the question how threat
intelligence data can be produced within the
company. In this context, it was also argued that
there is a need for an automated generation of basic
intelligence data that can be enriched by experts
using tools like KAVAS afterwards. Integrating
external intelligence feeds, cooperatively analyzing
threat data as well as creating visual threat reports
seems to be beneficial for companies. The
interviewees also suggested several additional
features to improve the user interface. These, for
example, include improved highlighting for
important and editable attributes or additional filter
functions. Furthermore, the interviewees named
some additional object properties that were
necessary for practical usage, such as additional
timestamps defining the point in time when the
object was detected. These are not defined within
the current STIX standard and consequently not
available in KAVAS.
Discussion
The results of the conducted interviews show that
KAVAS provides the ability for internalization and
externalization of threat intelligence information. Given
the fact, that it is still in the stage of a proof of concept
prototype, the experts’ feedback was already good. Fur-
thermore, the experts provided several suggestions for
future improvements of the tool.
The interviews also demonstrated that there is a
strong interest for visualizing threat intelligence infor-
mation among companies. The experts already have sev-
eral use-cases for this kind of application in mind.
However, the question of how to generate intelligence
data in the first place remains.
Moreover, the interviews also showed that there are
several weaknesses in the STIX standard, which became
obvious while evaluating KAVAS. An example for this is
the absence of a top-level element to represent and
structure specific company assets such as IT systems af-
fected by an incident.
Conclusion and future work
Conclusion
In this work we presented KAVAS, a concept for inter-
active visual analytics of threat intelligence information.
Our approach persists information in a graph database
to maintain an integrity-preserving data structure. This
database is connected to a visual interface supporting se-
curity experts in understanding and analyzing incident
descriptions. Additionally, the visual analytics compo-
nent of KAVAS facilitates the process of including the
knowledge of the security experts into CTI information.
KAVAS achieves this with its functionalities to edit exist-
ing descriptions and adding new knowledge allowing for
more thorough incident documentations.
While designing KAVAS, and especially its visual compo-
nent, we aimed to follow the concept of knowledge-assisted
visual analytics. More precisely we designed our concept to
support the four main knowledge conversion processes
which are essential to improve the collaboration of human
and machines. Internalization is done in KAVAS by visually
representing the incident documentations stored in the
CTI vault. This way, the explicit knowledge in the CTI
vault is accessible for security experts and they can gain
knowledge using the visualization. KAVAS also supports
Externalization as it allows for editing the STIX bundles.
The tacit knowledge is externalized when the expert edits
the threat intelligence information visually displayed in
KAVAS. Being implemented as graph database the CTI
vault has the essential functionalities to support the Com-
bination knowledge conversion. This process is imple-
mented in KAVAS as the CTI vault can be fed with new
threat intelligence information and it includes this newly
available knowledge into the existing knowledge base. A
similar process in KAVAS supports the Collaboration. As
externalization of an expert’s tacit knowledge is possible,
other security experts can profit from the externalized
knowledge of each other providing an implicit form of
collaboration.
The application KAVAS described throughout this work,
clearly fulfills the three requirements we started with:
 R1 - Handling of complex threat intelligence
data: The CTI Vault persists STIXbased threat
intelligence information in a graph database. It
additionally provides the possibilities to store
Table 2 General information on the interview participant
Position Business Branch Organization’s size CTI Knowledge STIX Knowledge
#1 Security Researcher Academia ca. 5.000 high medium
#2 Chief Information Security Officer Manufacturing ca. 15.000 high high
#3 Security Analyst Manufacturing ca. 15.000 medium low
#4 Chief Technology Officer Secure Cloud Services ca. 60 medium medium
#5 Senior Consultant Security Consultancy ca. 20 low low
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externalized user knowledge in its knowledge base,
while the integrity of the original information is
preserved and ensured. Moreover, any data stored in
the vault is compliant with the STIX format at any
point in time.
 R2 - Visual representation of STIX: KAVAS’
visual component can display threat intelligence and
enables security experts to interactively explore
incidents and gain insight about what happened.
 R3 - Conversion of experts’ knowledge: As
described above, KAVAS provides functionalities for
each of the four knowledge conversion processes.
Fulfilling all the stated requirements, KAVAS offers a
flexible platform for sharing, analyzing, annotating and
visualizing cyber threat intelligence information based
on the STIX data format.
Future work
Although we met the previously defined requirements
for KAVAS, some challenges remain, which have to be
addressed in future work.
A key challenge for future work regarding the CTI
Vault will be the analysis of STIX data to find intercon-
nections and redundancies between different bundles,
which currently are standalone object pools, not at-
tached to each other. Enabling the interconnections be-
tween and the merging of bundles could contribute
greatly to the usage of STIX features. Additionally, this
would improve the quality of available threat intelligence
information. Examples for this are the merging of differ-
ent incidents into a whole campaign of attacks and the
determination of correlations between observed events
within different incidents. The process for merging bun-
dles and finding redundancies has to be subject for fur-
ther research as it is a challenging task to identify
interconnections and quality problems across independ-
ent bundles.
Additionally, there are some potential improvements
regarding the functionalities of the visual component.
During the interviews, the participants highlighted the
need for a number of different advanced filters as well as
some other features, which would help them even more
to work with complex threat intelligence. Furthermore,
experts should be included into the process of merging
and connecting bundles. KAVAS could also be extended
to support more sophisticated collaboration features for
security experts like annotating CTI information to ex-
change domain knowledge in a more direct manner.
Another important future challenge regarding our pro-
posed visual analytics tool is a comprehensive user study
to quantify its effects on the work of security experts.
These effects need to be quantified. Also the tool’s impact
on the quality of threat intelligence documentation has to
be measured as expert knowledge can be externalized with
KAVAS. Currently, KAVAS is only validated in terms of
being able to work with the very limited examples pro-
vided by the OASIS committee and by a qualitative evalu-
ation to show its feasibility. The main reason for this
small-scaled evaluation is the lack of available real-world
threat intelligence data being documented with STIX 2 up
to this point in time. Its predecessor STIX 1 is the
industry-wide state-of-the-art for documenting this type
of information and we presume that it is very likely for
STIX 2 to achieve the same amount of acceptance in the
near future. Since the specification of STIX 2 is still under
development, it is not reasonable to evaluate the effective-
ness and efficiency of KAVAS in a comprehensive and
quantitative manner yet.
Another topic for future work has to be the analysis
and assurance of data quality among STIX bundles. As
STIX supports collaborative efforts to maximize the
number of prevented cyberattacks, the data quality of
the incident descriptions is crucial. This is becoming
even more true when the information is analyzed and
enriched by human operators. High quality information
is essential to ensure trust. Therefore, existing data qual-
ity metrics have to be applied on STIX-based descrip-
tions to assess the added value they provide. Moreover,
visual metaphors for these metrics have to be added to
the KAVAS visual representation helping analysts to as-
sess the trustworthiness of the information.
Endnotes
1https://trac.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7970
2http://veriscommunity.net
3https://stixproject.github.io
4https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-stix-visualization
5https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/
overview
6https://angular.io
7https://material.angular.io
8https://d3js.org
9https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/ex-
ample/defining-campaign-ta-is/
10http://bit.ly/2NLDn3W
11http://bit.ly/2xX74EO
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Abstract
Humans are commonly seen as the weakest link in corporate information security. This led to a lot of effort being put
into security training and awareness campaigns, which resulted in employees being less likely the target of successful
attacks. Existing approaches, however, do not tap the full potential that can be gained through these campaigns. On
the one hand, human perception offers an additional source of contextual information for detected incidents, on the
other hand it serves as information source for incidents that may not be detectable by automated procedures. These
approaches only allow a text-based reporting of basic incident information. A structured recording of human
delivered information that also provides compatibility with existing SIEM systems is still missing. In this work, we
propose an approach, which allows humans to systematically report perceived anomalies or incidents in a structured
way. Our approach furthermore supports the integration of such reports into analytics systems. Thereby, we identify
connecting points to SIEM systems, develop a taxonomy for structuring elements reportable by humans acting as a
security sensor and develop a structured data format to record data delivered by humans. A prototypical
human-as-a-security-sensor wizard applied to a real-world use-case shows our proof of concept.
Keywords: Cyber threat intelligence, Human awareness, Human-as-a-security-sensor, Security information and event
management (SIEM)
1 Introduction
Today’s security analytics solutions like Security Informa-
tion and Event Management (SIEM) systems heavily rely
on a huge amount of data in order to reliably detect inci-
dents in organizations (Bhatt et al. 2014). New sources
providing security-relevant data, such as knowledge about
occurred incidents observed by human individuals, can
therefore significantly enlarge the data basis for incident
detection.
During past years, humans or employees were gen-
erally seen as the weakest link in corporate IT security
(Lineberry 2007). To mitigate the risk of humans for IT
security, a lot of effort is put into awareness campaigns
and training of employees (Mello 2017) to ensure that
they receive a basic understanding of this topic. This also
enables them to distinguish between “normal” events and
events harming the organization. However, the ability
to recognize malicious events is not harnessed to its full
extent. Information about potential incidents might be
*Correspondence: manfred.vielberth@ur.de
Universität Regensburg, Universitätstr. 31, 93053 Regensburg, DE, Germany
hidden in the minds of humans and could be the missing
link for attack detection or for forensic reconstruction of
adverse events. Especially when it comes to nontechnical
traces. Therefore, we argue that the connection of digital
events with non-digital events observed by people is
crucial to IT security.
In this paper, we describe an approach that integrates
the human data source to further processing in security
analytics systems (e.g. SIEM systems). Therefore, we illus-
trate the problem with a motivating example in Section 2.
Subsequently, related work in the area of human-as-
a-security-sensor is portrayed within Section 3. In
Section 4, we present the problem and research question
tackled and show how to integrate human sensors into
SIEM systems in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, a risk model
and a taxonomy for human threat reporting are proposed.
On this basis we develop a CTI base data structure for
human sensor information in section 4.3 and a data
format for the representation of this data in Section 4.4.
Finally, the proposed approach is evaluated in Section 5
and concluded in Section 6.
© The Author(s). 2019, corrected publication 2019 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
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2 Motivating example
In the following section, we use a real-world attack to
illustrate the main problem tackled in this work. The
example underlines benefits that may arise from integrat-
ing the human factor into threat detection mechanisms,
including improved threat detection and additional con-
text information.
Between 2017 and 2018, Kaspersky Lab (Golovanov
2018) investigated several cybersecurity incidents that
go by the name of DarkVishnya. Malicious devices were
directly connected to organizations’ local networks, caus-
ing damage estimated to multiple millions of dollars. As
shown in Fig. 1, the attack was conducted in the following
essential steps:
1 The attacker tries to physically enter the premises of
the attacked organization, claiming to be a person
with legitimate interest (e.g. being an applicant or a
courier).
2 After the successful entrance, the attacker tries to
place a network device unobtrusively and hides it by
blending it into the surrounding area. Moreover, the
device is connected to the local network
infrastructure in order to enable further attack steps.
3 After the attacker has left the organization, the
placed device is remotely accessed by utilizing
standard mobile technologies like GPRS, 3G or LTE
to control it for further attack steps.
4 The attacker scans the network for usable
information and for accessible resources in the local
network. This may include shared folders, servers or
other systems that execute critical actions.
Additionally, brute-force attacks or network sniffing
is used to gain access to login credentials.
5 The attacker tries to exploit the previously gained
access e.g. by installing malware to retain access and
to execute malicious services.
The crux of the attack is that the first three steps are
nearly impossible to detect with technical security sys-
tems like SIEM, or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), as
neither the attacker entering the building, nor the plac-
ing of a hardware device leave any digital traces. The
first digital traces that may be detected by security sys-
tems are left at the beginning of the network access.
Unlike automated analyses, employees have the ability to
detect and report such anomalies before technical traces
and potential damages occur. If, for example, a suspicious
person walks around the office building, the employee
might already categorize this event as an anomaly. Addi-
tionally, context information, such as a description of a
person, enhances this first perception. However, employ-
ees are often not able to recognize technical traces, such
as network scans. The example demonstrates that it is
hardly possible to capture the full extent of an attack,
when collecting technical or human traces independently
or if one of them is not considered at all. Therefore,
we propose an approach that enables the acquisition of
anomalies or potential attacks detected by employees,
to translate them into machine readable language and
thus to create the basis for combining these two types
of data.
3 Related work
The first IT security related approaches for threat report-
ing by humans are systems that handle malicious or
unwanted emails. These can be narrowed down to spam
and phishing emails. There are several examples avail-
able in practice that allow to report such threats. These
are in most cases integrated into email software, where
emails can be marked (Google LLC; Microsoft Cor-
poration) or a standalone web interface is provided
(Anti-Phishing Working Group). In most cases, these
reports are used to train phishing or spam filters of the
provider.
Fig. 1 Attack steps of DarkVishnya
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A second approach commonly applied in practice is
human-to-human reporting. A central contact point (e.g.
the help desk of an organization) is set up. Especially
when implementing an information security management
system (e.g. control A.13.1 of the ISO 27001 standard
demands the reporting of security events or weaknesses
from all employees (ISO/IEC 27001: Information technol-
ogy – Security techniques – Information security man-
agement systems – Requirements 2013)) this is com-
mon practice for reporting security issues by employees
(Hintzbergen et al. 2015). However, this approach entails
some disadvantages. For example, the human point of
contact has to interpret the received information and
decide how to proceed. This might result in wrong
decision-making, especially as help desk personnel are
commonly no security specialists. Additionally, the col-
lected data is poorly structured and not utilizable for
technical analyses in most cases. Although not security
related, the idea of using humans as sensors has been
a topic of interest for a while. For example, Wang et
al. (2014) pursue the idea that social networks might be
the largest existing human sensor networks. Furthermore,
Kostakos et al. (2017) investigate several scenarios, where
humans can act as sensors. They consider, among others,
crowdsourcing markets, social media and the collection of
citizen opinions.
Heartfield and Loukas (2018) recently proposed a more
general approach focused on semantic social engineer-
ing attacks. In their work, they develop and prototypically
implement a framework for reporting semantic social
engineering attacks. They propose a model for predict-
ing the reliability of reports generated by humans and
show, that human sensors can outperform technical secu-
rity systems in their considered context. In addition, they
implement a backend application, which is mainly respon-
sible for incident response and dashboard capabilities. In
one of their previous works (Heartfield et al. 2016), they
also coined the term human-as-a-security-sensor , which
refers to the ”paradigm of leveraging the ability of human
users to act as sensors that can detect and report informa-
tion security threats”. For our work, we adopt the meaning
of the paradigm. This capability is strongly influenced by
the security training the person received in advance. In
addition, an approach for scoring the trustworthiness of
human sensors was introduced by Rahman et al. (2017).
They especially monitor features of the mobile device,
utilized for conducting the report, for predicting the reli-
ability of the provided data.
To sum up the developments in this area, platforms for
reporting potential malicious or unwanted emails were
implemented at first. This was followed by the develop-
ment of processes for human-to-human reporting and
succeeded bymore sophisticated approaches for detecting
semantic social engineering attacks with the help of a
human-as-a-security-sensor framework. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no approaches that sup-
port reporting a wide range of possible attacks detectable
by humans. Additionally, there are no concepts for inte-
grating reported incidents into existing, and inmany orga-
nizations already established, security systems (e.g. SIEM
systems). Moreover, the participation of people with dif-
ferent knowledge in the field of cybersecurity, is currently
neglected.
4 Integrated human-as-a-Security-Sensor
(IHaaSS)
Resulting from the explanations in Section 2 and Section 3
we tackle the issue, that observations of humans are
either poorly or not at all integrated into the auto-
matic security analytics process. This raises the follow-
ing research questions:
Q1: What are the connection points of a human-as-a-
sensor to the data flow of a SIEM system?
Q2: How can human-provided information be struc-
tured (data format) in order to facilitate further
technical processing?
Q3: How can incident information be systematically
acquired from people?
To answer these research questions, we applied the
following approach:
1. To answer Q1, we illustrate how to integrate human-
as-a-security-sensors into security analytics in
Section 4.1. This is based on existing data collection
approaches and the generic data flow of SIEM systems
identified in literature (Vielberth and Pernul 2018).
2. To answer Q2 and Q3 it is in a first step necessary to
identify all possibilities a human sensor can report.
This is carried out by developing a risk model and
taxonomy, adhering to the method for taxonomy
development by Nickerson et al. (2013) in Section 4.2.
3. To answer research question Q2, we first
conceptualize a CTI base data structure for the
representation of human sensor data in Section 4.3.
On this basis we then identify suitable CTI data
format standards to realize this base data structure
and extend them for the capturing of human sensor
data in Section 4.4. This allows the integration of
human-generated reports into SIEM systems for
further processing.
4. Finally, the incident information can systematically
be acquired (Q3) following the risk model and
taxonomy, which is restricted by constraints
identified in Section 4.5.
Thereby, we see the main contributions of this paper in
the identification of connection points, the development
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of the taxonomy, the extension of well-established data
formats and the identification of constraints for a system-
atic data acquisition. We also show the practicability of
our approach using a prototypical implementation and an
exemplary real-world use case.
4.1 Integrating human sensors into SIEM
To connect technical data with human-generated traces,
both need to be brought together in one single system.
One way to achieve this is to integrate human knowl-
edge into SIEM systems that are already in place in most
organizations within a security operations center (SOC)
(Crowley and Pescatore 2018). Apart from that, the pre-
sented approach can easily be adapted to other security
monitoring tools.
A SIEM system is essentially designed for the collec-
tion of relevant log data to detect incidents and gain
situational security awareness. In Fig. 2 we extended the
basic SIEM structure as proposed by Vielberth and Per-
nul (2018) with the data flow of an integrated human-
as-a-security-sensor. Hereby, the SIEM first collects rel-
evant event information, in most cases in the form of
log data. This data gets enriched with additional con-
text data and translated in a uniform representation
during the normalization step. The core of the system
lies in the correlation and analysis component, where
information from various sources is connected and inci-
dents are detected using methods such as pattern match-
ing. Monitoring enables security analysts to be actively
involved in the analysis, whereas reporting delivers com-
pliance reports or enables the participation in established
threat intelligence sharing platforms between organiza-
tions. In case of a detected incident, alerting and incident
response triggers necessary reactions to mitigate further
harm. Finally, the storage module is responsible for both,
short- and long-term storage of event data and analysis
results.
For integrating human sensors into SIEM (Q1), we
extend the basic SIEM data collection approach. Accord-
ing to Holik et al. (2015) and Turnbull (2019), two funda-
mental approaches can be applied. They both distinguish
between push- and pull- based log collection. Since we do
not collect log data, but human-generated incident infor-
mation, these two approaches require adaptation. In the
following, both approaches are described in the context of
this paper:
• Push: The push method applies when an employee
initially detects an incident and actively delivers the
gathered information to the system. It is important to
offer guidance for enabling humans to provide
information in a structured way, especially if their
knowledge about security is limited. Additionally,
employees might report information in different
levels of detail, depending on how much they know
about the incident. The push approach is similar to
systems pushing log data into SIEM systems as
described in literature (Holik et al. 2015). Thus, the
connection point of the push approach is the event
collection (compare Fig. 2).
• Pull: In traditional SIEM systems, the pull approach
basically refers to polling-based systems (Turnbull
2019), which query the data periodically, generally in
fixed time intervals. Since periodically polling
information from human sensors is hardly feasible,
we only pull information in certain cases. These cases
occur during certain steps of the SIEM data flow (as
described subsequently), which are the connection
points for the pull approach. The pull approach is
applied if important information is missing during
the monitoring or analysis of incidents. Presumably,
this happens in case an incident is reported by people
with little knowledge about IT security or about the
context of the incident. The lack of information can
Fig. 2 Integrating human-as-a-security-sensor into the SIEM Data Flow
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either be detected automatically during the
correlation and analysis phase, or by human experts
monitoring the system or during incident response
steps. Furthermore, needed information might be
missing in case technical indications about an
incident occur, but previous attack steps were not
reported. For instance, technical traces from step
four of the attack in Fig. 1 could be identified in the
system, while previous attack steps were not
reported. Therefore, it is necessary to advice
employees to report missing hints. In order to gain
more information, an expert can interview the
reporting person and guide him to contribute further
or more detailed information.
4.2 IHaaSS incident model and taxonomy
For being able to develop a format (Q2) and structure
the acquisition of information (Q3), it is necessary to
capture everything that human-security-sensors can per-
ceive. Information security management standards and its
associated resources provide a good basis by providing
risk assessment guidelines. These consider and evalu-
ate mostly future risks. However, in our approach we
want to report past incidents, requiring to adjustment for
some elements. Regarding the NIST Guide for Conduct-
ing Risk Assessments (Joint Task Force Transformation
Initiative 2012) and Juliadotter and Choo (2015), the key
risk factors are Threat Sources, Threat Events/Vector, Tar-
gets/Vulnerabilities and Impact. All four risk factors are
observable or can at least be assessed by human sensors
and thus, have to be dealt with. The resulting threat model
can be seen in Fig. 3.
In the proposed Integrated Human-as-a-Security-Sensor
(IHaaSS) incident model, there are two types of threat
events: threat events caused by humans or technical
sources (commonly security events) and events which are
not necessarily assignable to a source (especially safety
events). Threat events can be either initiated by threat
sources or by previous events. Furthermore, it is possible
that no entities are affected, or the affected entities are not
(yet) known. The same applies to the expected impacts.
This leads to the conclusion that only threat events are
mandatory elements, as without threat events there is no
need to report.
In order to get a deeper insight into human sensor
reports, we examine the four risk factors in more detail,
thereby create a taxonomy for human-as-a-security-
sensor threat reporting. This taxonomy classifies and
Fig. 3 IHaaSS Incident Model and Taxonomy
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structures the security-related artifacts a human sen-
sor can observe. Thereby, we loosely adhere to the
method for taxonomy development by Nickerson et
al. (2013). However, we did not develop a completely
new taxonomy, but rather combined and adapted exist-
ing taxonomies to fit the purpose. Thereby we fol-
lowed the “conceptual-to-empirical approach” (Nicker-
son et al. 2013), because of the existing foundations
and a well-established knowledge base in this area. The
identified objects are described in more detail in the
following:
• Threat Sources: Threat sources are the starting
point of the incident and can initiate subsequent
threat events. This part of the taxonomy is based on
the NIST Taxonomy of Threat Sources (Joint Task
Force Transformation Initiative 2012). However, to
avoid overlaps with subcategories of threat events,
we narrow the scope. In the context of our paper, a
threat source is an entity, which can decide and
initiates events. Thus, the environment defined as a
threat source by NIST is equal to a threat event in
our taxonomy as we argue that environmental
factors cannot take decisions. Additionally,
environmental events might be initiated by sources
and are therefore better classified as events (e.g. a
fire can be set by a person). However, the risk model
process remains unaffected, because events can
initiate other events. As a result, environmental
events can still trigger structural events such as
outages.
• Threat Events: Threat Events are the processes
actually causing harm to an organization and thus
are the key component of an IHaaSS report. Our
taxonomy of threat events is based on the ENISA
Threat Taxonomy (Marinos 2016) with some
changes in order to fit in the rest of our model. We
have defined more general categories, which allow
the distinction between intentional (Attack) and
potentially unintentional (Technical, Environmental,
Legal) events. This is especially important in order
to form dependencies in Section 4.5. Furthermore,
the environmental events are merged with
environmental threat sources from the NIST
Taxonomy of Threat Sources (Joint Task Force
Transformation Initiative 2012).
• Entities: The identification of relevant assets (asset
inventory) is much discussed in academic literature
and by industry, due to its importance to risk
management (Fenz et al. 2014). Our approach,
however, is somewhat broader, which is why we talk
about entities (e.g. other organizations may be
affected, which are not necessarily an asset for the
company). The entity taxonomy is taken from (Joint
Task Force Transformation Initiative 2012), wherein
it is called adverse impact.
• Expected Impact: The expectation of possible
impacts is usually quite hard to classify for humans.
Therefore, the human sensor commonly provides
qualitative estimations, especially when the IT
security knowledge is low. Nevertheless, this
estimation can be very helpful for evaluating further
actions and reactions. Very Low to Very High is a
rating of the effect of the event as described by the
NIST (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative
2012). It ranges from “negligible” to “multiple severe
or catastrophic effects”.
4.3 Conceptualizing a CTI data structure for human
sensor data
In the previous sections, we introduced connecting points
for the integration of human knowledge into SIEM sys-
tems and developed a taxonomy that serves as an infor-
mation basis for the acquisition of threats detected by
humans. In this section, we lay the theoretical founda-
tions for the integration of human-provided information
into SIEM data processing. The central factor for this inte-
gration is the harmonization of data structures to ensure
compatibility of information. As shown in 4.1, SIEM sys-
tems work with both normalized raw data and enriched
context data, which can be summarized under the term
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). To enable the integration
of these types of information, we propose an approach
of translating the human provided information into the
existing CTI data structures in this section. To this end, we
first discuss the types of information that can be provided
by human sensors and classify them in the context of CTI
information. On this basis, we then propose a CTI data
structure that allows to fully capture information provided
by human sensors to answer the research question Q2 on
a general level. Finally, Table 1 summarizes the results of
this section
The work of Burger et al. (2014) serves as a basis for
the allocation of human sensor information to CTI data
structures. It divides CTI into the three main categories
Intelligence, Attribution and Indicator. Intelligence refers
to rather complex issues such as concrete procedures of
attackers or methods for mitigating security incidents,
which cannot be fully acquired from automated analy-
ses. Although a deeper expert knowledge is necessary for
the final evaluation of intelligence information, untrained
employees can contribute valuable information, which
may make an incident detection possible in the first place.
An example of this would be the detection of unautho-
rized physical access to protected resources. The Attribu-
tion category describes various types of additional contex-
tual information about a security incident. These include,
for example, information on attackers or affected devices.
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Table 1 CTI base model extensions
Classification Taxonomy UPSIDE Model Changes
Intelligence Threat Events Attack Attack Event -
Technical - Technical Event
Environmental - Environmental Event
Legal - Legal Event
Expected Impact Result Result
Attribution Threat Sources Actor Attacker Actor
Structure - Structural Source
Entities Assets Attack Target Affected Entity
Persons Attack Target Affected Entity
Indicator Threat Events Indicator -
This data is also only recognizable to a limited extent
through automated analyses. Since attribution informa-
tion usually does not require specific specialist knowledge,
employees can also make a valuable contribution here.
For example, employees can help identifying a poten-
tial attacker and point out potentially affected devices. In
contrast to these categories, Indicator describes specific
system events that can, for example, be obtained from
system logs. Since log files contain extensive information,
they are usually evaluated using automated analyses and
can only be used to a limited extent within a human sensor
platform. However, when an incident is captured, addi-
tional fine-granular informationmay also be provided. For
example, a malicious email provides information about
a potential attack or an attacker, but also provides fine-
grained information within its source code. As a result,
indicator information is not primary information that is
obtained from human observations, but secondary infor-
mation that is collected when entities are created and
populated. Summarizing, it can be stated that human
sensors can mainly contribute to analyses with context
information from the categories Intelligence and Attribu-
tion whereas Indicator information is only used to a very
limited extent.
After performing a classification of human sensor data
in the context of CTI data structures, we propose a CTI
data structure that is able to cover the full range of human
sensor information in the following. To achieve this,
we utilize the previously introduced categories Intelli-
gence, Attribution and Indicator to describe the individual
changes necessary. More specifically, we use the UPSIDE
model that describes CTI base entities byMenges and Per-
nul (2018) to determine and discuss entities that can be
mapped by CTI data structures and those that are still
missing for the representation of human provided infor-
mation. On this basis, we propose conceptual adaptations
to existing CTI data structures to support human sensor
data as described in our taxonomy.
• Intelligence: The Intelligence category describes
the attack patterns used, countermeasures taken and
additional information on incidents such as the
expected impact. The Threat Events and Expected
Impact sections of the taxonomy can be assigned to
this category. Threat events are divided into active
(attack) and passive (technical, environmental and
legal) incidents. According to the CTI base model, the
description of active attacks is possible by defining
attack events and the underlying procedure. Incidents
without an active component are not supported so far.
In addition, the model offers the possibility to define
the result of an attack as result entity. This allows
"Expected Impact" from our taxonomy to be mapped,
however, this also only applies for active attacks.
• Attribution: The Attribution category defines
various contextual information, such as information
about attackers and targets. The sections Threat
Sources and Entities from the taxonomy can both be
assigned to this category. In the area of threat sources,
the CTI base model can represent active attackers.
Although, an unintentionally involved actor and other
threat sources cannot be defined yet. In the taxonomy
section entities, both assets and persons can be
represented within the CTI base model. However,
these can only be represented as targets in connection
with an attack. It is not possible to represent any
other kind of participation of these entities.
• Indicator: The Indicator category is used to display
detailed information within threat events. The entity
indicator from the CTI base model defines a generic
representation within a security incident that can be
assigned to any other entity. Accordingly, the
requirements of the taxonomy are basically fulfilled
in this area.
After comparing our taxonomy with the capabilities of
the CTI base model, we discuss necessary adjustments for
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the integration of human sensor information in the follow-
ing. Several adjustments are necessary within the Intelli-
gence section. Since only attack events are supported, it
is necessary to introduce additional entities to be able to
map passive events. This includes technical events, envi-
ronmental events and legal events. In addition, the result
of an event must be adapted in such a way that the result
of passive events can also be represented. The Attribu-
tion area also requires several adjustments. On the one
hand, the attacker element must be extended in such a
way that a passive participant can also be represented.
In addition, it is also necessary to introduce an addi-
tional entity to represent a structural source for incidents.
Finally, entities can be represented completely, but only
in the context of an attack. Here an appropriate exten-
sion is necessary so that entities can also be affected by
passive events. The indicator area does not require any
adjustments at the conceptual level. Summarizing, Table
1 gives an overview of the results of this section. Column
Classification assigns the results to the respective CTI cat-
egory, while column Taxonomy shows the elements of the
taxonomy under consideration. The UPSIDE Model col-
umn shows the assignment to the CTI base model and
column Changes shows the necessary adjustments to the
base model to support human sensor information.
4.4 A structured representation for threat intelligence
reported by humans
In the previous sections, we introduced connection points
for integrating human knowledge into SIEM systems and
a taxonomy that defines the information basis for the
acquisition of threat information detected by humans.
Subsequently, we introduced the theoretical foundation
for a CTI data structure that is able to represent human
sensor data. Based on these findings, we develop a CTI
data format in this section that allows to capture infor-
mation provided by human sensors and enables further
technical processing according to research question Q2.
In developing the data format we pursue two main objec-
tives. On the one hand, we aim to achieve a high com-
patibility to existing SIEM systems to allow a direct inte-
gration of additional information into the system. On the
other hand, we aim to create a format that allows a com-
plete representation of human sensor data. More specifi-
cally, the full scope of the taxonomy shown in Section 4.2
needs to be covered. In order to meet these require-
ments as completely as possible, we first select existing
and well supported CTI data format standards as devel-
opment basis in the following. Subsequently, we propose
a specification of necessary extensions for the integration
of human sensor data according to Section 4.3.
Event collection modules within SIEM systems handle
heterogeneous raw data from different log sources. This
data is then translated into homogeneous indicator data
structures to allow further processing. Literature pro-
vides different standards for the structured representation
of indicators, such as CybOX1 or openIoC2. These data
structures are commonly referred to as Indicators of Com-
promise (IoC) as they depict a set of observations associ-
ated with a threat (Appala et al. 2015). These basic inci-
dent data can furthermore be enriched using intelligence-
and attribution data, such as information about attackers,
utilized attack patterns or attackers’ objectives as shown
by Burger et al. (2014). Together, they allow the represen-
tation of complex security incident information as shown
in Section 4.3. Literature also offers different standards
for representing enriched incidents information, such as
STIX, IODEF, VERIS and X-ARF (Barnum 2014; Dan-
durand et al. 2015; Menges and Pernul 2018). In order to
allow the representation of human delivered information,
we chose the combination of the existing formats CybOX
and STIX as development basis. Both formats are issued
together by MITRE3 and a combined usage is explicitly
intended. Since these formats are most commonly applied
to represent comprehensive threat intelligence informa-
tion (Shackleford and SANS Institute 2015; Sauerwein
et al. 2017), high compatibility to existing systems can
be assumed. Moreover, they offer broader representation
capabilities in their basic configuration than compara-
ble formats as shown by Menges and Pernul (2018) and
therefore, represent a solid foundation for the integration
of human delivered information. Both CybOX and STIX
are briefly introduced in the following and examined for
necessary extensions to represent human delivered infor-
mation afterwards.
CybOX provides an extensive catalog of object types
for the description of the indicator layer. Each object
represents individual components of log files, such as
files, processes or network packets and offers description
options at a detailed level. For example, the object type file
allows the description of basic file properties such as path,
extension or file name but also additional information
such as permissions, compression procedures or creation
date. STIX is the most extensive and widespread format
for the structured representation of cyber threat intelli-
gence information available today (Burger et al. 2014). It
provides flexible data structures, such as non-structured
free-text attributes, built-in controlled vocabularies using
predefined values (vocabs) as well as integrated references
to external data sources such as platform or vulnerability
databases (enumerations). STIX uses indicators provided
by CybOX as information basis and a wide range of well-
defined data definitions to express the intelligence and
attribution information for threats. The data model con-
sists of the following core concepts. Incident is the central
1https://cyboxproject.github.io
2https://github.com/mandiant/OpenIOC_1.1
3https://www.mitre.org
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entity for structuring the incident information. TTP (Tac-
tics, Techniques and Procedures) and Course of Action
to describe the Intelligence layer. Campaign, Threat Actor
and Exploit Target describe the Attribution layer. Indica-
tor, Observable serves as interface to the Indication layer
that is essentially provided by CybOX. Moreover, numer-
ous attributes for a detailed expression of these concepts
are provided by the data model (Barnum 2014; Menges
and Pernul 2018; Fransen et al. 2015).
After this short introduction of the data formats STIX
and CybOX, we develop adjustments for these formats to
represent human delivered incident information follow-
ing the IHaaSS taxonomy (see Section 4.2) and CTI data
structure (see Section 4.3) in the following. For this pur-
pose, we first discuss the missing elements within the data
formats based on the CTI basic data structure. On this
basis, we propose the following changes to the formats to
allow the integration of human sensors.
• Intelligence: Previously, it was shown that attack
events can be mapped within the CTI base model,
whereas other events are not available yet. Using the
taxonomy, we are able to limit these additional events
to the categories Structural, Environmental and
Legal. In order to also support these events within the
data format, we have defined the additional entities
"Technical Event", "Environmental Event" and "Legal
Event". All these entities are derived from the basic
entity TTP, which describes tactics, techniques and
procedures used in the course of an attack. An
essential property of TTP objects is the structured
representation of attack patterns. For this purpose,
STIX uses the CAPEC Enumeration, a freely available
data set of known attack patterns for the
unambiguous description of specific attacks. In order
to achieve a comparable functionality for the
additionally defined events, we defined a
corresponding vocabularies for structural, legal and
environmental events. Each vocabulary offers
predefined event definitions according to our
taxonomy. In addition to the event definitions, the
area of intelligence also offer possibilities for
describing the expected impact of an incident. For
this purpose it was previously shown that the base
model only provides impact definitions that emerge
from active attacks. Although this is basically also
true for the data format, its data definitions do not
explicitly restrict the representation of incident
results to an underlying attack. As a result, no
changes are necessary to enable the definition of
specific event results.
• Attribution: It was shown that an integration of
structural sources is necessary for addressing passive
threats within the CTI base format. In addition, it was
shown that the entities are limited to the expression
of active attacks. The data format already provides
elements such as Threat Actor, Exploit Target to
represent active attacks and attackers, and Asset
Vocabulary to define assets. To enable the integration
of passive threats, we extend STIX with the definition
of an additional entity "structural source" as intended
in the CTI base format. Since this is an alternative
threat source, the object is derived from the existing
Threat Actor object and exists on the same level. This
object is extended by an additional vocabulary
"StructuralSourceTypeVocab" to be able to represent
structural threat sources in a structured way. Since
this extension of threat sources also extends the
scope of attribution, we additionally defined an
extension of the asset vocabulary. This makes it
possible to define additional assets that can occur in
connection with passive threats.
• Indicator: The indicator category is used to
represent incident event information on a high level
of detail, which are basically able cover the event
information that may be delivered by humans.
However, humans are usually not capable of
delivering information on this level of detail and will
rather provide unstructured data fragments.
Consequently, such data fragments must be evaluated
afterwards and the format must allow the
unstructured data to be recorded at the time of
acquisition. For this reason, we have also added an
extension to the Observable object that allows to
include unstructured data, which can later be
translated into structured CybOX information.
In addition to these specific extensions, all objects were
equipped with specific IHaaSS IDs and to enable addi-
tional references between the objects. This allows employ-
ees to express their perception by establishing links
between objects. These additional connections can then
be separately evaluated by analysts and integrated into the
analysis results. In summary, it was shown in this section
that STIX already fulfills numerous requirements for the
implementation of an IHaaSS platform. However, the for-
mat requires different extensions to fully match the tax-
onomy according to the CTI base model. To achieve this,
additional entities to represent structural threat sources
as well as environmental, structural and legal events are
defined within the data model. Moreover, different vocab-
ularies are introduced to unambiguously represent these
entities. Finally, the Observable object is extended by
an attribute for the unstructured capture of event data.
Table 2 gives an overview of all these adjustments to the
data format.A detailed overview of the specific extensions
integrated as well as the actual object specifications can
be found in the repository published together with this
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Table 2 STIX extensions
Classification Base entity Additional Entity Additional attribute
Intelligence TTP Structural Event StructuralEventTypeVocab
TTP Environmental Event EnvironmentalEventTypeVocab
TTP Legal Event LegalEventTypeVocab
Attribution Threat Actor Structural Source StructuralSourceTypeVocab
Incident
Indicator Observable Observation
work4. The repository includes XML-schema definitions
for the STIX schema extension types and vocabularies that
are developed with this work.
4.5 Structured acquisition of human-as-a-security-sensor
information
To implement a system harvesting incident information
from a human sensor, it is necessary to develop a syste-
matic approach to guide the user through the acquisi-
tion (Q3). This supports the structured input into a data
format 4.4 and encourages human sensors to provide
as much information as possible. The process for guid-
ing the user is basically given by the IHaaSS Incident
Model and Taxonomy as shown in Fig. 3. Thereby, mul-
tiple threat sources, threat events, and entities can be
specified consecutively. The expected impact is estimated
for the whole incident and thus recorded only once. The
respective subtypes for sources, events or entities are also
gathered in hierarchical sequence to avoid overstrain-
ing of the user. Each event is assigned a cause (either a
threat source or another threat event), which leads to a
chain of events. However, the process is subject to some
constraints. More precisely, threat events cannot be ini-
tiated by some threat sources or preceding threat events.
The constraints for our acquisition process are defined as
follows and explained in more detail subsequently. The
notation is based on the formal model of Klingner and
Becker (2012):
prohibits(Attack) = Environmental ∨ Legal (1)
prohibits(Technical) = Legal (2)
prohibits(Environmental) = Legal (3)
prohibits(UnusualNaturalEvent)
= Actor ∨ Structure ∨ Attack
∨ Technical ∨ Legal
(4)
Equation 1 defines that an attack cannot be initiated
by an environmental or a legal event. The reason for this
4http://tinyurl.com/y3h5k25t
is that an attack requires action by a human being or
at least some technical device and thus cannot be initi-
ated by nonhuman events or sources. Furthermore, the
cause of a technical security event cannot be a legal event
(Eq. 2), technical events can only follow physical events or
sources. The same applies to environmental events (Eq. 3).
Unusual natural events (e.g. sunspots) cannot be caused
by any other events or sources except Environmental ones
as stated in Eq. 4, because they have a natural cause.
These constraints are the most explicit ones. It would be
possible to define additional constraints considering more
detailed layers of the underlying taxonomy. However, the
constraints would depend on the organization where they
are implemented and would not be unambiguous.
5 Evaluation
In the previous sections, we presented an approach for
integrating human sensor information into SIEM sys-
tems. Therefore, we first discussed possible connecting
points for the interaction between human sensors and
SIEM systems. We also developed an incident model that
extends the scope of SIEM threat detection by incidents
that are additionally detectable by human sensors. Based
on these findings, we extended the STIX data model to
create data structures capable of capturing this informa-
tion and proposed a concept for the structured acqui-
sition of human sensor information. In design science
research, demonstration is like a light-weight evaluation,
to show that the artifact works to solve instances of a
given problem (Venable et al. 2012; Peffers et al. 2007).
To evaluate that our approach achieves its purpose in
our context, we demonstrate it threefold: First, we explain
our prototypical implementation, which shows that it
is realizable in practice. Thereafter, we use the exam-
ple from chapter 2 to show that it can be mapped to
the IHaaSS Incident Model and Taxonomy presented in
Section 4.2. Finally, we demonstrate how this example
would be represented in the STIX based format presented
in 4.4. Hereby it is worth mentioning, that a taxonomy
is never perfect and has to be shaped and extended as
the field of its purpose advances (Nickerson et al. 2013).
Furthermore, it is hardly possible to evaluate the tax-
onomy going beyond a demonstration, since it can only
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be shown exemplary, that it fits its intended purpose.
This is especially true for the context of this paper, as
there are almost no limits to the variety of cyberattacks
and incidents. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no similar taxonomy describing the artifacts that can be
recognized by human security sensors. Thus it is not
possible, to compare the performance of our taxonomy
to others.
5.1 Prototypical implementation
Our application prototype realizes the rendering of infor-
mation delivered by human security sensors into the
structured threat intelligence information. A working
example of the IHaaSS prototype is available online5.
The prototype pursues two different goals. On the one
hand, it demonstrates the use of IHaaSS in a possible
scenario for the structured acquisition of incident infor-
mation to show the overall validity of our approach.
On the other hand, it illustrates the value of informa-
tion delivered by human security sensors and the com-
bination possibilities with data from existing analytics
processes. The application consists of two major compo-
nents: First, a wizard component that allows the reception
of incident information delivered by humans. Second,
a server component that translates the acquired inci-
dent information into the structured format to be fur-
ther processed afterwards. The frontend is implemented
by using Angular6 and Typescript7. Java EE in combi-
nation with a Glassfish8 application server was used to
implement the STIX conversion logic and the database
access.
Figure 4 shows a screenshot of the first step in the
wizard component. The wizard is divided into two com-
ponents. In the first component, the information can
be entered by the user. The second part (Captured ele-
ments) gives an overview of already declared incident
elements so that the user can see what has been previ-
ously entered. The wizard is structured in four steps as
specified by the taxonomy. At first, the threat sources
can be reported. Thereby, an arbitrary number of sources
can be added. For selecting a source, the user is pre-
sented a drop-down list containing the elements of the
first layer of the taxonomy (Actor and Structure). When
an element is selected, a second drop-down list with the
elements of the next layer is displayed. This continues
until there are no sub-elements left. The same selection
mechanism is implemented for event types and entities in
subsequent steps. Only for events a "triggered by" input
field is added to specify the previously reported threat
source or threat event that initiated the event. There the
5http://tinyurl.com/yyqqlgg7
6https://angular.io/
7https://www.typescriptlang.org/
8https://javaee.github.io/glassfish/
selectable events get filtered according to the constraints
defined in chapter 4.5. In the fourth and final step, the
estimated impact of the whole incident can be entered.
Furthermore,the following additional information is
requested:
• Email: The email is used to enable follow-up contact
to the user who reported an incident for example
when additional information is required.
• Date: The date on which the incident occurred. The
current date is used as default value.
• General description of the incident: A free text
explanation of the incident enables the statement of
additional context information.
• Technical data: This input field is used for providing
technical information like log data or the content of a
phishing mail. This information could also be
gathered partially automatically as described by
Heartfield and Lukas (2018) depending on the
incident and the organizations’ infrastructure.
After the incident information was acquired by the wiz-
ard component, the data is transferred to the backend
component. The backend provides the conversion logic,
which translates the information collected by the wiz-
ard into corresponding STIX objects. It also provides the
underlying data storage for persisting the translated STIX
objects for later use.
5.2 Case study
In order to evaluate the wizard in combination with the
underlying taxonomy and constraints we show how an
employee could report an incident using the wizard. We
used the DarkVishnya incident as shown in Section 2 as an
exemplary use-case, which we iterate through below. Note
that we take the role of a fictional employee that could
have observed the incident. Thus, we only consider occur-
rences that may have been observed by a non-technical
staff member for this example. The potential selection
steps within the wizard are subsequently shown in brack-
ets. For this incident, we identified the following two
threat sources:
1 An unknown person is observed inside the premises
(Actor → Individual → Outsider)
2 A suspicious hardware device is seen in an office
room
(Structure → IT Equipment → Processing)
Moreover, two threat events can be identified:
1 The person falsely claims to have legitimate access
and enter s the premises
(Attack → Physical attacks → Unauthorized entry to
premises)
4. HUMAN-AS-A-SECURITY-SENSOR FOR HARVESTING THREAT INTELLIGENCE 95
Dissertation Florian Menges, 2020
Vielberth et al. Cybersecurity            (2019) 2:23 Page 12 of 15
Fig. 4 Screenshot of the wizard for reporting incidents by humans
2 The hardware device is placed in an office room and
connected to internal network infrastructure
(Attack → Nefarious activity/Abuse →
Manipulation of hardware and software)
In addition, a network device was identified as a neg-
atively affected entity. Thus, assets are selected from the
wizard. Finally, the impact is estimated as low, since the
employee may not be able to judge the whole extent
of the incident. After the data is collected from the
human sensor, it is translated into the corresponding
STIX data objects by the server component as described
in the following. The outsider (1) who falsely claimed
to have legitimate access to the premises is translated
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into a Threat Actor object. Its specific properties are
mapped to the internal vocab "ThreatActorTypeVocab"
that was extended within this work. The technique of
gaining unauthorized access to the premises is translated
into a TTP object and matching attack patterns from
the CAPEC enumeration are mapped. The suspicious
hardware device (2) attached to the internal network
is then mapped to a structural source object and its
specifics are mapped using the "StructuralSourceType-
Vocab" created with this work. The action of planting
a malicious device is described using a further TTP
object and the corresponding CAPEC attack patterns
analogous to the first TTP object. After creating these
specific entities, the general descriptions of the incident
as well as the time of the occurrence, affected assets,
and the expected impact are recorded using an Inci-
dent object. All these objects are then finally wrapped
using a Report object. The complete STIX report for
this exemplary use-case is appended to this work as sup-
plementary material. Moreover, it can be viewed under
the past incidents overview section within the wizard
prototype9.
Considering the results of this incident, there are dif-
ferent possible connecting points to automated analy-
ses within a SIEM system. Firstly, the generated report
delivers information about the approximate time of the
occurrence, the exact location as well as the affected net-
work device and possibly even the used network port.
This data can then be enriched with the correspond-
ing log information from the SIEM system in order
to clarify the findings. Furthermore, if an electronic
access control has been circumvented in any way, the
log data available can also be used as further evidence
and to enrich the incident information gathered from the
employee.
5.3 Discussion
The prototypical implementation has shown three key
aspects: First, it was demonstrated, that it is possible
to represent the beforehand theoretically defined IHaaSS
incident model and taxonomy (Section 4.2) as a wizard-
like application. This application guides the user through
the taxonomy and enables him to select and report all
possible elements. Second, the acquisition can be con-
ducted in a structured way since the constraints defined
in Section 4.5 were all implemented within the proto-
type. Nevertheless, practical usage over a longer period
of time will reveal whether these constraints are exhaus-
tive. Third, the acquired data can be translated into a STIX
representation, which could be further used for security
analytics systems, despite the volume of possible user
input.
9http://tinyurl.com/y5tsoxo3
The case study has shown that it is generally possible to
apply the prototype for a real-word incident. Therefore, it
was validated with an expert who analyzed the attack as
a member of the incident response team. However, only
a broad long-term study can show the usability, which we
will address in the future.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we present an approach for acquiring and
structuring incident information from human sensors to
prepare it for the use within security analytics systems
such as SIEM systems. Therefore, we identify the connec-
tion points of human sensors within a SIEM system (Q1)
and answer the question how the reportable information
can be structured (Q2). Thereby the IHaaSS Incident
Model and Taxonomy is deduced, which consists of the
four components threat sources, threat events, entities
and expected impact. The incident model builds the basis
for a data format suitable for representing threat intel-
ligence information reported by humans. An important
factor while developing the data format is to maintain the
compatibility with existing and well-established formats,
in our case STIX. For acquiring the data from human
sensors in a structured way (Q3) we propose a process
where we define some constraints, which ensure that the
collected data is not contradictory. Finally, the approach
is evaluated from three directions. First, we prototypi-
cally implement the approach and second, an example
use-case is mapped to the IHaaSS Incident Model and
Taxonomy to show its practicability. Finally, the use case
was represented in the proposed STIX-based format.
Since the examined subject of human-as-a-sensor, espe-
cially with its focus on security, is a rather new topic,
there is a lot of potential for future research. A topic
marginally tackled in this paper is the connection of
human-generated data with machine-generated data,
which for example originates from log files. The data
collected from humans may be extended by automatically
or manually deriving relationships to machine data. To
achieve this, different approaches such as rule-based
correlation and aggregation may be used. In order to
facilitate the definition of rules, it can be helpful to visual-
ize the generated data. Therefore, existing approaches as
presented by Böhm et al. (2018) could be extended to the
proposed data format. Machine learning techniques also
show a lot of potential regarding the correlation of data
acquired by humans and machine-generated data.
Our present work considers the acquisition and struc-
turing of information delivered by humans. However, we
have not examined forensic and legal requirements. Nev-
ertheless, considering these requirements is of great rel-
evance especially when the collected data is supposed to
be used as evidence in court afterwards. Furthermore,
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human generated data may also play an important role in
the incident response process and thus should be qualified
as data foundation for forensic analyses. Since reports may
contain personal data, the topic needs additional consider
ation from a legal point of view.
An additional research gap can be identified with regard
to motivating employees for reporting detected incidents.
On the one hand, incentives have to be created and on
the other hand, barriers keeping employees from report-
ing have to be removed. For example, if a person reports
an incident, which denigrates a colleague, it might be an
unwanted result. In this context, obfuscation techniques,
such as anonymization or pseudonymization, may help
to solve some of these problems. Additionally, changes to
the corporate culture are required, so that it is considered
normal for employees to report detected incidents, as it
is for example in an anti-fraud culture. In this regard the
analysis and assurance of data quality is especially impor-
tant due to the possibility of erroneous inputs by humans.
Finally, the proposed approach is rather generic. Thus, it
has to be adopted to the respective context for practical
use. Especially the proposed taxonomy could be refined in
order to depict more corporate information and it has to
be tailored to match the corporate culture.
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Abstract. The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) in Europe raises a whole series of issues and implications on
the handling of corporate data. We consider the case of security-relevant
data analyses in companies, such as those carried out by Security Infor-
mation and Event Management (SIEM) systems. It is often argued that
the processing of personal data is necessary to achieve service quality.
However, at present existing systems arguably are in conflict with the
GDPR since they often process personal data without taking data pro-
tection principles into account. In this work, we first examine the GDPR
regarding the resulting requirements for SIEM systems. On this basis, we
propose a SIEM architecture that meets the privacy requirements of the
GDPR and show the effects of pseudonymization on the detectability of
incidents.
Keywords: Security Information and Event Management · SIEM ·GDPR
· Threat Intelligence · DINGfest.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The security of the modern information infrastructure is of high importance. In
order to detect misuse and attacks at an early stage a lot of information about the
events inside IT-infrastructures, e.g. inside computer networks and software ap-
plications also across many systems, is required to detect or post-mortem report
and document attacks. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
systems help organizations to keep up with the ever increasing complexity by
providing a holistic view on IT-infrastructures. Naturally, SIEM systems process
enormous amounts of data about security related events, e.g., when specific users
login or certain users perform critical actions. It is often argued, that generally
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the quality of service depends critically on the quality and detail of the data col-
lected and processed within the system [48], which has been shown for different
domains such as threat intelligence [37].
Events like those just described that are processed within the SIEM system
are clearly related to concrete users and therefore must be treated as personal
information, which require protection under Europe’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [13]. Adopted in May 2018, it regulates and harmonizes
the protection of personal data in the processing and transfer of data within and
between private companies and/or public bodies in the European member states.
Although, the GDPR is only compulsory for EU member states, it has evolved
into a blueprint for data protection all over the world, as discussions between the
US Congress and Mark Zuckerberg in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica
case indicate5.
Hence, SIEM systems must also comply to the regulations themselves, which
leads to conflicting interests. On the one hand, SIEM systems rely on personal
data such as information from the identity and access management (IAM) for
providing high detection rates of incidents and thus a high level of protection.
On the other hand, the requirements of the GDPR suggest that investigations
of data streams as carried out in current SIEM systems may no longer be legally
compliant. To complicate things even further, regulations regarding the handling
of digital evidence mandate that authenticity and integrity of the data related
to an incident should be guaranteed at all times in order to maintain its high
legal probative value. It is therefore necessary to find the best trade-off between
those two demands. With this work we attempt to fill the resulting research gap
and to harmonize legal GDPR requirements with the technical architecture for
SIEM systems. To bridge the gap between the disciplines of computer science
and law and to produce the most reliable results possible, this paper was written
by IT security researchers in collaboration with a lawyer A central idea is the
integration of anonymization and pseudonymization into threat analytics mech-
anisms. While this makes it necessary to change the original data, it is possible
to maintain legal integrity and authenticity by using redactable and sanitizable
signatures, a cryptographic concept to retain a level of authenticity useful to re-
tain a suitable level of legal evidence even when data gets obfuscated or if certain
parts of it are missing. We deploy cryptography to enable balancing authenticity
proofs for the collected security-related events with the confidentiality require-
ments of the information about commercially-relevant internals (trade secrets)
and employees’ as well as customers’ privacy (personal data). Thus, our goal is
to minimize the amount of data which is being made accessible to third-parties
in every step of the SIEM process. By enforcing this with cryptography the pro-
posed system adheres to the security-by-design principle of least privilege as well
as the privacy-by-design principle of data minimization. At the same time we
aim to keep the impact on detection as low as possible and thus we provide an
audit-able process to gain access to more details if security analysis is needing
5 https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/11/17224492/zuckerberg-facebook-congress-
gdpr-data-protection
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it. For the reason of being able to reconstruct original data, leaving a trace in
an audit log, we focus on cryptographic methods and support pseudonymization
rather than anonymization. Technically, we encrypt and sign events early and
store the decryption keys with a party trusted for logging access to stored keys;
moreover we employ signatures that allow to slice or redact data.
1.2 Related Work
When looking at the application of privacy mechanisms to threat analytics (e.g.
SIEM systems), literature can be divided into a pre-GDPR and a post-GDPR
phase, as this regulation still has a big impact on the integration of privacy. In
the former phase there are not many results to be found regarding applying pri-
vacy to SIEM systems, however the challenges in integrating privacy in forensic
and threat analyses has been identified [40,17]. Although the challenges were not
solved for SIEM systems, selected works in the IT security domain address it.
For example Burkhart et al. [6] describe a privacy preserving solution for secure
multi-party computation. Furthermore, a main focus during this era was the ap-
plication of privacy to intrusion detection systems (IDS), which could be declared
as the predecessors of modern SIEM systems and thus in our context are worth a
closer look: Sobirey et al. [39] propose an approach for pseudonymizing user re-
lated data in IDS and closely examined, which records need to be pseudonymized
in audit records. Based on this work, Biskup and Flegel [3] and Park et al. [28]
propose an approach which is quite similar to the one presented in this paper
as it uses cryptograpic methods to pseudonymize personal data, though these
are closely tailored to IDS and not completely adaptable to SIEM. In addition,
they were issued before the publication of the GDPR and thus did not have all
the requirements in mind and respectively were not evaluated against the new
requirements. Our approach also differs,as we have a more abstract view of the
whole system and do not focus largely on cryptographic details. Furthermore,
Buschkes and Kesdog˘an [7] discuss requirements such as data avoidance and
reduction of personal data.
Although privacy preserving methods were widely discussed in the past, re-
cently the application of GDPR received an increased amount of attention and
new works were published. In relation to SIEM, some work was published cov-
ering GDPR compliant data processing. Sgaglione and Mazzeo [38] and Cop-
polino et al. [8] introduce the COMPACT project, which is a GDPR compliant
SIEM. However, they do not go into detail, how this is realised technically.
Current research for SIEM systems mainly focuses on the architecture and im-
provement of such systems and not on the integration of privacy [26,25,27].
In cryptography, digital signatures are used to ensure authenticity and in-
tegrity of data, i.e., they guarantee that upon inspection data is unchanged and
comes from an attributable source. Special techniques of redactable signature
schemes (RSS) by Steinfeld et al. [41,18] allow subsequent deletions in the data,
while sanitizable signature schemes (SSS) as proposed by Atieniese at al. [1] even
allow subsequent edits by dedicated authorised parties while maintaining authen-
ticity of the remaining data. Both RSS and SSS allow to balance authenticity
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with privacy protection, because they allow retaining the integrity and authen-
ticity protection for the unedited or not-removed parts of the document and at
the same time keep the confidentiality protection for the overwritten parts of
the document. In cryptography the latter property is intuitively termed privacy.
While many schemes have appeared in the literature [2], only some of which up-
hold privacy and only those schemes that additionally fulfil detectability, known
as non interactive public accountability [5] can be used for eIDAS6 compliant
signatures [30,31,45]. While the legal compliance of such signatures has been
subject to research, the integration of such schemes into privacy protection of
SIEM have not yet been investigated. In particular, in the application scenario of
SIEM we want to be able to later reveal previously not-shared content. For this,
a special form of digital signatures is needed which has the property of merge-
ability, i.e., the ability to re-add signed content to previously redacted but still
signed content and re-generate a valid signature over the merged content [34].
1.3 Contribution and Outline
To the best of our knowledge we are not aware of an approach, that integrated
GDPR into SIEM in a comprehensive way. Given the fact that these regulations
need to be applied by all companies that operate within the European Union,
there appears to be high demand for systems that are GDPR compliant. In
this paper we present the first privacy-friendly – and thus GDPR-compliant –
SIEM architecture that protects the confidentiality as well as the authenticity
of security-relevant events starting at their collection, keeping the protection
during the analysis and finally sending an incident report.
The presented architecture allows the deployment of a SIEM that meets the
regulatory requirements under the EU data protection. It protects personal infor-
mation in the data sets from unnecessary visibility using pseudonymization and
encryption techniques without a significant reduction in detectability. Hence, we
balance data-quality (detection of incidents) with legal obligations from privacy
legislation and thus also protect trade secret by sharing only the minimum nec-
essary information in any step of the SIEM process. Thus we strongly adhere
to the GDPR’s data minimization principle. Still, we achieve the highest level
of confidence that the security-relevant events initially recorded and reported
into the SIEM process are protected from tampering by using redactable and
sanitizable signature schemes to proof authenticity. This allows us to balance
the need for generating data with a high legal evidence with the need to protect
privacy (and trade-secrets).
The legal analysis carried out for this architecture and presented in this
paper shows that even potentially invasive data can be collected in a GDPR-
compliant manner as our proposed system balances the necessity of the collection
(detection and reporting of actual security incidents) with the protection of users
6 eIDAS is short for the current legislation which defines the technical functionalities to
allow electronic signatures to be legally equivalent to handwritten signatures within
the EU [12].
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privacy and customer’s trade-secret needs. The paper shows the actual influence
of pseudonymization on incident detection mechanisms and the results of the
performed legal evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we give some
background on the GDPR (legal) and SIEM (technical) in Section 2. In Section
3 we develop the research questions that arise from integrating GDPR into SIEM.
On this basis, we describe our GDPR-compliant architecture for SIEM systems
in Section 4. The architecture is the evaluated on both technical and legal level
in Section 5. The paper concludes in Section 6.
2 Background
This section provides the background information that is needed to understand
the approach presented in this paper. Thus, we first give an overview of the
functionality and properties of SIEM systems, as this serves as a basis for our
architecture. Subsequently, we give an overview of the requirements the GDPR
defines with special attention to the processing of personal data.
2.1 Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
In general, SIEM was first mentioned by Gartner [49]. It originated from the
initially separate systems Security Information Management (SIM) and Security
Event Management (SEM) [15]. SIEM must fulfill several requirements, which
are all connected: Log collection, enrichment with context data, log normaliza-
tion, event correlation, and analysis as well as long- and short-term storage of
log data, reporting, monitoring, alerting, and incident response [24,47,14].
A SIEM system as described in [47] is essentially designed for collecting
relevant log data in a central place from arbitrary systems such as network
devices or operating systems. This among other things enables the detection of
incidents and in this way gaining situational security awareness. On a high level
of abstraction, a SIEM system consists of the three main steps data acquisition,
processing and reporting, which are elaborated in the following in more detail.
Data acquisition: Hereby, it first collects relevant event information, in most
cases in the form of log data, which gets enriched with additional context
data. There are basically two approaches for data acquisition: First, the data
can be pushed into the SIEM by the data generating system. Thereby, the
SIEM does not influence the generated data. Second, the data can be pulled
by the SIEM from the observed system, which grants more control over the
generated data enabling for example the assurance of integrity. This data
then is translated into a uniform representation during the normalization
step.
Processing: The core of the system is the correlation and analysis component,
wherein information from various sources is correlated and incidents get
detected by methods such as pattern matching. Real-time threat detection
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enables fast reactions in case of an incident, whereas forensic analysis pursues
the goal of analyzing the whole extent of the event in the aftermath in order
to secure evidence. A distinction can, therefore, be made between short-
term and long-term storage of relevant data. For long-term storage, it is
particularly important to preserve the data in a tamper-proof way in order
to be able to use it as evidence in court. Monitoring and visual security
analytics enable security analysts to be actively involved in the analysis
process. In the case of a detected incident, alerting and incident response
triggers necessary reactions to mitigate further harm.
Reporting: An essential part of modern SIEM systems is reporting occurred
incidents for compliance reasons (e.g. critical infrastructure providers) or
enables the participation in established threat intelligence sharing platforms
between participating organizations.
2.2 GDPR
In the following we present some background on general and SIEM-specific
GDPR demands and later (see Sect.3) detail, which problems arise for SIEM
systems to be built to comply.
Since 25 May 2018, the GDPR has been in force throughout the European
Union (EU) to ensure the protection of the “natural person” in data processing.
This regulation is directly applicable to all member states of the EU. The GDPR
does not contain any immediate legal requirements for software developers but
if they intend to sell their product to customers, they must be aware of the legal
requirements.
Data protection is the protection of the natural person from privacy impair-
ments through the processing of data concerning the person. Everyone should
be free to decide who, when and how their data should be accessible. The term
of personal data is therefore defined as “all information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person”, Art. 4 (1) GDPR.
General principles of data processing In order to achieve the goal of high
personal protection, the GDPR pursues the regulation of all basic principles
which are regulated in Art. 5 (1) GDPR. According to the GDPR, only lawful,
fair and transparent data processing is permitted in a transparent manner, Art.
5 (1) lit. a GDPR, in order to serve the principle of good faith. Furthermore, data
processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that it is applied by Art. 6
GDPR. But even then, it must be done in a transparent way which is traceable
for the data subject. Another important principle is the purpose limitation, Art.
5 (1) lit. b GDPR. Thus, the clear purpose of processing must be previously
established and legitimate. Furthermore, the principle of data minimization is
applicable, Art. 5 (1) lit. c GDPR. This means that data collection is only allowed
within limits for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further. A
further principle is accuracy, Art. 5 (1) lit. d GDPR. Only correct data may
be collected. Even after processing it must be ensured that personal data is
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accurate. If this is not the case, data must be erased or rectified with delay. One
further fundamental principle is the storage limitation, Art. 5 (1) lit. e GDPR.
In the course of data processing it must be ensured that an identification is only
possible in case of it being necessary for the purpose. Integrity and confidentiality
have recently become further important principles, Art. 5 (1) lit. f GDPR. This
means that processing must occur in compliance with general safety standards.
Compliance with these principles must be proven at any time by the controller,
Art. 5 (2) GDPR.
Processing on a legal basis and transparency obligations Generally, there
must be a legal basis for the processing, otherwise all collection of personal data
is considered unlawful. The exceptions are regulated by Art. 6 GDPR. First of
all, processing is lawful if the data subject has given consent to data processing,
Art. 6 (1) point (a) GDPR. Processing is also allowed for the performance of
contracts, Art. 6 (1) point (b) GDPR. If the processor is subjected to a legal
obligation, data processing is also lawful without further requirements, Art. 6 (1)
point (c) GDPR. This also applies if the protection of vital interests is pursued,
Art. 6 (1) point (d) GDPR. The processing is also possible for the performance
of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority,
Art. 6 (1) point (e) GDPR. Lastly, processing is lawful for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where
such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms
of the data subject which require protection of personal data, Art. 6 (1) point
(f) GDPR. While a lot of the exceptions might be triggered by the need and
want to have a SIEM to protect from security breaches, the collection must
meet a balance test, e.g. collection must not overshoot the goal, and must be
transparent, e.g. clearly communicated to the data subjects.
Data security In addition, the GDPR regulates a close interconnection of
data protection with data security (especially Art. 32 GDPR) to the effect that
technical and organizational measures in the data-processing company enable
the highest degree of data security (availability, confidentiality, integrity, and
resilience). In our scenario, the two security goals confidentiality and integrity are
particularly relevant. We must ensure that information about events that could
relate to incidents is transferred from the source to the sink, and is not altered or
made accessible to unauthorised persons. To protect integrity an unauthorized
modification must be detected if it happened, which is especially important to
use non-tampered recorded data as evidence. Thus, protecting integrity and
authenticating the data’s origin provides legal value. Further, confidentiality
protection guarantees that no unauthorized party is able to obtain information
not intended for them, e.g. we must securely communicate the personal data to
have them reach only the right recipients.
Redaction The term “redaction” itself is not found in the GDPR directly; it
refers to the irreversible removal of the information [43]. This process is explicitly
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mentioned in guidance documents that explain how to remove information that
is not subject to the information to be released under laws for the freedom
of access to information, e.g. UK FOIA [29] and thus is also applicable as a
technique in the context of GDPR’s data minimization [44,43].
Pseudonymization The term “pseudonymisation” of the GDPR means the
processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no
longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and
is subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal
data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person, Art. 4 (5)
GDPR. In order to make a pseudonymization, the data subject must first be as-
signed to pseudonyms. These can be user IDs. Thereafter the necessary data for
identification must be kept separately. It must be ensured that they are strictly
separated from the pseudonyms. It is important that features that can only indi-
rectly lead to identification must be removed in the event of pseudonymization.
The pseudonymization can be made by the data subject himself, the controller or
an independent third party, a data trustee. An assignment rule must be created,
e.g. through a reference table. The pseudonymization must be performed without
the knowledge of the data subject. The data subject must be informed about the
pseudonymization and it must be clarified who generates the pseudonym, who
owns the assignment rule and under what circumstances an identification may
take place. This is because pseudonymized data continues to be personal data.
Particularly in the area of monitoring software development compliance with
the GDPR is mandatory because it extracts its results from a data stream that
contains personal data. The pseudonymization protects the data of the data sub-
jects. At the same time, it is an opportunity to still being able to detect security
incidents effectively and identify the responsible user in this regard.
3 Problem Statement and Research Questions
In SIEM systems very large amounts of data are processed from various sources,
while at the same time a GDPR compliant data protection must be guaranteed.
This can be achieved by protecting all data relevant to data protection against
unauthorized access using techniques such as encryption or pseudonymization.
Working on protected data, however, brings different additional problems with
it. On the one hand, it needs to be ensured that incident recognition is still
possible despite the data protection. On the other hand it also needs to be
possible to remove the protection in case of an actual incident. These aspects,
which we have identified as essential for a GDPR-compliant analysis process,
translate into the following three specific research questions. In this work we
use the pseudonymization for the realization of the data protection, since this
represents a valid procedure according to both GDPR and different reporting
regulatory environments.
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3.1 Data Protection considerations and attacker model:
SIEM systems work with data from highly heterogeneous sources. As a result,
different requirements need to be met in order to enable data protection in ac-
cordance with the GDPR. Establish data protection through the full encryption
of all data would be the most intuitive and legally compliant way to process
the data. However, since the GDPR only requires the protection of personal
data, the data can also be classified according to protection requirements and
partially peudonymized in this context. In this way it can be achieved to still
be legally compliant, while more meaningful data is available for analysis at the
same time. To achieve this, all acquired data needs to be available in a standard-
ized form to allow the identification of information that needs to be protected.
More specifically, the data acquired can be differentiated into information that
is not relevant for data protection, data that may be relevant for data protection
(e.g. path information in folder structures) and specific information relevant for
data protection (e.g. e-mail addresses or contents of e-mails). In addition to this,
the pseudonymization mechanism also needs to be protected. It must be ensured
in a technical and organizational way for each data processing step within the
SIEM system.
For being able to design a compliant and secure system, it is conducive, to
define an attacker model, that determines the necessary measures. Thereby, the
role, the goal, behaviour and the resources of the attacker are delimited:
– Role: The attackers role against which we consider our system protected
can either be an outsider or an insider. An outsider is any person who has
only access to interfaces of the system, which are open to the public. The
outsider can however utilize a breach to gain access to certain parts or data
of the system. Any third party who is involved in the SIEM system can also
be referred to as an outsider. In contrast, an insider is any person who is
directly involved into the system, such as analysts or server-admins.
– Goal and behaviour: The attacker can be either passive or active. The
passive attacker only lists to the data without any intervention, whereas the
active attacker tries to gain access to the data or the system by actively
interacting with the system. For our approach, the considered goal of the
attacker is to gain access to private data, since we design a SIEM system
which is GDPR compliant.
– Resources: Since we utilize measures which are based on common asymmet-
ric or symmetric cryptography, we can only consider attackers, with limited
resources.
In summary, this raises the first question:
Q1: How must data that is processed in SIEM systems be protected
to be GDPR compliant?
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3.2 Impairment of Incident Identification through Data
Concealment:
The GDPR stipulates that data protection must be applied as early as possible
within the analysis process. Considering the data management of SIEM systems,
this translates into a data protection obligation at the time of data acquisition.
As a result, incident detection always needs to be performed on pseudonymiza-
tion data. In this context, the relationship between pseudonymized data and
plain text data within the data stream is a significant factor influencing possible
analyses. This may impair both automated and manual analyses due to possi-
ble losses in the meaningfulness of the data analyzed. This leads to the second
question:
Q2: Does the recognition of security incidents function properly de-
spite of data pseudonymization or may losses and trade-offs be ex-
pected here?
3.3 Lifting the Pseudonymization while retaining Data
Authenticity:
To enable the utilization of information about detected security incidents, while
being compliant with the legislation, two main conditions need to be met. On
the one hand, information about incidents must be available in the long term in
an integrity preserving manner. On the other hand, a de-pseudonymization of
the data needs to be possible at any time after detection. This warrants that the
information can be used as a reliable means of evidence in trials that might take
place in the future. Please note that the GDPR proposes both anonymization
and pseudonymization techniques as possible data protection measures. How-
ever, since the use of anonymization would prevent the data from being used as
evidence, this technique will not be considered further in this paper.
To achieve this, appropriate technical and organizational measures need to
be in place ensuring that de-pseudonymization is only possible in case of actual
incidents. Additionally, legal compliance also needs to be ensured for the data
after lifting the pseudonymization for further processing. This requires protecting
the data’s integrity including origin authenticity.
Thus, the principle of data minimization complicates especially the goal of
integrity. This principle has always been at the center of data protection and can
be found in European and member state legal texts, e.g. already in the former
Directive 95/46/EC and thus also in the GDPR. In detail Art. 5 GDPR describes
that personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary
in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.
In general, there are two ways to conform with data minimization: (a) not
collect or not forward personal data if it unnecessary, e.g. deleting it from data
sets or blacken it out, i.e. redact it, or (b) making it harder to restore the personal
data. For the latter, an important measure in this regard is the pseudonymiza-
tion of data because it reduces the risks for the data subject and simultaneously
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it helps the controller to fulfil his data protection obligations (see also recital
28). By, for example, ensuring that only pseudonymized data is used during the
incident analysis and that the person is only revealed if an anomaly is detected,
would make a legally compliant processing of personal data in a SIEM conceiv-
able. For the former, personal data, e.g. fields that contain this information,
could just be removed before forwarding them.
On the other hand, both mechanisms for data minimization (pseudonymiza-
tion or removal) result in a modification of the initially gathered data; an in-
tended modification but a modification nevertheless. This results in standard
cryptographic mechanisms to protect the data’s integrity, such as digital sig-
natures or message authentication codes, to fail. Thus, they are unsuitable to
protect the integrity end-to-end. The more recent cryptographic mechanisms,
known as redactable [18,41] or sanitizable signatures [1] are capable of allowing
our architecture to authorize modifications such as removal of unnecessary data
points from authentic data set gathered by the SIEM. From their initial versions
these algorithms have evolved (see [2] for an overview). Most recently they un-
dergo the process of becoming an internationally recognized signature standard7.
While this process takes time, the current status shows that the cryptographic
mechanisms have the needed maturity to be backed and accepted in the cryp-
tographic community. Once becoming recognised through such a standard, legal
argumentation for compliance becomes a lot easier as legislators and judges will
find the algorithms in lists of known mechanisms. Even if not standardised (or
not yet) the provided authenticity offerings are technically equivalent to nor-
mal signatures [32,16] and in any case much better than having none and also
non-standard algorithms are suitable to win legal arguments in court cases –
bearing the need for technical expertise appointed by court. This leads to the
third question:
Q3: Which conditions need to be met to ensure that incident infor-
mation can be de-pseudonymized in case of an incident and how can
it be used as means of evidence?
4 Conceptualizing a GDPR-compliant SIEM System
Although SIEM systems have grown to mature security tools, privacy has largely
been neglected in this area. Thus, we have previously defined central research
questions that arise when applying the GDPR regulation. To answer these ques-
tions, we propose a SIEM architecture that is compliant with GDPR, while
largely preserving its functionalities in this section. Therefore, we propose con-
crete solutions for each of the individual research questions based on an extended,
GDPR-compliant architecture.
7 ISO/IEC 23264 Redaction of Authentic Data https://www.iso.org/standard/78341.
html [last accessed: Jan. 2020]
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4.1 DINGfest base Architecture
This section gives an overview on our general security monitoring architecture
and assigns the previously defined research questions to the respective areas of
the architecture. The presented architecture is based on the general DINGfest
architecture as presented in [23] and extends it by data protection measures and
the resulting GDPR compliance. DINGfest is a research project that aims at
improving the detection, forensic analysis and the reporting of detected incidents.
The project started June 2016 and will finalize at the end of 2019 and is funded
by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The general system
monitoring architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. It consists of three main modules
– namely data acquisition, data analysis and incident reporting located within
an organization and shows an external authority possible counterpart for the
receipt of detected incidents. The counterpart is intentionally included in the
architecture design, since its role and the management of the data flows generated
there are one central factor in ensuring the legal compliance of the system. This
concerns data protection requirements according to the GDPR on the one hand
and may also concern existing statutory reporting obligations of the organization.
The data acquisition module collects data from all monitored computing
resources in the company. This data may contain personal data of employees
and customers that needs to be protected. The monitored resources are not only
computing devices like workstations, servers and mobile devices, but also net-
work devices like routers and switches. The actual data is obtained from various
sources. This includes, for example, data extracted with the help of Virtual Ma-
chine Introspection (VMI). This also includes data obtained from system log
files or incident information provided by human sensors [46]. Moreover, all data
extractions within the acquisition area are stored in the acquisition log. This en-
ables a later auditability of all the information obtained. The extracted data is
finally pushed into a larger data stream, which serves as data basis for the data
analysis section. Data acquisition is the starting point at which all data (includ-
ing personal data) is transferred to the system. As a result, research question
Q1 must be addressed within this module to show how data must be protected
or pseudonymized to ensure GDPR-compliant data handling. This additionally
generates the required prudential value for the gathered evidence.
The data analysis module analyzes the whole data stream and tries to de-
tect security incidents using a combination of fingerprinting and pattern recogni-
tion. If the detection engine discovers a potential security violation it generates
an incident alert that contains a description of the assumed violation and the re-
lated data records. The alert is then received and analyzed by a forensic analyst.
The analyst can use a visual analysis interface and request additional data from
the data acquisition module. Should the suspicion be confirmed, the incident
is forwarded to the reporting module. Otherwise, the incident alert is deleted
right away. As shown above, the data acquired during data acquisition must be
protected. This makes data analysis more difficult, since information is lost as
a result of pseudonymization. Therefore, the research question Q2 will be ad-
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Fig. 1. DINGfest Base Architecture
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dressed within this module to show how far incident detection with disguised
data is still possible.
The tasks of the reporting module include the long-term storage of an-
alyzed incidents (usually between several weeks and several year depending on
the local legislation) and the reporting to local authorities in accordance with
the legislation in force. Arriving incidents are therefore stored in a database and
processed by an incident reporter. During this process the reporter might query
the database to contrast the current incident with past incidents. Eventually a
report is generated and forwarded to local authorities, in order to inform them or
comply with regional regulations. Such reports may contain information about
innocent individuals or company assets which also need to be protected. Within
this module the research question Q3 will be addressed. The aim is to ensure
that information can be de-pseudonymized in the event of an actual incident,
while preserving its integrity. This is necessary to enable the use of the data as
evidence in possible later court cases. Furthermore, it must also be ensured that
the data can be reported to the appropriate authorities in compliance with the
law and data protection regulations.
4.2 GDPR compliant Data Processing
In the following we present our approach in more detail, especially relevant parts,
which enable GDPR compliant data processing inside SIEM (Q1). To this end,
we propose an approach that pseudonymizes personal data at relevant points
and at the same time allows to de-pseudonymize this data in case of a detected
incident (Q3) in compliance with GDPR regulations. Fig. 2 shows the basic
structure of this approach. To achieve a pseudonymization of the information,
cryptographic methods are used. These on the one hand prevent access to per-
sonal data by encrypting it and on the other hand allow decrypting it under
certain constraints specified by the GDPR. However, the decisive question is
where the data must be encrypted and how to implement the key management
for encryption.
The GDPR demands the protection of personal data as it is processed. Thus,
we argue that personal data must be pseudonymized as soon as possible in the
system. In the case of SIEM this is the case directly after or ideally during the
data is acquired. To achieve this, a public key (B) is provided by a TTP (Trusted
Third Party), which is responsible for key management. With this key, the fields
containing personal data are encrypted asymmetrically and the unencrypted
personal data is deleted. In order to be able to comprehend and proof, that
all personal data has been pseudonymized, an Acquisition Log is kept. For this
purpose, we propose to use a tamper proof logging scheme, which synchronizes
all logged data with an external blockchain as presented by Putz et al. [35]. For
proper use of public key cryptography, we refer to Lo´pez et al. [22].
In order to determine, which fields must be encrypted, a Policy is followed.
For each logging system type an individual mapping must be defined that spec-
ifies the fields containing personal data. This policy is defined by the Data Pro-
tection Officer (DPO) or an equivalent position inside the organization. A DPO
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is responsible for compliance and data protection within an organization and
should have the necessary expertise to make the required decisions.
In addition to the data protection aspects shown above, the model presented
is also intended to provide protection against attacks resulting from the attacker
model defined in Section 3. According to the assumptions made, possible dangers
from insiders and outsiders are examined more detailed in the following.
Outsider: According to the model, outsiders can be divided into two main
groups. Common outsiders, which have no specific reference to the system, and
the TTP as an outsider, which is partially involved in the analysis process.
The authority as the third participant is not considered in detail here, as it is
supposed to have access to the data it receives in the context of a report.
– Common outsider: The major problem is to prevent data flows to out-
siders. Specifically, the areas of data acquisition, data analysis and incident
reporting must be protected. This is essentially guaranteed by a consistent
use of the internal, symmetric key A. This ensures that the data remains pro-
tected even in the event of an unwanted extraction. The data may only be
possibly unprotected in the case of an extraction during the data acquisition
process. The security of this data mainly depends on the level of protection
of the underlying source system.
– TTP: The TTP used in the present data model also represents a specific
outsider, who is integrated into the SIEM process. However, the TTP only
receives the key B from the data flow for custody, but does not have access to
data from the data stream at any time. It is also worth noting that the TTP
does not have access to the key A at any time. Accordingly, the TTP must
be considered the equivalent of other outsiders in the case of data leaks.
During data analysis, an incident detection approach is followed. This ap-
proach is mainly automated but can also be supported by human analysts.
Thereby, the incident detection is conducted solely on pseudonymized data and
thus is GDPR compliant. The thereby used event detection approach is elabo-
rated further in the following chapter.
Insider: In the present model, only two groups of people have access to the
internal data. These are analysts in the areas of data analysis and incident report-
ing on the one hand and data protection officers who define the corresponding
policies on the other hand.
– Analyst: The analysts involved are only provided with specific data extracts
and personal data under certain circumstances. For this purpose, an approval
for specific data components must be granted according to the policy defined
by the data protection officer. If such an approval does not exist, analysts
always work only with pseudonymized data.
– DPO: The data protection officer is never given access to the data within
the data stream and thus has access to resources that are equivalent to an
outsider. On the other hand, the DPO has a protective influence on the data
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stream by defining the respective policy. This ensures that the protection
of the data stream is always split between two different roles within the
company.
4.3 Event Detection on protected Data
Different software usually comes with different log formats that is often loose
text. In our case, we use standard Linux logs like syslog and auth.log that usu-
ally come with a Linux distribution. Furthermore, we use access.log of Apache’s
HTTP Server [42]. Since system call traces are a rich source of behavioral infor-
mation [36,19], we also use system calls traces that are obtained via virtual ma-
chine introspection. System call tracing has a negative impact on performance,
but especially enterprise environments can benefit since some events cannot be
detected using common logs.
Table 1. The unified log message format [21]
Name Description
source The source from where the message comes from.
type id Describes the type of the message, e.g., the system
call number.
date Timestamp of the message when it was generated.
path A path, e.g., which path was opened.
user The user who performs the event.
process name The name of the process that performs the event.
· · · · · ·
misc Can be used for random things (no personal data)
that do not fit into that format.
Log messages are transformed into a unified structured log format. An excerpt
of the message format that we use in DINGfest can be seen in Table 1 [21]: The
entry source specifies from which of our sources log the message comes from.
Thereby, we assume that it is not possible to deduce from the source to the user,
i.e., in server scenarios. One of the most important attributes of the unified
log message is type id. This ID specifies what kind of message it is. In case of
system calls the type id is the system call number. Misc may contain arbitrary
information that does not fit into the unified message format, e.g. command
line option. We assume, that this field does not contain personal data. For the
evaluation we checked manually that this field does not contain personal data.
Another useful feature is path. However, the path may contain personal data
such as the user name.
An example of a unified log message is shown in Listing 1.1
{
” source ” : ” s y s c a l l s ” ,
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” type id ” : 59 ,
” process name ” : ” l s ” ,
” user ” : ” a l i c e ” ,
” pid ” : 103 ,
”path” : ”/home/ a l i c e / t o p s e c r e t /”
. . .
}
Listing 1.1. Example of a unified message.
So we can distinguish between three kinds of log file entries:
1. Those that definitely contain personal data (e.g., user),
2. those that may contain personal data (e.g., path), and
3. those that do definitely not contain personal data (e.g., source, type id, pro-
cess name, misc)
The classification may vary from system to system. For example, it is also possi-
ble that in a specific scenario a process name or a source name may also contain
personal data. The classification, however, determines which features can be
used for privacy friendly event detection, namely only features from the third
category. We use this idea in our evaluation in Section 5.1 to assess the impact
of privacy protection on event detection quality.
4.4 De-pseudonymization in case of an incident
In the previous section we presented an approach that allows us to perform
incident detection on data that is pseudonymized according to the GDPR reg-
ulation. On this basis, this section describes how security incidents can be de-
pseudonymized after detection in order to analyze and process them further and
to prepare them for a legally compliant report. The complete process for these
descriptions is additionally shown in Fig. 3.
When the automated data analysis found indications for a possible incident,
it is first necessary to verify the result. For this purpose, the data is revised by
an analyst to ensure that it is an actual incident and to avoid false positives.
Once the analyst approves the incident within the Data Analysis module, the
Trusted Third Party (TTP) is contacted, which initially provided the public
key B for the data pseudonymization within the Data Acquisition module. The
TTP receives the signature of the data packet concerned in order to be able
to identify the appropriate key and checks the request against the decryption
policy specified by the DPO. If the check is negative, the request is denied. If
the check is positive, the TTP determines the correct private key B for the
signature provided and sends it to the Data Analysis module to allow the de-
pseudonymization of the data. When de-pseudonymizing incident data, it is also
important to enable auditing of de-pseudonymizations. Therefore, we store every
de-pseudonymization request and sign it, in order to be able to provide proof of
data access afterwards.
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DINGfest Reporting Flowchart
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After the analysis module has received the private key B from the TTP,
the initially appended data markings are used to identify all fields that contain
pseundonymized information within the data package and to de-pseudonymize
it. The resulting data package is then transferred to the Incident Reporting
module where it is decrypted using the key A and stored within the IoC Vault,
which is an integrity proof, long term storage for incident data as shown by
Boehm et al. [4]. This data can then be used for further analyses and incident
reports. If an incident must be reported, the data needs to be cleared by an
analyst first. This is important to prevent both privacy violations of personal
data and the publication of confidential company data. More specifically, the
analyst must decide, which data is to be excluded from the report and which is
to be secured. This additional information about performed pseudonymizations
and exclusions is appended to the data using further data marking definitions.
The actual extent of data protection, however, may strongly depend on the use-
case of the report. While in the case of reports within the scope of a reporting
obligation, the statutory requirements must be complied with, in the case of
voluntary reports significantly more data can be concealed or removed.
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After an analyst has cleared an incident and prepared it for a report within
the IoC Vault, it is transferred to the Reporting module in the next step. A
symmetrical key C is created in the key repository and assigned to this very
data package to pseudonymize the previously chosen contents. Furthermore, the
package is extended by an additional data marking that contains the signature
of the utilized key C key to enable later attributions. The key C is then used to
pseudonymize the data according to the analyst’s specifications. In addition to
this, the data is also encrypted with the public key D, provided by the recipient
(for example, an authority). This ensures that the reported data can only be
opened by the correct recipient, i.e., a legal authority. In a final step, the data
(secured with keys C and D) is transferred to the recipient. If the data was re-
ported due to a reporting obligation, such as European NIST directive [11] or
German IT-security law [9], the receiving authority may request a decryption
afterwards under certain conditions. In this case, the authority needs to be able
to request the key C from the organization. In order to receive the key C, the
authority transmits the key signature contained in the data package to the or-
ganization. This enables the assignment of the correct key. If the correct key C
is assigned, it can be transferred to the authority.
4.5 Evidence generation using malleable signatures which
withstands pseudonymizations
We can positively answer the second half of Q3, i.e. we can ensure that we are
able to use the pseudonymized or partial reported events as means of evidence.
Assume we add protection of integrity and origin authentication during the data
gathering inside the data acquisition module. Inside DINGfest’s base architec-
ture, the evidence could be protected by standard electronic signature schemes,
e.g. the different acquisition modules would sign the data they gathered. When
a cryptographic signature algorithm complies with the requirements of common
legal frameworks for electronic signatures its signature provides a high proba-
tive value for the data being signed. This said, any subsequent modification
for data-protection compliance would destroy any evidence guarantees for the
remaining data, e.g. removing the full path from a signed full file name of a ma-
licious executable as it contains a personally-identifiable user name also removes
the evidence protection for the name of the executable. Thus, we propose use
redactable or sanitizable (malleable) signature schemes to retain the authentic-
ity and integrity of the data gathered from the data acquisition module towards
the final report. This means that, if wanted, the digital signature protects the
authenticity of the data provided even till the incident report, i.e. so in the final
report one can verify that the event data has not been modified in unauthorized
ways –not tampered with– and that it originated from a trusted data acquisition
module.
By omitting the cryptographic details of other malleable signature schemes,
the privacy statement describes, which parts of the data could be removed or
pseudonymized. This allows to control the signature scheme for which subsequent
changes are made and parts are authorized. Thus, removing the original data
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or encrypting these parts, would allow the subsequent steps to always verify the
authenticity of the remaining data. When data is de-pseudonymized the best-
suitable malleable signature schemes are those that offer mergeability [33]. This
allows to put data parts back into the signed data set and thus the original mal-
leable signature would now verify over all remaining parts, the ones previously
readable plus those added by the de-pseudonymization. If not added, private
malleable signature schemes [2] retain the confidentiality of all those parts that
have been removed, i.e. even though one can successfully verify the signature
on partial data, the information contained in the signature itself does not allow
an attacker to gain information on the data parts removed and thus not shared.
Hence, the added value of a retain-able private malleable signature, like [33],
does not violate any GDPR requirements [30].
The legal analysis of these private accountable redactable signature scheme
shows that they increase the legal probative value for the signed reported data
as eIDAS compliant electronic signatures could provide [30,16,31,45]. Hence, the
DINGfest GDPR architecture protects the records such that the remaining infor-
mation can be used as means of evidence; further after the de-pseudonomization
steps at any later time the data’s origin and originality is attested.
5 Evaluation
In the previous sections we presented an architecture for a GDPR compliant
SIEM system. The central elements of our approach are to guarantee a GDPR
compliant data processing, to enable the recognition of security incidents on
pseudonymized data as well as the de-pseudonymization of the data in the case
of an incident. In this section we evaluate the validity of our approach in two
ways. First, we conduct a technical evaluation of the impact of pseudonymization
on the detectability of events. Subsequently, we carry out a legal evaluation for
our proposed solution. To achieve this, we investigate the individual components
of our architecture presented in Section 4.2 on conformity with the specifications
of the GDPR as shown in Section 2.2.
5.1 Impact on Detectability
Evaluation Methodology The evaluation of the impact of privacy protection
on the quality of SIEM is performed based on the theory for forensic fingerprint
calculation of Dewald [10].
In this theory, all interactions of interest with the system (e.g., by users) are
called events. An example event is the login of a user. Many events either directly
or indirectly leave digital traces within the system (e.g., in log files on disc or
in main memory). These traces are formalized as feature vectors. Generally, a
feature is a quantifiable attribute of a system that can be observed by the SIEM.
In our study we concentrate on feature vectors that can be extracted from log
files system call traces [21]. Obviously, tracing all system calls is very expensive
in terms of performance, there are ways to get rid of most overhead caused by
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system call tracing. The theory [10], which we now explain, defines conditions
under which an event is detectable based on the features traces it leaves in the
log files of a system.
The set of features that we consider in our evaluation is based on an abstract
representation of log file entries and attempts to harmonize many log files in
modern systems. Our format represents every log file entry using the following
four features:
– a source from what log the message comes from,
– a generic type id that describes the kind of log message,
– a path, and
– a misc field that may contain arbitrary content (e.g., the name of a network
adapter).
A feature vector is a vector of values for these features. Depending on the system,
there can be many different features vectors consisting of these four features.
Since an event can cause multiple entries in multiple log files, we define the set
of feature vectors that are generated as the evidence set of that event.
More formally, let Σ be the set of all possible events that can happen in the
system and are of interest to the SIEM. When some event σ ∈ Σ happens, log
entries are generated. The evidence set E(σ) of event σ is the set of all subsets
of feature vectors that are thereby generated by σ. It is technically necessary,
that the evidence set is closed under subsets. Intuitively, it can be interpreted
as the fact that partial evidence is also evidence of the event.
It is obvious that the evidence sets of different events may overlap. To be
able to detect an event, it is necessary to calculate the characteristic evidence
set CE(σ)[10] of an event σ, which is defined as the set that contains only feature
vectors that are caused by σ and not by any other event σ′ ∈ Σ. Formally, the
set of characteristic evidence of an event σ with respect to a set of other events
Σ′ is defined as follows:
CE(σ,Σ′) = E(σ) \
⋃
σ′∈Σ′
E(σ′)
The set of characteristic evidence of an event is also called characteristic finger-
print of that event.
As one can see in the formula above, a characteristic fingerprint is defined
for a specific reference set Σ′. All feature vectors that are caused by σ′ ∈ Σ′ are
not in CE(σ,Σ′). One can say, that CE(σ,Σ′) is the evidence set E(σ) minus
all other evidence sets of events in Σ′. Let |CE(σ,Σ′)| and |Σ′| be sufficiently
large, then a match of the feature vector with the log files of a system is a
clear indication that σ happened and not σ′. The size of CE is an indication for
the discriminative power of the evidence. The larger the set, the higher is the
probability that the event may be detected no matter what the reference set Σ′
looks like. However, it is also possible, that CE(σ,Σ′) is empty, i.e., one cannot
detect reliably the occurrence of σ.
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Characteristic Evidence without Personal Data We now evaluate the
impact of pseudonymization on the existence of characteristic evidence that is
needed for event detection. The evaluation setting is based on the DINGfest ar-
chitecture as described by Latzo and Freiling [21] [20]. We calculated evidence
and characteristic evidence sets for 45 different events (see also Table 2 that
typically appear in Linux server environments as one typically finds them in
small and medium-sized enterprises. In our threat model, we consider an adver-
sary with root privileges that were either gained via a privilege escalation attack
or by having them anyway (i.e., a malicious insider). Basically, it is not possi-
ble to determine the intention of an administrator’s input. Hence, most events
can also be used maliciously, e.g., for information retrieval, covering traces, etc.
So, basically all events might be interesting during a forensic analysis or event
detection.
The higher the number of feature vectors in a characteristic fingerprint, the
better the quality of that fingerprint. This is intuitive since a feature vector in a
fingerprint is basically an indicator of an event. In the evaluation, we compare
the size of characteristic evidence sets with and without taking personal data
into account. More concretely, we consider the following two feature sets:
– F1 = {source, type id, path, misc}
– F2 = {source, type id, misc}
First, F1 is a feature set that has turned out to be reasonable for our events.
However, F1 includes the path feature that may contain personal data. Features
of F2 do not contain personal data. For calculating the fingerprints, an event
was executed 40 times (trainings set). Furthermore, the reference set Σ′ for
a characteristic fingerprint of σ are always all other events. Table 2 compares
sizes of the characteristic evidence set using the two feature sets including the
decrease rate when using F2 instead of F1. As one can see, omitting the path as a
feature has a huge impact on the size of characteristic evidence. On the average,
using F2 reduces a characteristic fingerprint by half of its feature vectors. For
three events, there is no characteristic fingerprint, anymore. Figure 4 shows the
absolute number of feature vectores of the characteristic evidence sets using F1
and F2. “Big”events, that come originally with big characteristic fingerprints are
in general more affected than smaller events.
We have shown that it is possible to calculate characteristic evidence for all
events even if features that contain personal data are not used. However, the
fingerprints that we generated had a lower quality, i.e., the size of the charac-
teristic evidence set was reduced by an average of about 50%. By extending the
feature set and the set of traces acquired from the SIEM, we conjecture that
fingerprints can also be calculated for this action even if data is pseudonymized.
In the following we want to compare the matching results using characteristic
fingerprints with F1 and F2. For matching, we calculate a score that indicates
what proportion of feature vectors in event traces are matched by a character-
istic fingerprint. Fig. 5 (F1) and Fig. 6 (F2) show the corresponding matching
matrices. The values there are average values of 10 traces of the event (test
set). It stands out that the matching matrices are quite similar. In Fig. 6 there
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Table 2. The events used for the evaluation
Class Name Description
|CE(σ,Σ′)|
Loss Factor
F1 F2
CLI
ls Lists files 1 1 0.0
cp Copies file 4 1 0.75
mv Moves file 2 1 0.5
cat Cats file 0 0 0
vmstat Virtual memory statistics 6 1 0.833
netstat Network statistics 15 1 0.933
tar Creates compressed tar archive 5 4 0.2
rm Removes file 1 1 0.0
shred Shreds file 2 1 0.5
curl Downloads file 1 0 1
CLI Root
tailShadow Reads /etc/shadow 7 2 0.714
catCredentials Reads Wordpress config file 4 2 0.5
vimHosts Opens /etc/hosts in Vim 220 3 0.986
rmSudo Removes file with sudo 2 2 0.0
shredSudo Shreds file with sudo 9 3 0.667
Web
wordpressLogin Wordpress Login 63 10 0.841
wordpressSearch Wordpress Search 3 0 1
wordpressOpen Opens Wordpress website 0 0 0
Service
sshLogin SSH login (server side) 2219 466 0.79
apacheStop Stops apache web server 1712 15 0.991
mysqlWp Login into Wordpress DB via command line 47 1 0.979
Kernel Modules
lsmod Lists loaded kernel modules 251 1 0.996
insmod Loads kernel module 10 3 0.7
rmmod Unloads kernel module 12 3 0.75
Docker
dockerHelloWorld Starts docker hello world example 28 3 0.893
dockerUbuntuLog Starts docker ubuntu and show log 23 5 0.783
dockerImages Lists all docker images 1 1 0.0
dockerPs Lists all running dockers 0 0 0
dockerPSA Lists all dockers container 0 0 0
dockerUbuntuSleep Starts docker in background 2 2 0.0
dockerRm Removes all docker containers 0 0 0
dockerNginx Runs nginx docker and curl it 65 8 0.877
dockerUbuntuBash Attaches bash of container 0 0 0
dockerPrune Removes unused container 1 1 0.0
dockerPruneVolumes Removes unused objects and volumes 1 1 0.0
dockerRmImages Removes all images 2 2 0.0
dockerUbuntuBashCp Attaches container and runs cp 0 0 0
dockerUbuntuBashMv Attaches container and runs mv 18 1 0.944
dockerUbuntuBashRm Attaches container and runs rm 3 1 0.667
dockerUbuntuBashCat Attaches container and runs cat 24 0 1
Nextcloud
nextcloudStatus Shows Nextcloud status 3 2 0.333
nextcloudAppList Lists Nextcloud apps 44 2 0.955
nextcloudUserList Lists Nextcloud user 3 2 0.333
nextcloudUserAdd Adds new Nextcloud user 103 16 0.845
nextcloudGroupList List Nextcloud groups 5 2 0.6
Average 0.508
is much less matched noise. The characteristic fingerprints in Fig 6 are much
smaller than in Fig. 5, though. For that events for which we could calculate a
characteristic fingerprint, the matching results are similar good. This is also con-
firmed by the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 7. There,
the true positive rate (sensitivity) and the false positive rate are plotted against
each other with different thresholds. It shows, that the sensitivity with F2 is only
a little smaller with about 78% versus the sensitivity of F1 with about 84%.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of powers of characteristic evidence sets with personal data (blue)
and without personal data (black).
In this section we showed that it is possible to calculate characteristic finger-
prints with a reduced feature set that does not contain personal data. While the
size of the characteristic fingerprints decreased when using that feature set, the
matching results were very similar. It showed, that when there is a characteristic
fingerprint, matching usually also works. So, to improve this approach, future
work should focus in extracting more features from logs that help to increase
the size of characteristic fingerprints.
5.2 Legal Evaluation
As we have seen above, to generate fingerprints of high quality, data must be ob-
tained by processing previously collected data during the data acquisition which
clearly relates to a personal user’s actions and thus is considered as personal
data. Hence, the general principles mentioned in Sec. 2.2 relating to processing
of personal data and especially a lawful processing are important. Processing
shall be lawful only if one of the Art. 6 GDPR included reasons applies. Appli-
cable and best suited for the SIEM case is Art. 6 (1) lit. f, when processing is
necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests. This clause is different to
the other lawful bases as it is not centered around a particular purpose and it is
not necessary that the individual has specifically agreed to (consent). Legitimate
interests are more flexible and could in principle apply to any type of processing
for any reasonable purpose. Art. 6 (1) lit. f states:
”1.Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the
following applies: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests
are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject which require protection of personal data, [...]”.
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Fig. 5. Matching matrix using F1. The events listed on the y-axis are the ground truth,
the events on the x-axis correspond to the characteristic fingerprints [20]
Legitimate interest is balanced with personal data protection Since
legitimate interests can apply in a wide range of circumstances, it is mandatory
that the controlling party puts its legitimate interests and the necessity of pro-
cessing the personal data to the interests, rights and freedoms of the individual
in balance. To provide a balance-test, the key elements of the legitimate interests
provision is contained in a so-called three-part test. Whereas this test is not ex-
plicitly named in the GDPR, the legitimate interests provision does incorporate
three key elements:
– Purpose test: there must be a legitimate interest behind the processing.
– Necessity test: the processing must be necessary for that purpose.
– Balancing test: the legitimate interest must be balanced with the individuals
interests, rights or freedoms.
This concept of a three-part test for legitimate interests has been confirmed
by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Rigas case (C-13/16, 4
May 2017) in the context of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which
contained a very similar provision. This means, the controller must be able to
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Fig. 6. Matching matrix using F2. The events listed on the y-axis are the ground truth,
the events on the x-axis correspond to the characteristic fingerprints.
meet all three requirements of the test prior to commencing the processing of
personal data.
Firstly, purpose is clearly given as the whole purpose of the SIEM architec-
ture as given in Sec. 4 is to detect unlawful use of information systems and their
data, it is important to make clear that the European Parliament has already
considered the legitimate interest of processing personal data necessary for the
purposes of preventing fraud. This is explicitly backed by recital 47: ”[...] The
processing of personal data strictly necessary for the purposes of preventing fraud
also constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. [...]”.
Secondly, with regards to the condition relating to the necessity of process-
ing personal data, it is important that derogations and limitations in relation to
the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.
In that regard, communication of features which do not contain personal data,
does not make it possible to identify a person with enough precision in order
to be able to bring an action against him. Accordingly, for that purpose, it is
necessary for the SIEM system to obtain also the possibility of full identification
of that person, i.e. allow to de-anonymize and retain authenticity proofs in order
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Fig. 7. ROC curve with F1 in red and F2 in blue. The differences are quite small.
to construct substantial and reliable evidence of an unlawful use of the system
against that person.
Thirdly, it is necessary to make a balancing test to justify any impact on
individuals. During the test the controller takes into account ”the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require the protec-
tion of personal data”, and makes sure they dont override his interests. In recital
75 speaks of the risks of the rights and freedoms of natural personas: ”The risk
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity,
may result from personal data processing which could lead to physical, material
or non-material damage, in particular: where the processing may give rise to dis-
crimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation, loss
of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, unauthorized
reversal of pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disad-
vantage; where data subjects might be deprived of their rights and freedoms or
prevented from exercising control over their personal data; [...]; where personal
aspects are evaluated, in particular analyzing or predicting aspects concerning
performance at work, [...] ; or where processing involves a large amount of per-
sonal data and affects a large number of data subjects. ”
Since the data acquisition module collects data from all monitored comput-
ing resources in the company, one can assume a great danger for personal data of
employees and customers. Also, the analysis of personal data in the data stream
by fingerprinting and pattern recognition and especially the merging of data is
in general - interfering with the privacy rights of a natural person. And finally, is
the reporting module and the included long-term storage of analyzed incidents
as well as the reporting to the authorities itself a potential risk for personal
data. Since the complete monitoring of the users without cause is not compli-
ant with the GDPR, especially since the user does not have any possibility to
intervene, fundamental rights would be violated, if the controller is not imple-
menting appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of
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security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate, for example
the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data.
Mechanisms for GDPR-compliance in DINGfest architecture DINGfest’s
GDPR architecture counters the above-mentioned problems by implementing
special steps as part of their work flow for a GDPR-compliant SIEM system:
First of all, by a continuous pseudonymisation through obfuscation during the
data acquisition. The suspension will only be carried out under certain conditions
determined by controller and, in particular, in case of suspicion of a criminal
offence. Since the public key is always provided by a trusted third party (TTP)
and policies provide the organizational background before a special field gets
encrypted, the balance between the rights of the controller and the user should
be met. All technical steps in which personal data is processed are accompanied
by a special pseudonymization method through obfuscation. If data analysis has
then found indications for an (possible) incident, the data protection officer has
to approve this case as an ”incident case” within the data analysis module. Only
then the TTP receives a key identifier for the data packet - not the packet’s
contents, not even in pseudonymous form -, in order to find the appropriate key.
The critical point is the policy (see the ”Policy” defined by the Data protection
office (DPO) in Fig. 2), which is being consulted by the TTP before sending
the decryption key to the data analysis module. This organizational measure
ensures a level of security appropriate to the risk, which is to reveal private data
to the controller. By providing a log of every request to de-pseudonymize data
fields the architecture enables to comply with transparency requirements, like
the right of access.
Only after passing this safety measure the DINGfest architecture allows to
reveal data to the controller (the data analyst) using the private key B, to
de-pseudonymize all necessary fields that contain pseudonymized information
within the data package. Only if the analyst decides to include this in the report
the resulting data package is then transferred to the incident reporting module,
during transfer and storage it gets again encrypted under key A. Again, the
access to the encrypted long-term storage of the data within the IoC vault, in-
cluding the use of data for further analysis and incident reports, only applies for
cases that deserve an attention because of potential unlawful behavior. This is
clearly a legitimate interest which is not overridden by recital 47 of the GDPR.
Furthermore, it depends on the individual use case, which data is to be excluded
from the report and what data must be removed or stays pseudonymized. This
extra step, in which the analyst balances the rights of both parties, is the very
essence of the balance test, and here the DINGfest GDPR architecture imple-
ments this check to balance the legitimate interest with the individuals interests.
As said, if the data analysis module decides to keep pseudonymization of fields
then only pseudonymized data of this incident is transferred to the incident re-
porting module. When the report is generated, the data is again encrypted with
the public key of the recipient in most cases an authority. This way, the reported
data can only be opened by the correct recipient.
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DINGfest’s GDPR architecture reduces the risks for personal data By
using the methods of pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data, it is to
be concluded that scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of
varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the
controller has implemented appropriate technical and organizational measures
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an architecture for a GDPR compliant SIEM system,
as implemented in the DINGfest prototype SIEM system. We first identified
central questions that must be answered for the development of such a platform.
The questions affected the necessary conditions for a GDPR compliant data pro-
cessing, techniques for the incident recognition on pseudonymized data as well
as a lawful de-pseudonymization techniques in the case of occurred incidents.
We then answered these questions with the help of our architectural design and
evaluated them both from a technical and legal perspective. Using this evalu-
ation, we have shown that it is possible to comply with the legal requirements
for pseudonymization, while at the same time keeping detectability. Altogether
we presented a base architecture for a GDPR compliant SIEM system with this
work. Although it was developed based on our underlying system DINGfest, it
may also serve as a draft for other security systems that have to be adapted to
GDPR specifications.
In the context of this work, it was revealed that the performance of the
recognition mechanisms used can be impaired using pseudonymization. This is
one challenge that could be addressed in future work. Beyond that we defined
the fundamental boundaries of a GDPR conform architecture with this work.
However, various details were not considered. An example for this is to transfer
our architecture to already established SIEM systems. Each system is tailored to
its infrastructure and thus, it is necessary to define, which of the collected data
sets needs to be protected. This applies both to data that is collected during
initial data acquisition and to data that is prepared for a report. To support this
process, it would be helpful to develop a central repository that defines the data
points relevant to data protection for frequently used data sources. Furthermore,
it will also be necessary to develop the needed details for the data protection
policy within SIEM systems in future works. It would be conceivable to develop
a generally applicable basic policy and specific implementations of this policy
adapted to individual systems.
Regarding the legal probative value DINGfest using malleable signatures al-
lows to balance integrity protection for evidence and GDPR-compliant removal
or pseudonymization of the gathered data. To achieve this the data acquisition
module emits malleable signed data –instead of simply digitally signed data– and
hence any subsequent modification due to GDPR-compliant processing does not
inhibit the verification of the integrity and origin of the remaining data. With a
scheme that is accountable and private and supports mergeability, previously ob-
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fuscated parts of an entry can be subsequently de-obfuscated and the signature
still verifies and provide means of evidence.
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Abstract The exchange of threat intelligence informa-
tion can make a significant contribution to improving
IT security in companies and has become increasingly
important in recent years. However, such an exchange
also entails costs and risks, preventing many companies
from participating. In addition, since legal reporting
requirements were introduced in various countries, cer-
tain requirements must be taken into account in the ex-
change process. However, existing exchange platforms
neither offer incentives to participate in the exchange
process, nor fulfill requirements resulting from report-
ing obligations. With this work, we present a decen-
tralized platform for the exchange of threat intelligence
information. The platform supports the fulfillment of
legal reporting obligations for security incidents and
provides additional incentives for information exchange
between the parties involved. We evaluate the plat-
form by implementing it based on the EOS blockchain
and IPFS distributed hash table. The prototype and
cost measurements demonstrate the feasibility and cost-
efficiency of our concept.
Keywords Threat Intelligence Sharing · Blockchain ·
Smart Contract
1 Introduction
The threat landscape for IT infrastructures has grown
steadily in recent years and this trend is continuing. At
the same time, it is becoming apparent that the coun-
termeasures currently available can hardly keep pace
Florian Menges, Benedikt Putz, and Gu¨nther Pernul
University of Regensburg
Universita¨tsstr. 31, DE-93053 Regensburg
E-mail: firstname.lastname@ur.de
with the ongoing attacks. It has been shown that the ex-
change of threat information is an effective instrument
for improving existing countermeasures and the over-
all situation. It leads to more knowledge about threats,
earlier detection of attacks and thus to more effective
countermeasures. The potential benefits of the threat
information exchange have recently been recognized in
the public sector by introducing corresponding legal
regulations. For example, several countries already re-
quire the reporting of security incidents, especially for
critical infrastructure operators.
While the exchange of threat information offers the
aforementioned benefits for the security situation, it
can also entail various disadvantages and problems that
may prevent companies from participating. These in-
clude high additional costs for appropriately trained se-
curity personnel and infrastructure, possible data pro-
tection problems and the risk of publishing sensitive
data. In addition to these problems, a complex set of le-
gal reporting requirements must be taken into account.
Companies must be able to provide non-repudiable
proof of accurate reporting, both to avoid penalties and
to potentially use the data as evidence in court. Con-
sequently, sustained availability and integrity of the re-
ported data must be ensured. Sharing platforms must
address these problems by incorporating legal require-
ments as part of the design. Additionally, incentive
structures must be created for the exchange of threat
information, to offset costs and to motivate stakehold-
ers to participate in the long term.
In doing so, we consider two use-cases separately.
The platform intends to 1) support the fulfillment
of legally obligatory reporting and 2) to create
economic incentives for voluntary reporting. While
these scenarios have different requirements and thus fol-
low separate processes, the proposed platform option-
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ally also enables sharing of obligatory reports. Based on
these considerations, we formulate the research ques-
tions we intend to answer:
– RQ1: How can threat intelligence information be
exchanged while ensuring availability, integrity and
non-repudiation?
– RQ2: How can the exchange of threat intelligence
information be incentivized?
To solve these problems, we propose a sharing con-
cept and application prototype for a threat intelli-
gence sharing platform based on Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT). DLT excels at providing availabil-
ity, integrity and non-repudiation - the three require-
ments of RQ1. Availability is ensured by the underlying
blockchain network, which consists of a large number of
geo-distributed nodes maintaining a replicated ledger
around the clock. At the same time, integrity assurance
is provided through a sequentially linked hash chain,
which ensures that the current world state is always the
result of all past transactions. The consensus protocol
assures that state transitions are append-only and pre-
vious entries are non-repudiable. Distributed Ledgers
also provide verifiable decentralized execution of appli-
cations in the form of smart contracts, which also pro-
vide the option to implement digital currency in the
form of blockchain tokens. These tokens can be used to
provide decentralized incentives by assigning real value
to threat intelligence information.
Existing work has attempted to address some of the
aforementioned problems using DLT, however, the re-
search questions have not been sufficiently addressed
so far (see Section 2). For this reason, we propose the
blockchain-based DEALER platform (Decentralized
IncEntives for ThreAt InteLligEnce Reporting and Ex-
change). It fulfills legal requirements for obligatory Cy-
ber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting, while also pro-
viding an incentive structure to counteract possible par-
ticipation drawbacks and to encourage voluntary shar-
ing of CTI. Our contribution includes a novel protocol
based on verifiers and token-based incentives to encour-
age fair sharing of high-quality threat intelligence data.
To avoid trusting a third-party platform provider, the
architecture is fully decentralized and maintained by
independent blockchain operators and the participants
themselves. In brief, the platform provides the following
key features:
– availability, integrity and non-repudiation for
obligatory reporting, fulfilling legal requirements
– decentralized incentives by leveraging blockchain
tokens for purchase and sale of threat intelligence
– transactional fairness for both seller and buyer
– quality assurance through a verifier system
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we first provide an overview of approaches
for platforms to report threat information, in particu-
lar with a focus on meeting the aforementioned security
goals. In Section 3 we define requirements for the de-
velopment of our plattform. Section 4 introduces our
concept for the storage and incentivized exchange of
threat intelligence information. In Section 5 we propose
the system design for the application of our concept and
present the implementation of our prototype. The cost
structure and thus the practical feasibility of our pro-
totypical implementation is evaluated in Section 6. The
results of this paper are discussed in Section 7 and the
paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Related Work
The exchange of threat information has been the sub-
ject of practical and legislative work in recent years.
These include laws in different legislations, such as the
NIS Directive 1 in Europe and the IT-Sicherheitsgesetz
(BSIG) 2 in Germany, which stipulate the reporting of
incidents for providers of critical infrastructures. These
legislations are also influenced by data protection re-
quirements, which are for example specified by the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 3 or the Cal-
ifornia Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 4. At the same
time, first platforms for the exchange of threat infor-
mation are available. Examples are IBM X-Force [1] or
Facebook threat exchange [2] as commercial platforms
as well as MISP [3] and OPENCTI [4] as open source
platforms. These platforms allow the exchange of threat
information, however, data integrity or availability are
not conclusively assured and incentive structures are
not available. Central providers can advertise data in-
tegrity and availability, but ultimately it is always nec-
essary to rely on the provider to ensure the protection
goals are met. This is particularly problematic in the
area of possible obligations to provide evidence, as ma-
nipulation of the data stock cannot be ruled out with
central providers. At the same time, a single provider
usually also represents a single point of failure when
it comes to the availability of the platform. Further-
more, existing providers do not yet offer functionalities
for quality-assured trading and thus an incentivised ex-
change of CTI information. A great deal of research has
1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/oj
2 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bsig_2009/
BJNR282110009.html
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
4 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375
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been done on the requirements and challenges of imple-
menting CTI platforms. In an early work, Serrano et al.
[5] point out the fundamental problems for the exchange
of threat information. Dandurand et al. [6] defined re-
quirements for the exchange of information, emphasiz-
ing the necessity of assuring data integrity and avail-
ability, which is also supported by the work of Brown et
al. [7]. Mohaisen et al. pointed out various open research
questions in that field, such as possible dangers and neg-
ative incentives that may relate to the exchange of CTI
[8]. In addition to this, there are also works that deal
with specific implementations of CTI platforms, such as
the MISP platform by Wagner et al. [3]. However, nei-
ther specific integrity or availability requirements nor
the integration of incentives are considered. Literature
also provides works that address the necessity of cre-
ating incentives for the exchange of CTI. Sauerwein
et al. conducted an exploratory study that showed a
need for incentivizing stakeholders within the exchange
process [9]. This work is supported by Sillaber et al.
examining the needs of stakeholders and resulting chal-
lenges [10]. While these studies provide possible start-
ing points for the use of incentive procedures, the actual
use of such procedures within CTI platforms is not con-
sidered. Moreover, there are also first approaches that
try to implement CTI exchange on decentralized plat-
forms. Alexopoulus et al. present a method for sharing
security data streams based on a smart contract and
data stream subscriptions [11]. Since the proposed data
streams require a direct connection between the par-
ties, the assurance of integrity and availability cannot
be guaranteed. Incentive structures are also included
in the work, but the design suffers from various weak-
nesses. Since the described on- and off-chain interac-
tions of buyer and seller are independent of each other,
negative consequences for fraud attempts during data
transfer can only be implemented to a limited extent.
In addition, the quality of the incident can vary during
a stream, but only the entire stream can be evaluated
by a buyer. This increases search costs on the market-
place because information about alerts is only available
in aggregated form.
In summary, it can be stated that different works
exist in the area of threat intelligence exchange that
consider the requirements and the application of plat-
forms. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
currently no work that allows an incentive-based, fair
exchange of CTI information, while maintaining data
integrity and availability to comply with regulatory re-
quirements.
3 Objective and requirements
The exchange of threat intelligence information can be
categorized into two different areas. On the one hand,
unidirectional reports of security incidents, are stipu-
lated by law and mostly concern companies that are rel-
evant for the functioning of society. On the other hand,
bidirectional exchange of security information between
companies is done on a voluntary basis. The goal is an
improvement of the information basis on security inci-
dents for all participants and to increase their security
level. The platform developed in this work aims to cover
both use cases by enabling both reporting and exchange
of security incidents. We consider the use cases oblig-
atory reporting and incentive-based exchange of
CTI information separately, as they should be indepen-
dent features on the platform. However, a combination
of both approaches should optionally be possible. There
are different and unique requirements that result from
each of these use cases, which are described in more
detail below.
3.1 Requirements for reporting security incidents
The most important requirement for reporting security
incidents is to comply with the underlying legal frame-
work. For this reason, we first examine the implications
of reporting obligations in more detail and derive result-
ing requirements for reporting. One basic requirement
for a functioning reporting infrastructure is providing
a way for a company to provide incident data and for
legal authorities to receive this data. In this context,
reports of security incidents are often time-critical, as
legal authorities may have to react to reported events
in a timely manner. For this reason providing very high
availability is one key factor for the operation of a
reporting infrastructure.
In the context of reports it is also of utmost impor-
tance to be able to prove who submitted a report. On
the one hand, this is necessary so that authorities can
take the necessary steps to prevent supply bottlenecks,
for example. On the other hand, this also provides a
guarantee for the reporting institution, as it enables it
to prove that the reporting obligation has been fulfilled
and thus avoid penalties. This necessity results in the
requirement of non-repudiation and unambiguous as-
signment of reports. In addition, a further requirement
results from the actual use of the data. Besides being
used to prevent damage, the threat intelligence informa-
tion obtained may also be used as evidence. Specifically,
recorded data may either be used as evidence in court
proceedings or as proof of damage against contractual
partners such as insurance companies. Following this,
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Fig. 1 High level overview of the DEALER threat intelligence sharing concept.
ensuring data integrity is an additional requirement
in the reporting process that needs to be taken into
account. Besides regulations that stipulate reports of
security incidents, there are also regulations regarding
the handling of personal data in different jurisdictions,
such as the GDPR in the European Union. According
to this, the platform must also provide the necessary
tools to allow the protection exchanged data in compli-
ance with legal regulations.
3.2 Requirements for an incentive system
In addition to requirements resulting from legislation,
there are also functional requirements for exchange
platforms. Every exchange of information on security
incidents is accompanied by various risks. When pub-
lishing information, companies risk to accidentally leak
important data. This may for example include com-
pany secrets or information about the company infras-
tructure, that may for example simplify attacks on that
company. In addition, a reporting process involves costs
for the collection, processing and dissemination of in-
cident data. At the same time, the benefits of partic-
ipating in an exchange platform are often difficult to
quantify, especially with comparatively low legal penal-
ties for omitted reports. From these points it can be
concluded that companies tend to have little intrinsic
motivation to report incidents themselves, whereas the
motivation to passively obtain information from a re-
porting platform is likely to be high. As a result, an
incentive system that motivates every participant on
such a platform to actively participate can be defined
as a further essential requirement for the sustainable
functioning of such a platform (RQ2).
4 The DEALER sharing concept
In this Section we present the DEALER concept, which
is designed to fulfil the previously defined requirements
and to provide an incentives structure for sharing CTI
information. This includes an ecosystem describing the
stakeholders in the system, their roles and relation-
ships and a marketplace describing the processes and
concepts within the ecosystem, designed to guarantee
sustainable CTI exchange. This Section provides an
overview of the relationships within the system and the
overall idea of the concept. The individual processes
within the system are described subsequently.
The entire system, which is outlined in Figure 1 con-
sists of five essential components. At the center of the
system is a blockchain and a distributed database.
These form the technological basis for the implemen-
tation of smart contracts, integrity-secured storage of
exchange processes and provide decentralized storage
structures for reported security incidents. The starting
point for reports within this system are Critical In-
frastructure Compounds. These include the critical
infrastructure operator, an IT service provider if appli-
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cable, and a CTI provider. The CTI provider takes care
of external communication and acts as a so-called con-
tact point, a construct that can be derived from legal re-
quirements for incident reporting. The information col-
lected is intended for either Associated Institutions or
Organizations. Associated Institutions describe par-
ticipants who are interested in the reported information
within the scope of reporting obligations. These can for
example be legal authorities to which a reporting obli-
gation exists. These can also be other institutions, such
as insurance companies, to which a possible claim can
be made accessible via the platform. On the other hand,
there are Organizations that are not affected by re-
porting obligations, but are nevertheless interested in
participating, for example to increase their own level of
protection. Analyses and services within the system are
provided by the CTI ecosystem. This enables exter-
nal service providers to bring their services into the sys-
tem. For example, verification providers can offer qual-
itative incident data evaluation, or analytics providers
can aggregate information on several incidents and offer
it within the system.
DEALER’s overall concept defines two central use
cases: statuatory incident reporting and incentive-based
threat intelligence exchange. Both concepts are briefly
described below before we take a closer look at the un-
derlying processes.
Obligatory reports are generated by the Criti-
cal Infrastructure Compound and transferred to the
blockchain. The transmitted data is pseudonymized and
encrypted in such a way that only the receiving author-
ity can access it. In connection with such a report, the
data can also be made available to other users of the
platform as part of the incentive-based exchange. How-
ever, this step is explicitly optional and must be actively
selected.
The incentive-based exchange process is based
on an economic model, where participants can offer
and demand information on security incidents. For this
purpose, a separate token is introduced on the plat-
form, which functions as an internal currency and is
used as economic reward for active participants. When
threat information is provisioned, structured incident
data is transferred to the blockchain in encrypted and
pseudonymized form. The information provided can
then be sold to other participants or made available as
a report. The uploaded incident information is assigned
to verifiers who ensure its data quality against a fee. Af-
ter successful verifications, the data can be traded on
the platform at the previously defined price.
In addition to these two sharing mechanisms, legal
authorities may additionally issue global warnings re-
garding threats to all participants. In some legislations,
such as the IT security law in Germany [12], such global
warnings are part of the reporting obligation and thus
necessary for compliance. The warnings also represent
an additional benefit for the platform participants: the
free CTI provided by the legal authority supplements
purchasable incident information.
After this high-level introduction to the basic con-
cept of DEALER, the core processes of the platform are
presented in more detail below. They include Registra-
tion (4.1), Sharing (4.2), Verification (4.3), Purchase
(4.4) and Fairness (4.5).
4.1 Registration
Initially, participants must register to be able to trans-
act on the decentralized marketplace. Each participant
has an account with a balance of fungible tokens, which
may be used to trade incidents. To prevent sybil at-
tacks, we require a fixed initial token stake si to create
the participant’s balance. This prepayment requires a
meaningful investment, while not deterring new users.
The user balance is managed by the platform. With-
drawals are allowed on request up to the initial fee,
which must remain until the participant closes the ac-
count.
Verifiers are treated separately during registration,
as they are given free access to incident information
and must evaluate it. The purpose of registration is to
achieve a unique identification of the verifier, for ex-
ample by requesting a tax number, identity documents
or a social security number. This registration process
is intended to prevent the risk of verifier misuse (i.e.
free-riding or submitting default ratings). In contrast
to regular participants of the platform, verifiers must
be approved before participating in the verification pro-
cess. During bootstrapping of the verifier pool, approval
can be conducted by the platform developer. Once the
verifier pool has reached the minimum size (see Section
7.2), new participants can be approved through major-
ity votes of existing participants.
Additionally, the platform provides an exclusion op-
tion for malicious verifiers. Exclusion of a verifier must
be approved by a majority of the verifier pool through
multisignature votes. Any verifier may initiate such a
vote by providing evidence for several instances of mis-
behavior (i.e. repeatedly submitting default or unreal-
istic verification reports).
Besides preventing misuse, the goal of authenticat-
ing verifiers is to ensure an intrinsic interest in the anal-
ysis of security incidents and possession of the necessary
technical expertise for actual incident information as-
sessments. Appropriate verifiers could for example be
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threat intelligence vendors, CERTs or security opera-
tions professionals.
4.2 Sharing
Figure 2 shows a BPMN diagram of the sharing process
from incident detection to data upload, verification and
provisioning on the platform. Initially, the participant
locally performs required preprocessing steps. These in-
clude anonymization (removing private data and iden-
tifying details), addition of public descriptive metadata
and encryption of the incident with a symmetric key
k. The metadata also includes a sale price ps. A signed
transaction is submitted to the platform and the in-
cident is uploaded to the distributed database. If the
participant decides to sell the incident to other users,
a verification fee pv must be paid once with the initial
transaction (i.e. pv ∼ 0.6ps). The incident is then made
available on the marketplace and verification is initi-
ated. Three random verifiers are chosen from the verifier
pool. The seller then uploads three keys kv1/kv2/kv3 for
each chosen verifier, encrypted with each verifier’s pub-
lic key, and notifies the platform at time T1. The ver-
ifiers retrieve and decrypt the uploaded incident with
their individual key file. They assign an initial rating
value based on a set of platform-provided quality met-
rics (see Section 4.3).
The verifiers submit the verification result to the
platform. If all results arrive until time T2, the verifi-
cation fee pv is distributed equally among the verifiers
(i.e. pv3 ∼ 0.2ps per verifier). If any verifier does not
respond, the seller may trigger a replacement of inac-
tive verifiers. These verifiers must respond until time T3
(T3 > T2 > T1), else the seller may request a removal of
the incident from the platform and partial reimburse-
ment of the verification fee (pv3 per missing verifier).
For obligated incident reporting, the participant
may want to keep the incident confidential and not
share it with verifiers. In this case, the participant only
uploads a key for the regulatory authority and no verifi-
cation is performed. The platform provides a timestamp
and proof of reporting for the incident.
4.3 Verification
The data quality verification conducted by verifiers
serves as an incident reputation bootstrapping mech-
anism. We propose a 5-point rating scale for incident
quality from 1 (very low) to 5 (great). The verification
needs to be as objective and meaningful as possible to
provide guidance for buyers, since the actual data is en-
crypted. The following items serve as verification guide-
lines:
– consistency with metadata of the seller’s previous
incidents
– similarity check for incident metadata and verified
incidents
– assessment of various threat intelligence quality in-
dicators [13]
After receiving the incident data, each verifier inde-
pendently performs a verification of the contained in-
formation. A basic consistency check using metadata of
the seller’s previous incidents verifies that the incident
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originates from the same industry. To avoid duplicates
and resold incidents (see also Section 7), verifiers com-
pute a similarity score to other previously downloaded
incidents (i.e. using the simhash algorithm [14]). For
apparent duplicates, verifiers then submit a low score
without additional quality assessment.
Regarding threat intelligence quality indicators, the
platform provides a structured assessment process. This
procedure is intended to help verifiers make objective
and comparable assessments of security incidents by it-
eratively processing predefined questions.
To achieve this, the implemented questions are
based on objective CTI data quality indicators devel-
oped for STIX2 [13]. The quality criteria are divided
into three major domains. These include information
about the contained data, object representations within
the data and the completeness of the available informa-
tion. In particular, the data model domain reflects in-
formation about the representational consistency of the
data representations and the concise representation of
the stored information. The object metrics area con-
siders the objectivity of the data collected as well as
metrics about the relevancy of the stored data regard-
ing the situation described. The third domain addresses
the completeness of the available information in more
detail. This includes the examination whether an ap-
propriate amount of data is used to convey the facts
presented. In addition to this, the syntactic accuracy of
the data transported as well as the schema complete-
ness of the data is checked.
4.4 Purchase
The incident purchase in Figure 3 process starts off with
a potential buyer browsing the repository of previously
uploaded incidents. For this purpose the platform fron-
tend offers sophisticated search and filter functionality.
Metadata and ratings are provided for each individual
incident by verifiers and past purchases. Once an in-
cident of interest has been identified for purchase, the
buyer retrieves the encrypted incident to verify its avail-
ability. If the incident is available, the buyer places an
order for the incident and pays tokens corresponding to
the sale price ps to the platform escrow. The seller ac-
cepts the order by uploading a public key encrypted file
key kb for decryption. In case of successful decryption,
the buyer notifies the platform by sending a confirma-
tion along with an incident rating.
If the decryption fails, the buyer notifies the plat-
form about the failure, which initiates the dispute res-
olution process. Any verifier may then provide an inde-
pendent copy of the decryption key to the buyer. In the
unlikely event that the buyer is still unable to decrypt
the file, keys must be uploaded by additional verifiers
to resolve the dispute. Once the buyer is able to decrypt
the file, the buyer submits a rating for the incident and
closes the dispute. Each contributing verifier receives an
equal share of dispute fee pd as compensation, which is
deducted from the sale price (i.e. pd ∼ 0.06ps). The dis-
pute fee should be proportionately low for two reasons:
verifiers can upload key copies in an automated fashion;
and sellers should not lose a disproportionate amount
of the sale price in case of unwarranted disputes.
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A time lock T4 is in place to allow parties to redeem
their tokens if the counterparty fails to respond. If the
buyer does not report decryption success or dispute, the
seller may collect the sale price after T4 has expired. If
the seller never accepts the offer, the buyer may redeem
the locked tokens after T4.
4.5 Fairness
Fairness of incident purchase must be considered from
two perspectives:
– Seller Fairness: An honest seller is guaranteed to
receive the advertised sale price for providing a cor-
rect decryption key.
– Buyer Fairness: An honest buyer is guaranteed to
receive the cleartext of the purchased incident, or is
refunded the deposited purchase price.
We guarantee Fairness based on the following as-
sumption: There is always at least one honest verifier
that provides a valid decryption key. After verification,
there are at least four copies of the decryption key (the
seller and three verifiers) available on the platform. It
is reasonable to assume that there is at least one honest
participant among these four, which provides a decryp-
tion key in case of an issue with the seller’s key.
We now analyze the various ways how seller and
buyer may attempt to cheat, and how the protocol mit-
igates these attempts.
Buyer Fairness. The honest verifier assumption
means that the buyer will always receive a decryption
key, and that there is no scenario where the buyer will
not be able to decrypt the file. Conversely, the buyer
will also not receive the deposited price back. In case the
seller attempts to cheat by uploading a wrong decryp-
tion key for the buyer, the buyer can initiate a dispute
to receive a correct key from a verifier. Verifiers receive
a dispute fee pd as participation reward for uploading
correct keys during a dispute. The seller is thus disin-
centivized to send wrong keys, since that increases the
likelihood of a dispute and results in a loss of pd tokens.
In case both seller and verifier keys are incorrect,
the buyer may be unable to decrypt the item at all.
This will not occur in practice based on the assumption
that the majority of verifiers is honest and provides
correct keys. This assumption can be made based on
two properties of our platform:
1. random assignment of verifiers to incidents makes
seller-verifier pairings unlikely, and repeated collu-
sive arrangements are time-consuming
2. misbehavior is disincentivized through significant
verifier registration requirements (see Section 4.1)
coupled with the possibility of exclusion
We have thus ensured that the seller is punished for
uploading wrong key material, while the buyer is able
to decrypt the purchased file. To increase the buyer’s
confidence in receiving a correct key, the time of last
platform activity of an incident’s verifiers can be shown
in the user interface.
Seller Fairness. The buyer may attempt to cheat
the seller by not responding after the seller has provided
the decryption key. For this reason, there is a deadline
for the buyer to respond, which starts from the time the
seller has uploaded the key and ends after time T4. If
there is no response after expiry, the seller may redeem
the purchase price.
The buyer may also collude with the verifiers to
falsely vote for seller misbehavior. In this case the hon-
est seller would lose out on pd tokens deducted from
the sale price. This scenario is unlikely, since the buyer
has no incentive to collude with verifier. If buyer and
verifier are in contact, they could exchange data and
tokens through another channel with a reduced price.
In practice, this is unlikely to occur, since there is a
large overhead for buyers to contact verifiers for every
incident they are interested in.
If not colluding with a verifier, the buyer has no in-
centive to blame the seller. He cannot receive any tokens
back that were paid for the sale, and he is guaranteed to
receive a correct decryption key if at least one verifier
is active.
These considerations guarantee Seller Fairness, with
the restriction that the seller may lose out on a small
portion of the sale price pd in case of a dispute. Disputes
cannot be prevented by the seller, but buyers have no
incentive to start disputes, so we expect them to be
negligible in practice.
5 Application Prototype
To implement the sharing concept, we choose a com-
bination of blockchain technology and distributed hash
tables. This avoids having to trust a single third-party
service provider to provide storage and confidentiality.
A data storage distributed in this way can be main-
tained collaboratively and only by participants inter-
ested in sharing data. Blockchain networks also allow
utilizing virtual currencies that provide possibilities to
realize built-in sharing incentives for participants. In
the following we first discuss the technologies used for
our prototype (5.1). Subsequently, we develop the con-
ceptual architecture (5.2) and briefly present our pro-
totypical implementation of the sharing platform (5.3).
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5.1 Technology selection
In this section we will first discuss the underlying tech-
nologies for our sharing platform. This includes the per-
mission model, the approach for storing incident data
as well as the chosen blockchain platform.
Permission Model: Blockchain frameworks can
be categorized as permissioned or permissionless, de-
pending on whether the validators must be authenti-
cated or not. Thus, we first choose a suitable permis-
sioning model for our sharing concept. Permissioned
blockchains are attractive due to increased control of
the platform by its operators, the independence from
public blockchains and zero transaction fees. However,
the operation of a Permissioned Blockchain requires
that the infrastructure is operated by the participants
themselves. This results in high initial costs, while
availability is only guaranteed by a limited number of
blockchain nodes. It is also still unclear how digital to-
kens can be created and exchanged for fiat currency
in a permissioned setting. In a permissionless setting,
the blockchain nodes and infrastructure are already
available, but fees must be paid to the maintainers of
the platform. Public blockchains usually provide a high
number of distributed nodes that guarantee high avail-
ability, while token distribution can be handled trans-
parently using existing exchanges. Since high availabil-
ity and incentives for participants are essential aspects
of our concept, we choose a permissionless blockchain
approach for our concept.
Blockchain Platform: Commonly, researchers use
Ethereum for permissionless blockchain application
prototypes due to its good tool support and large de-
veloper community [15]. Although the design can also
be implemented with other permissionless blockchain
systems, we choose the EOS blockchain5. First and
foremost, EOS does not charge users transaction costs.
Transaction allowances are determined based on staked
EOS tokens, thus lowering the long-term cost of using
the platform. In addition, EOS provides more scala-
bility regarding transaction throughput (up to 8,000
transactions/second compared 15 transactions/second
for Ethereum [16,17]).
Data Storage: Due to high costs associated with
smart contract data storage, larger data items are com-
monly stored off-chain in blockchain applications [18].
One way of trading data using blockchain is settling
the trade on-chain and trading the actual data off-
chain [11]. This avoids the need for another storage
platform besides the blockchain. However, it also re-
quires the seller to re-upload data to every buyer, which
means that both seller and buyer need to be online at
5 https://eos.io
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Fig. 4 IPFS off-chain storage folder hierarchy (for each user).
the same time. A decentralized off-chain storage plat-
form avoids this issue. To ensure an integrity link be-
tween the blockchain network and the off-chain store,
the database should be content-addressable. Since only
encrypted information is stored off-chain, access control
is not required. Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) pro-
vide these properties: they offer public, distributed and
content-addressable key-value data storage. We opted
for IPFS6 as the DHT implementation in the proto-
type. IPFS is widely used in research as an off-chain
storage solution, and it provides the features needed
for sharing CTI data and encryption keys.
One of these features is a fixed address for each
peer for sharing dynamic content (referred to as IPNS
address). In the DEALER prototype, each seller and
buyer operates a IPFS node. The node’s IPNS address
is based on the hash of the peer’s public key and can
only be updated with a signed update from that peer.
We exploit this functionality to statically address each
user’s shared incidents and decryption keys. We lever-
age the IPFS Mutable File System to create a local
folder hierarchy corresponding to the files we intend to
share (see Figure 4). The root hash of this folder hi-
erarchy changes every time an item or key is added to
a folder. Each time that happens, the updated hash is
published to the peer’s IPNS address. Other peers can
resolve this address to retrieve the latest incidents and
keys shared by other users. By pinning content hashes,
verifiers permanently replicate the encrypted incident
shared by the seller to ensure its availability. Verifiers
are incentivized to replicate seller content, since they
potentially profit from each sale in case of a dispute
(see Section 4.5).
5.2 Architecture and data model
As shown in Figure 1, the prototype architecture
consists of a smart contract on the EOS blockchain
platform and IPFS based decentralized storage. The
blockchain platform provides executable smart con-
tracts that implement the Platform role in the processes
6 https://ipfs.io
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on the DEALER platform.
described in Section 4. IPFS provides storage capabil-
ities for reported incident data and encryption keys.
It also provides pseudonymous identity: Participants
sign up with blockchain accounts, which are autho-
rized through public-private key pairs and represented
by unique addresses. Figure 5 gives an overview of the
platform’s data model.
The model shows a distinction between on-chain
and off-chain storage. The on-chain storage manages
transaction information and metadata including assign-
ments of users (User), reports (ItemMetadata), votes
Assignment and purchases (Order) of incident data.
The off-chain storage holds the actual incident data
(ItemContent) as well as the encrypted decryption keys
for the information (ItemKey). The ItemMetadata ta-
ble contains the reported incidents’ metadata, including
a short description, the originating industry, the price
and a reference to the reporting user. ItemMetadata
also contains the CTI item’s hash, which links the meta-
data to the full incident data ItemContent stored off-
chain. Using the hash reference, data can be retrieved
from IPFS through a DHT lookup and verification of
the retrieved file against its hash reference. The assign-
ment of randomly selected verifiers is done using the
Assignment table by establishing a link between the
verifying user and the respective item. This table also
stores the results of item verification, while cumulative
results of verification and rating processes are stored in
the ItemMetadata table. The assignment table is ad-
ditionally linked to the Complaint table, which stores
complaints about inaccurate verifications. The Order
table finally contains the transactions associated to an
order, where a transaction establishes the relationship
between the buyer and the seller, as well as the item
concerned. Besides storing report items, the applica-
tion also allows the issuance of warnings. These can be
inserted by authorities as a specific type of user and
stored in the table Warning on chain.
5.3 Application Prototype
The prototypical implementation of the platform con-
sists of three major components: the smart contract on
the EOS blockchain based on EOS C++ code, the IPFS
data storage and a DApp (Decentralized Application)
front end based on Node.JS. Since Smart Contract and
data storage were already described previously, this sec-
tion focuses on the implementation of the DApp. Fig-
ure 6 shows the user-interface of the DApp, which is
explained in more detail in the following.
The application’s user interface offers four funda-
mental areas tailored to each participant type. The area
BUY allows potential buyers to get an overview of of-
fers on the platform and to buy and download available
incident information. The overview contains a short de-
scription of the incident information as well as its cur-
rent verification status and price. Buyers can also man-
age past purchases and re-download previously bought
information at any time. The area SELL, allows sellers
to report an incident to the blockchain. Such a report
can contain a title, a short description, the correspond-
ing industry sector, the actual incident data and a sale
price. Incidents are encrypted using AES-256-CBC be-
fore being uploaded to IPFS. After the DHT upload,
the hash reference and metadata are submitted to the
smart contract. If the incident was intended for sale,
RSA-encrypted copies of the AES symmetric keys are
shared with the verifiers using their public keys stored
on the blockchain. Besides reporting, sellers can man-
age past reports and view the verification status and
number of their successful sales.
The VERIFY section allows the user to act as a
verifier for an incident. The verifier is presented with a
list of all incidents assigned for verification. For each in-
dividual incident, the verifier is presented with a wizard
as shown in Figure 7. The wizard sequentially requests
input for the quality criteria defined in Section 4.3.
The verification results are arithmetically averaged af-
ter submission and sent to the platform in a blockchain
transaction. Although the prototypical application al-
lows a weighting of the individual quality criteria, this
was not implemented within the demonstration proto-
type for reasons of clarity.
Finally, the area WARNING allows authorities to
issue warnings on current threats to platform partici-
pants. Warnings contain informational text and struc-
tured incident information for particularly dangerous
threats.
The source code for the prototype can be down-
loaded at the project repository7. A live version of the
7 https://github.com/Dealer-Platform/
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Fig. 6 Prototypical implementation of the DEALER platform.
Fig. 7 DEALER verification wizard.
DApp is available online8, and the deployed EOS con-
tract can be inspected on the EOS Kylin testnet9.
8 https://dingfest.ur.de/dealer/
9 https://kylin.bloks.io/account/eosdealeradm
6 Evaluation
After presenting the prototype design, we now eval-
uate whether the chosen blockchain platform fits the
needs of threat intelligence reporting. Since EOS sup-
ports > 1000 transactions per second [17], we do not
expect throughput to become a bottleneck. However,
there are costs associated with transacting on a public
blockchain, which should be evaluated in more detail.
Smart contracts on EOS require CPU, NET and
RAM to execute. CPU and NET represent the process-
ing and network utilization of transactions and are ac-
quired by staking EOS for a fixed time. RAM is needed
to store data in the smart contract state and is pur-
chased at a fixed price. To calculate the required stake
per user to run the contract sustainably, we evaluate
the resources consumed by our smart contract in Table
1. Transactions were run multiple times with differing
parameters on the EOS Kylin testnet. For CPU/NET,
the values represent locked currency, i.e. to share one
incident per day, EOS worth 0.2e must be staked per-
manently. For RAM, the costs cumulate with each exe-
cuted action and are thus much higher. For this reason
we now focus on RAM costs.
In the following we estimate the costs of the plat-
form based on a real-world example. Therefore, we as-
sume that the platform will be used for the reporting
obligations of critical infrastructures in Germany. Ac-
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Table 1 Resources consumed by the EOS smart contract. EOS price: 2.00e,
RAM price: 0.058 EOS/kb, CPU cost: 0.05 EOS/ms, NET cost: 0.001 EOS/kb
Action CPU (stake) NET (stake) RAM (purchase)
Sharing 1.76 ms, 0.201e 0.256 kb, 0.0005e 0.755 kb, 0.088e
Verification 0.58 ms, 0.067e 0.120 kb, 0.0002e 0.000 kb, 0.000e
Purchase 1.07 ms, 0.065e 0.112 kb, 0.0002e 0.153 kb, 0.018e
Warning 0.74 ms, 0.084e 1.71 kb, 0.0034e 1.896 kb, 0.221e
cording to the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI), it is estimated that around 250 reports are car-
ried out annually in 9 industry sectors [19]. The EOS
RAM needed to store 250 incidents costs 22e per year
at the current conversion rate. The verifications do not
cost any RAM since they only modify storage entries
and don’t add data.
We assume that participating companies are partic-
ularly interested in information from their sector (on
average 28 reports per sector). According to the BSI,
1648 institutions in Germany are currently affected by
the reporting obligation [19]. We thus estimate about
1,648 * 28 = 46,144 purchases to be made in ongoing
operations (823e). Additionally, we assume that au-
thorities may issue warnings about once a month (3e).
In summary, we expect a total RAM cost of 848e to
store all platform interactions occurring in one year.
This is quite a feasible amount, considering that it cov-
ers more than a thousand institutions.
7 Discussion
In this Section the results of this work are discussed. For
this purpose, Section 7.1 reviews the previously defined
requirements and compares them to the actual results
achieved in the prototype. Subsequently, we discuss se-
curity concerns for the platform in Section 7.2.
7.1 Requirements
Reporting Requirements. At the beginning of this
work, Section 3 defined various requirements for a plat-
form that simultaneously complies with legal require-
ments and offers incentives for the exchange of CTI
information. Specifically, the integrity and availability
of data as well as the non-repudiation of reports were
defined as target values for compliance with legal re-
quirements. The decentralized blockchain technology
used provides the necessary basic conditions to build
a platform that is compliant with these requirements.
One of the most important features of a blockchain is
the assurance of data integrity using the decentralized
ledger technology. Our solution assures integrity by in-
cluding a hash of the data on-chain. Due to the EOS
blockchain’s immutability, this hash can be traced back
to the original upload transaction and authenticated
with the sender’s signature.
Furthermore, blockchains also offer a very high
availability of the network nodes as pointed out by We-
ber et al. [20]. The main restriction of blockchain sys-
tems pointed out in their work is the restricted write-
access availability. However, this is mainly the result
of the low number of possible transactions per second
of the considered blockchains Ethereum and Bitcoin.
Since the EOS blockchain exceeds the possible transac-
tions per second of these networks by orders of magni-
tude [17], restrictions of write availability are unlikely.
It should also be emphasized that the EOS network is
distributed over the entire globe 10, which makes the
availability of the network relatively independent of lo-
cal events.
In the presented prototype, metadata of each
reported security incident is stored on the EOS
blockchain in a publicly accessible manner. In order to
establish a reference for non-repudiation, a timestamp
is included in the incident metadata, which proves the
report’s existence. A reference to the reporting EOS
wallet is included to link the report to the reporter’s
EOS wallet. The full incident data is stored on the
IPFS DHT and replicated by the incident’s seller and
verifiers, ensuring availability of off-chain data through
sufficient redundancy.
In addition to this, the prototype also provides the
necessary tools to protect personal data within reports
according to legislations such as the GDPR. To achieve
this, the exchanged information is processed in an en-
crypted form on the platform. Each data flow is ad-
dressed to an explicit recipient and protected with the
corresponding public key. This ensures that only the re-
ceiving authority can view the reported information. In
the case of an exchange on the marketplace, the data
is also encrypted and assigned to a buyer and verifier
as specific recipients. However, since the data is trans-
ferred to different recipients, the mere assignment to
the recipient is not sufficient for information and pri-
10 https://glass.cypherglass.com/map/main/top50
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vacy protection. According to this, the offering com-
pany must decide here which data may be passed on to
recipients. Both the interests of the company and the
legal situation must be taken into account.
Incentives. At the same time, it was shown above
that incentives are a necessary condition for an active
exchange between the parties involved. In order to be
able to implement such incentive procedures, a market-
place was created within the platform for the mutual ex-
change of CTI information. Participants can offer their
incident information at the marketplace in return for
payment. This gives them the ability to compensate
costs incurred in the detection and recording process
and thus provides a financial incentive to participate in
the platform. Another focus of the platform is to en-
sure sustainability of the implemented incentive struc-
ture. Verifiers ensure the data quality of the traded CTI
information as well as functions that guarantee trans-
actional fairness for both buyer and seller. Verifiers and
sellers are incentivized to host incident data on IPFS
since they profit from incident sales.
Advantages over traditional CTI sharing
platforms. Overall, it can be concluded that the plat-
form for the exchange of CTI information presented in
this work offers several specific advantages over existing
CTI sharing platforms. Traditional systems usually rely
on trust in a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to implement
the data protection goals. In contrast to this, the decen-
tralized DEALER system guarantees these protection
goals without the need for a specific trust relationship.
The availability of the platform is distributed among
different independent actors and no central actor is re-
quired for integrity proofs. Moreover, the implemented
marketplace for the exchange of information is likewise
not dependent on the trustworthiness of actors. Within
the implemented smart contract, the sales process as
well as the selection of verifiers is predefined and trans-
parent for all participants.
7.2 Security
Free-riding verifiers. An important consideration is
prevention of free-riding verifiers. Every verifier period-
ically receives free access to a randomly selected inci-
dent. As a result, verifiers should be punished if they
do not perform verification as requested. If a verifier
repeatedly fails to verify assigned incidents in active
status, other verifiers may start a multisignature vote
for verifier removal. This should encourage verifiers to
only remain active when they intend to verify, to avoid
losing their verifier status.
Content reselling. Reselling information is a com-
mon concern for data marketplaces [11]. On our plat-
form, the hash of the shared incident data is stored on
the blockchain and thus the identity of the original au-
thor can be clearly established through the timestamp
and the signing public key of the transaction. While
uploading duplicate hashes is prevented by the smart
contract, resellers can slightly modify the incident to
change its hash. However, in the long run the similarity
checks introduced in Section 4.3 should help recognize
duplicates. If a duplicate is recognized, verifiers may
submit a low rating. Similarly, buyers are likely to no-
tice that they received a duplicate and rate the incident
poorly, leading to a decreasing rating. This should dis-
courage potential buyers and lead to decreasing profits
from reselling attempts.
Sybil attacks. Sybil attacks involve attackers be-
ing able to create new identities cheaply to manipulate
the application. They can be mitigated by introducing
nontrivial barriers to entry. On the DEALER platform,
this threat mainly applies to sellers and verifiers. Sybil
sellers could flood the platform with incidents to over-
whelm verifiers. Sybil verifiers could dilute the quality
assurance verifiers are supposed to provide. Therefore,
as established in Section 4.1, both sellers and verifiers
need to deposit cryptocurrency to create an account.
Verifiers additionally need to establish their organiza-
tional affiliation on registration. These measures should
deter any attempt at Sybil attacks.
Incident confidentiality. A compromise of the
RSA or AES encryption schemes may void the con-
fidentiality of incidents stored on IPFS. In that case
we assume there is sufficient advance notice for sellers
to re-encrypt their incidents with a another unbroken
encryption scheme. Sellers and verifiers are then incen-
tivized to stop hosting compromised incidents on IPFS,
since they no longer profit from sales if anybody can de-
crypt the incidents without purchase.
Verifier collusion. The platform requires a mini-
mum number of verifiers to ensure their assignment is
sufficiently random to deter collusion. If assignment is
not random, sellers may collude with verifiers to ensure
incident verification. Alternatively, a pair of verifiers
Fig. 8 A pair of verifiers is assigned to the same incident
every m incidents, given n verifiers.
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may collude during dispute resolution. The binomial
coefficient determines the probability of assigning two
verifiers to the same incident (n is the number of veri-
fiers, and k = 2):
(
n
k
)
=
n!
k!(n− k)!
As shown in Figure 8, with 15 verifiers the probabil-
ity is < 1%, while with 50 verifiers it is < 0.1%. Hereby
we determine 15 verifiers as a safe minimum number
of verifiers to safely operate the platform. Since veri-
fiers may be temporarily inactive, a higher number is
preferable in practice. With an expected amount of 250
reports annually (see Section 6), each pair of verifiers
shares only 2-3 incidents per year, which provides little
incentive for collusion.
8 Conclusion
In this work we presented a fully decentralized model
for sharing CTI. It is designed with legal and privacy re-
quirements in mind and ensures sustainable sharing us-
ing cryptocurrency-based incentives. We implemented
the DEALER platform based on the EOS blockchain
and IPFS DHT and demonstrated its practical feasi-
bility. On the platform, structured incident informa-
tion is exchanged pseudonymously. Randomly selected
verifiers use a set of objective CTI quality indicators
to bootstrap incident reputation and help buyers se-
lect fitting incidents. Buyers and sellers are protected
through dispute resolution mechanisms and exchange
items based on cryptocurrency incentives.
Beyond our model and prototypical implementa-
tion, future work should conduct an in-depth security
analysis considering possible attacks and their mitiga-
tions. Additionally, integration with existing incident
discovery, reporting and visualization systems is essen-
tial to the platform’s practical viability. For example,
the incident information currently available in plain-
text could be enriched by a visualization system such
as the one presented by Bo¨hm et al. [21]. Based on
such integrations, the platform can be deployed on the
public EOS blockchain and tested with a larger num-
ber of users. In this scenario, price discovery mecha-
nisms and their relationship to incident data quality
can be analyzed. While our infrastructure is developed
with privacy in mind, future work should ensure privacy
and compliance with legal requirements (i.e. GDPR) in
practice.
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